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Theses
•	 The	Ukrainian	oligarchic	system	developed	into	its	ultimate	shape	during	
Leonid	 Kuchma’s	 presidency	 (1994–2004).	 Although	 this	 system	 has	 un-
dergone	some	form	of	evolution,	it	appears	to	be	very	durable.	Oligarchic	
clans	emerged	in	the	mid	1990s	and	would	gain	a	dominant	influence	on	
the	country’s	political	life	over	the	course	of	a	few	years.	The	Orange	Revo-
lution	triggered	a	reshuffle	among	the	oligarchs,	but	the	system	itself	has	
remained	unaltered.	Representatives	of	big	business	 still	have	a	decisive	
impact	on	the	politics	and	economy	of	Ukraine.	
•	 Big	business	not	only	controls	entire	sectors	of	the	Ukrainian	economy	and	
the	electronic	mass	media—it	also	has	a	vast	influence	within	political	par-
ties.	 It	 is	often	the	case	that	the	overriding	goal	of	a	given	grouping’s	ex-
istence	is	to	represent	the	oligarchs	who	sponsor	it.	A	network	of	mutual	
connections	exists	between	politicians	and	oligarchs.	In	some	cases	these	
connections	are	so	durable	that	it	is	fair	to	say	that	oligarchic	groups	have	
been	formed	(consisting	of	businessmen,	politicians	and	state	officials	who	
support	each	other).	Representatives	of	big	business	are	often	much	more	
important	 players	 on	 the	 Ukrainian	 political	 scene	 than	 the	 politicians	
themselves.	One	may	risk	stating	that	it	is	the	interplay	of	the	interests	of	
the	oligarchs	that	is	the	real	mechanism	which	shapes	Ukrainian	politics.	
When	giving	their	support	for	a	given	political	grouping,	representatives	of	
big	business	are	guided	by	nothing	more	than	their	own	interests,	and	they	
do	not	identify	themselves	with	the	views	of	the	political	parties	and	politi-
cians	they	are	offering	financial	support	to.	 If	 the	political	configuration	
changes,	the	oligarchs	usually	have	no	problems	finding	common	ground	
with	the	new	government.	
•	 Although	 the	oligarchic	 system	does	have	 some	positive	 elements	 (for	
example,	 it	 contributes	 to	pluralism	 in	political	 life	and	 the	media),	 it	
needs	to	be	stated	that	the	overall	influence	of	Ukrainian	big	business	
is	harmful	and	hinders	the	country’s	development	in	both	political	and	
economic	 terms.	 The	monopolisation	 of	 the	 key	 economic	 sectors	 has	
constrained	 competition	 and	 is	 one	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 unfavourable	
investment	climate	in	Ukraine.	The	dependence	of	most	political	forces	
on	big	business	means	that	the	government	in	many	cases	is	guided	by	
the	interests	of	the	oligarchs	who	are	sponsoring	it	instead	of	the	inter-
ests	of	their	country;	this	often	leads	to	multi-billion	dollar	losses	in	the	
Ukrainian	state	budget.	
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•	 The	influence	of	the	oligarchs	on	Ukraine’s	foreign	policy	is	limited	when	
compared	to	economic	or	 internal	policy.	They	do	not	seem	to	have	a	co-
herent	strategy	in	external	relations,	but	their	actions	resulting	from	their	
individual	interests	often	have	a	significant	impact	on	Ukraine’s	behaviour	
on	the	international	arena.	Sometimes	their	influence	serves	the	Ukrain-
ian	national	 interest.	However,	where	 the	 interests	of	big	business	come	
into	conflict	with	the	interests	of	the	state,	oligarchs	lobby	(often	success-
fully)	for	their	own	benefit.	
•	 In	some	sectors	(primarily	metallurgy),	representatives	of	big	business	are	
the	main	barrier	to	Russian	capital	expansion	in	Ukraine.	Russian	business	
is	their	key	competitor	on	foreign	markets.	However,	oligarchs	are	some-
times	forced	by	the	circumstances	to	sell	their	businesses,	and	Russian	in-
vestors	are	often	the	only	prospective	buyers	in	such	cases.	Given	the	high	
degree	of	ownership	concentration	in	the	hands	of	relatively	few	oligarchs,	
it	 is	 very	 likely	 that	Russia	would	 take	 control	 of	 a	number	of	Ukraine’s	
strategic	companies	should	an	emergency	situation	arise	(for	example,	the	
second	wave	of	the	economic	crisis).	
•	 When	 Viktor	 Yanukovych	 won	 the	 presidential	 election	 in	 2010,	 repre-
sentatives	of	one	political	grouping,	the	Party	of	Regions,	gained	strength	
to	an	extent	unseen	so	 far	 in	Ukraine’s	history,	and	completely	monopo-
lised	political	power	in	the	country.	The	coalition	partners	of	the	Party	of	
Regions	 and	opposition	groupings	have	been	marginalised	 to	 a	 large	 ex-
tent.	The	network	of	the	groups	of	influence	which	emerged	after	the	Party	
of	Regions	took	power	has	remained	essentially	unchanged	over	the	past	
two	years.	The	government	and	the	presidential	administration	have	been	
divided	between	the	RUE	Group	and	the	‘Donetsk	clan’,	currently	the	two	
strongest	groups.	
•	 The	emerging	business	of	‘the	family’	–	this	term	is	used	to	refer	to	the	peo-
ple	who	are	directly	linked	to	President	Viktor	Yanukovych	and	his	sons	–	
is	a	new	phenomenon.	The	political	and	economic	expansion	of	‘the	family’	
began	 shortly	 after	Yanukovych	 took	office	as	president	of	Ukraine,	 and	
gained	momentum	in	2011	and	in	early	2012.	Although	Yanukovych’s	politi-
cal	power	is	stronger	than	that	of	any	other	president	in	Ukraine’s	history,	
the	financial	strength	of	‘the	family’	is	still	limited.	
•	 A	further	strengthening	of	‘the	family’s’	position	in	business	at	the	expense	
of	other	oligarchic	groups	is	very	likely	to	bring	about	a	conflict	between	
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Yanukovych	and	most	representatives	of	big	business.	The	consequences	of	
this	are	difficult	to	predict.	The	concentration	of	huge	political	power	in	the	
hands	of	Yanukovych	has	already	given	rise	to	concern	among	oligarchs,	
including	those	who	have	so	far	formed	his	political	base.	
•	 It	seems	quite	unlikely	that	a	system	resembling	the	Russian	model,	where	
big	business	 is	 subordinate	 to	 the	 government,	will	 be	 created.	Yanuko-
vych’s	main	weaknesses	are	the	limited	number	of	people	who	he	can	see	
as	 unconditionally	 loyal	 to	 him	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 other	 oligarchic	
groups.	It	seems	that	the	most	 likely	scenario	for	the	development	of	the	
situation	 in	 the	next	 few	years	 (at	 least	until	 the	presidential	election	 in	
2015)	will	be	the	development	of	a	compromise	between	the	oligarchs	and	
President	Yanukovych.	 If	 this	 is	 the	case,	 ‘the	 family’	would	gain	an	 im-
portant	but	not	dominant	position	in	the	model	of	power	and	business	in	
Ukraine.	
•	 The	political	influence	of	those	oligarchic	groups	which	are	not	linked	to	
the	governing	Party	of	Regions	has	lessened	significantly	since	2010.	How-
ever,	this	has	not	led	to	any	major	ownership	changes	so	far.	Other	groups	
have	managed	 to	 keep	 their	 assets,	 although	 the	 government	 has	 taken	
some	action	aimed	against	their	representatives.	However,	financial	sup-
port	from	big	business	for	opposition	political	parties	has	either	ceased	or	
been	significantly	reduced.	
8O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
12
Main sectors of business activity of the key Ukrainian oligarchs
Rinat Akhmetov
Metallurgy,	media,	banking,	transport,	conventional	
power	engineering,	insurance,	retail	trade
Ihor Kolomoyskyi and 
henadiy Boholyubov  
(Privat Group)
Banking,	media,	metallurgy,	oil	sector,	chemical	
industry,	air	transport
Dmytro Firtash Chemical	industry,	gas	sector,	banking,	titanium	
industry
Viktor Pinchuk Metallurgy,	media
serhiy Tihipko Financial	sector,	machine-building	industry
Kostyantin Zhevago Metallurgy,	machine-building	industry,	banking
Vadym Novinsky Metallurgy,	machine-building	industry,	shipbuild-
ing	industry,	agriculture
Oleh Bakhmatyuk Agriculture,	food	industry
Andriy and serhiy Klyuyev Metallurgy,	machine-building	industry,	renewable	
power	engineering
serhiy Taruta Metallurgy,	media
Petro Poroshenko Food	industry,	automobile	industry,	media
Borys Kolesnikov Food	industry	
Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi Media	
Tariel Vasadze Automobile	industry,	insurance	
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INTRODUcTION
The	oligarchic	system,	i.e.	a	system	based	on	links	between	the	newly	formed	
big	business	and	the	political	class,	emerged	several	years	after	Ukraine	re-
gained	 independence	 in	 1991.	 Although	 a	 similar	 phenomenon	 has	 also	 de-
veloped	in	other	former	Soviet	republics,	first	of	all	in	Russia,	big	business	at	
present	does	not	have	such	a	strong	influence	on	politics	in	any	other	Eastern	
European	country	as	it	does	in	Ukraine.	
Representatives	 of	 big	 business	 in	Ukraine,	 as	 in	 Russia,	 are	 commonly	 re-
ferred	to	as	oligarchs1.	
The	oligarchic	system,	which	took	its	final	form	during	Leonid	Kuchma’s	second	
term	in	office	as	president	(1999–2004),	turned	out	to	be	a	durable	phenomenon.	
The	nature	of	the	close	links	between	the	government	and	the	oligarchs	has	not	
undergone	any	major	changes	either	as	a	consequence	of	the	Orange	Revolution	
in	2004	or	following	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	victory	in	the	presidential	election	in	
2010.	Although	certain	reshuffles	inside	the	political	and	business	elites	have	al-
ready	taken	place	and	will	happen	in	the	future,	it	seems	unlikely	that	anything	
will	be	able	to	change	this	system,	at	least	in	the	medium	term.	
This	text	is	aimed	at	presenting	the	network	of	connections	existing	between	
big	business	and	politics	in	Ukraine	and	at	pointing	to	the	key	oligarchic	groups	
and	the	political	forces	they	support.	A	definite	majority	of	papers	concerning	
contemporary	Ukrainian	politics	as	a	rule	disregard	or	deal	with	this	subject	
very	 superficially,	while	 it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine 
without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the 
political and business elites there. 
Each	Ukrainian	oligarch	has	a	different	influence,	which	is	not	always	propor-
tionate	to	the	value	of	their	assets.	The	influence	of	some	businessmen	is	limited	
to	protecting	their	own	interests	within	the	sector	of	the	economy	in	which	they	
operate.	Others	have	a	much	broader	impact	and	this	can	be	sensed	across	the	
entire	country.	This	paper	 is	 focused	on	 those	representatives	of	big	business	
who	have	a	major	influence	on	both	the	domestic	and	foreign	policy	of	Ukraine.	
1	 The	term	‘oligarchy’	as	a	definition	for	business	was	coined	in	Russia,	and	was	popularised	
by	Olga	Kryshtanovskaya,	a	sociologist	from	the	Russian	Academy	of	Sciences,	in	the	mid	
1990s.	Oligarchs	are	representatives	of	big	business	who	are	able	to	influence	the	politics	of	
a	country	for	their	own	benefit	owing	to	their	assets.	
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This	text	has	been	divided	into	two	parts.	The	general	part	outlines	a	brief	his-
tory	of	the	oligarchic	system’s	formation	in	the	1990s,	its	development	before	
and	after	the	Orange	Revolution	and	during	the	rule	of	President	Yanukovych.	
One	chapter	is	devoted	to	the	impact	the	oligarchs	have	on	Ukraine’s	foreign	
policy.	An	attempt	to	provide	an	evaluation	of	the	impact	of	big	business	on	the	
country’s	development	and	the	possible	ways	the	oligarchic	system	may	devel-
op	in	the	future	have	also	been	presented.	Some	issues	which	deserve	special	
attention	have	been	discussed	in	separate	frames.	
The	second	part	contains	a	description	of	 the	key	groups	and	 individual	oli-
garchs	in	Ukraine:	brief	biographies	of	individual	representatives	of	big	busi-
ness	and	the	specifications	of	their	assets.
This	is	not	a	historical	work.	The	chapter	concerning	the	emergence	and	the	
initial	development	of	the	oligarchic	system	in	the	1990s	was	made	brief	for	
a	purpose.	It	seems	that	there	is	no	need	to	mention	all	the	oligarchic	groups	
existing	at	that	time,	except	for	the	most	important	ones	and	those	which	still	
have	a	say	in	politics	today.	The	processes	and	the	key	groups	of	influence	ex-
isting	within	the	timeframe	from	the	Orange	Revolution	to	Viktor	Yanukovy-
ch’s	victory	in	the	presidential	election	in	2010	are	described	in	more	detail.	
The	period	to	which	most	attention	has	been	paid	is	Yanukovych’s	presidency,	
i.e.	modern	Ukraine.	The	oligarchic	system	is	a	very	extensive	topic,	so	some	
issues	have	not	been	 tackled	at	 all	 (for	 example,	 the	 roles	played	by	 certain	
oligarchs	in	certain	regions).	Some	issues	have	been	outlined	in	a	general	way,	
such	as	ownership	changes	among	the	oligarchs	in	the	1990s	and	after	the	Or-
ange	Revolution.	One	exception	is	the	period	since	2010,	which	has	been	dis-
cussed	in	more	detail.	
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ReseRVATIONs
•	 This	work	is	based	on	commonly	available	materials	(mainly	on	the	Inter-
net).	Considering	the	fact	that	publication	of	sponsored	texts	–	which	are	
often	aimed	at	discrediting	political	opponents	and	business	competitors	
–	 is	widespread	 in	 the	Ukrainian	media,	despite	 the	author’s	best	efforts	
and	critical	approach,	in	many	cases	it	has	been	difficult	to	verify	the	cred-
ibility	of	the	facts	presented	below.	
•	 It	is	often	impossible	to	clearly	assess	the	assets	owned	by	individual	oli-
garchs,	and	percentage	differences	between	the	data	published	in	various	
rankings	of	Ukraine’s	richest	people	reach	double	digits.	This	is	due	to	the	
problems	with	assessing	 the	value	of	particular	assets	owned	by	 the	oli-
garchs	(for	more	on	this	issue,	see	the	supplement	‘Oligarchs	in	figures’).	
•	 In	some	cases,	and	these	are	not	rare,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	the	owner	
of	a	given	company	In	other	cases	the	ownership	structure	is	quite	trans-
parent	 and	does	not	 give	 rise	 to	 any	 serious	doubts.	The	 latter	 concerns	
for	example	the	corporation	System	Capital	Management	(SCM),	in	which	
Rinat	Akhmetov’s	assets	are	concentrated,	and	Viktor	Pinchuk’s	Interpipe	
and	Starlight	Media.	Sometimes	the	ownership	structure	is	transparent,	as	
is	the	case	with	Group	DF,	which	includes	the	key	assets	of	Dmytro	Firtash,	
but	its	owner’s	self-reliance	seems	dubious.	There	are	also	cases	where	the	
structure	 is	 extremely	 tangled	and	 impossible	 to	 follow.	One	example	of	
this	is	Privat	Group,	which	does	not	exist	as	a	single	legal	entity,	and	it	is	
not	certain	whether	 the	numerous	companies	which	are	associated	with	
this	group	are	really	controlled	by	it.	In	some	cases	the	real	owner	of	the	
business	or	company	can	be	a	different	person	than	the	one	specified	in	the	
register	as	the	formal	shareholder.	This	in	particular	concerns	‘the	family’,	
i.e.	the	group	linked	directly	to	President	Yanukovych	and	also	to	his	son,	
Oleksandr,	and	the	businessman	Yuriy	Ivanyushchenko.	
•	 The	part	of	the	report	which	carries	the	highest	risk	of	inaccuracy	is	the	
one	describing	the	period	after	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	victory	in	the	presi-
dential	election,	especially	in	those	parts	which	refer	to	business	activities	
linked	to	‘the	family’.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	no	doubt	that	Yanukovych	
has	been	taking	actions	to	strengthen	his	 immediate	political	and	finan-
cial	base,	which	has	been	proven	by	a	number	of	nominations	he	has	made	
within	 the	 past	 two	 years.	However,	 the	 available	materials	 concerning	
this	issue	are	mostly	speculative	and	not	completely	trustworthy.	
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•	 The	division	into	clans	and	oligarchic	groups	is	to	a	certain	extent	a	mat-
ter	of	convention,	which	is	especially	true	about	the	recent	period,	during	
which	the	changes	related	to	the	expansion	of	‘the	family’	linked	to	Yanu-
kovych	have	been	taking	place	quite	rapidly.	In	some	cases,	as	with	the	co-
operation	between	Akhmetov	and	Vadym	Novinsky	as	part	of	MetInvest,	
the	business	connections	are	clear	and	durable.	However,	the	connections	
existing	between	individual	politicians	and	officials	and	certain	oligarchs	
are	often	limited.	Financial	support	accepted	by	a	given	politician	does	not	
always	necessarily	mean	that	this	politician	is	a	puppet	in	the	hands	of	the	
businessman.	Despite	these	reservations,	the	division	into	groups	is	useful	
and	has	been	preserved	in	this	text.	
•	 Furthermore,	in	some	cases	the	hierarchy	within	a	given	group	is	difficult	
to	determine.	This	is	especially	problematic	when	attempts	to	analyse	the	
dependencies	inside	the	RUE	group	are	made,	where	completely	contradic-
tory	 interpretations	of	relations	existing	between	Dmytro	Firtash,	Yuriy	
Boyko	and	Serhiy	Lyovochkin	can	be	made	and	seem	reasonable.	
•	 Many	actors	present	on	the	Ukrainian	political	scene	are	difficult	to	classify	
firmly	as	either	politicians	or	businessmen.	For	example,	Andriy	Klyuyev,	
the	secretary	of	the	National	Security	and	Defence	Council	of	Ukraine,	who	
was	until	recently	first	deputy	prime	minister,	or	Borys	Kolesnikov,	deputy	
prime	minister	and	minister	 for	 infrastructure	–	 they	own	considerable	
fortunes	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 hold	 prominent	 functions	 in	 the	 govern-
ment.	 In	other	cases,	 the	 fortunes	of	politicians	or	state	officials	are	 for-
mally	registered	as	being	owned	by	members	of	their	families.
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I. The eMeRGeNce OF The OlIGARchIc sysTeM  
AND ITs FORM IN 1991–2004 
1. The genesis of the oligarchic system
The	oligarchic	 system	 in	Ukraine	began	 to	be	 formed	 immediately	after	 the	
collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	but	it	was	finally	established	firmly	in	the	second	
half	of	the	1990s,	during	the	presidency	of	Leonid	Kuchma.	For	this	reason	he	
is	often	referred	to	as	the	founding	father	of	this	system.	It	was	already	in	the	
last	years	of	the	existence	of	the	USSR,	after	perestroika	began,	that	members	of	
the	Communist	nomenklatura	started	amassing	capital.	When	Ukraine	gained	
independence,	this	capital	enabled	them	to	purchase	industrial	plants	at	low	
prices	as	part	of	privatisation.	The	first	business	groups	(usually	branded	as	
clans)	began	 to	emerge	during	 the	period	of	 the	 country’s	political	 and	eco-
nomic	transformation.	The	factor	which	united	these	groups	was	either	com-
mon	territory	or	a	common	sector	 in	which	 they	operated	 (for	example,	 the	
gas	sector	or	metallurgy).	The	mutual	dependence	between	representatives	of	
business	and	politics	was	formed	at	the	same	time.	Members	of	the	state	appa-
ratus	derived	benefits	from	the	support	offered	by	businessmen,	and	in	return	
they	made	possible	or	at	least	turned	a	blind	eye	to	widespread	violations	of	the	
law	in	the	process	of	privatisation	and	doing	business.	The	relations	between	
representatives	of	business	and	politics	also	overlapped	with	 the	close	 links	
of	both	of	these	groups	with	the	criminal	underworld.	The	bitter	struggle	for	
influence	in	the	mid	1990s	resulted	in	a	number	of	infamous	murders	of	state	
officials	(for	example,	of	Vadym	Hetman,	a	former	head	of	the	National	Bank	
of	Ukraine),	well-known	businessmen	(for	example,	Yevhen	Shcherban)	and	
mafia	bosses	(Akhat	Bragin).	
2. The formation of the clans
Kuchma’s	rise	to	power	in	1994	and	–	more	importantly	–	the	adoption	of	the	
constitution	which	set	up	the	presidential	system	in	Ukraine	made	it	possible	
to	organise	 the	system	of	mutual	dependence	between	politics	and	business	
which	had	already	been	forming.	Clans	based	on	regional	industry,	which	is	
distributed	 disproportionately	 across	 the	 country,	 were	 established	 during	
the	first	term	of	Leonid	Kuchma.	Large	heavy	industry	plants	are	concentrat-
ed	predominantly	in	the	two	eastern	regions,	the	Donets	Basin	(the	Donetsk	
and	Luhansk	Oblasts)	and	the	areas	surrounding	Dnipropetrovsk	(mainly	the	
Dnipropetrovsk	 and	 Zaporizhia	 Oblasts).	 The	 remaining	 industrial	 centres,	
such	 as	 Kharkiv,	 were	 somewhat	 less	 significant.	 The	 president,	 given	 his	
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extensive	scope	of	authority,	was	acting	as	an	arbiter	between	the	emerging	
oligarchic	groups.	He	managed	to	maintain	the	balance	between	the	clans	by	
backing	certain	of	them	against	the	others	and	to	prevent	the	oligarchs	from	
becoming	independent	of	the	government	structures	for	a	long	time.	
Three	main	clans	were	formed	during	Kuchma’s	first	term	as	president:
a.	 The Donetsk clan	–	whose	business	base	was	metallurgy.	Rinat	Akhmetov	
gained	the	position	of	the	most	important	oligarch	in	the	Donetsk	group.	
This	group	also	consisted	of	a	number	of	sub-clans	and	subgroups,	includ-
ing	the	Industrial	Union	of	Donbass	(ISD)	owned	by	Serhiy	Taruta	and	Vi-
taliy	Hayduk	and	the	group	controlled	by	the	Klyuyev	brothers,	Andriy	and	
Serhiy.	Viktor	Yanukovych,	who	was	the	governor	of	the	Donetsk	Oblast	in	
1997–	2002	and	the	prime	minister	of	Ukraine	in	2002–2005	during	Kuch-
ma’s	 second	 term,	became	 the	main	political	 representative	 of	 this	 clan.	
Initially,	Yanukovych	did	not	play	an	 independent	role;	he	was	rather	 in	
charge	of	fostering	the	interests	of	the	businessmen	from	Donetsk.	It	was	
only	when	he	gained	the	position	of	prime	minister	that	his	role	began	to	
grow.	The	Party	of	Regional	Revival	of	Ukraine,	which	was	established	in	
1997	and	was	renamed	as	the	Party	of	Regions	in	2000,	has	been	the	politi-
cal	base	of	the	Donetsk	clan.	
b.	 The Dnipropetrovsk clan –	its	influence	was	strongest	during	Kuchma’s	
first	term.	This	clan’s	significance	reached	its	peak	in	the	period	when	Pav-
lo	Lazarenko	was	prime	minister	(1996–1997).	Yulia	Tymoshenko	was	his	
closest	aide	(see	Frame	1).	One	of	the	main	reasons	why	the	Dnipropetro-
vsk	group	was	so	important	was	the	fact	that	Kuchma	himself	came	from	
the	Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast	and	had	worked	for	many	years	in	Dnipropetro-
vsk.	Following	the	dismissal	of	the	Lazarenko	cabinet	and	Lazarenko’s	es-
cape	abroad,	this	clan	fell	apart	into	several	groups,	the	most	important	of	
which	was	the	one	formed	around	Viktor	Pinchuk	(who	is	Kuchma’s	son-
in-law).	Later,	Privat	Group	 led	by	 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	 and	Henadiy	Boho-
lyubov	would	gain	increasing	significance,	while	the	other	circles	would	
become	less	influential.	Metallurgy	was	the	main	area	of	Pinchuk’s	activ-
ity.	Privat	Group	was	focused	on	the	financial	sector	(banking).	It	is	worth	
mentioning	that	a	number	of	other	influential	politicians,	including	Yulia	
Tymoshenko	and	Serhiy	Tihipko,	were	linked	to	the	Dnipropetrovsk	clan.
c.	 The Kyiv clan	–	its	pivotal	figure	was	Viktor	Medvedchuk,	the	head	of	the	
Presidential	Administration	during	Kuchma’s	second	term	in	office.	This	
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group	consisted	of	 ‘the	Kyiv	seven’2;	At	present	only	 the	Surkis	brothers,	
Hryhoriy	 and	 Ihor3	 are	 still	 active	 in	 this	 group	 of	 businessmen.	When	
compared	to	 the	other	clans	the	Kyiv	group	had	a	modest	economic	base	
(mainly	operating	in	the	energy	sector,	banking	and	media),	but	it	was	def-
initely	the	strongest	in	political	terms.	Its	political	strength	was	based	on	
the	position	of	Medvedchuk	as	Kuchma’s	aide	and	on	the	influential	Social	
Democratic	Party	of	Ukraine	(united),	SDPU(o),	which	had	its	representa-
tives	in	the	Verkhovna	Rada.	
Frame 1. The rise and fall of Pavlo lazarenko
Lazarenko,	who	comes	from	the	Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast,	may	be	recognised	
as	a	symbol	of	the	first,	unusually	turbulent	period	of	change	in	Ukraine	
after	 the	 country	 gained	 independence.	 In	 1992–1995,	 he	 governed	 the	
Dnipropetrovsk	Oblast	–	first	as	a	presidential	envoy	and	later	as	the	gover-
nor.	In	1995,	he	was	nominated	deputy	prime	minister,	and	was	the	prime	
minister	of	Ukraine	in	1996–1997.	At	the	same	time,	Lazarenko	was	a	very	
active	businessman.	He	was	commonly	perceived	as	the	region’s	greatest	
oligarch	already	at	the	time	when	he	was	the	governor	of	the	Dnipropetro-
vsk	Oblast.	When	he	held	the	post	of	prime	minister,	the	corporation	United	
Energy	Systems	of	Ukraine	(YESU)	developed	rapidly.	In	a	short	time	YESU	
became	Ukraine’s	 largest	 industrial	 and	 financial	 group	 and	 the	 largest	
private	importer	of	Russian	gas,	while	at	the	same	time	owning	assets	in	
various	sectors	of	the	economy4.	YESU	owed	its	growing	significance	to	its	
patronage	from	Lazarenko,	who	was	probably	a	hidden	shareholder	in	this	
company.	Its	expansion	led	Lazarenko	into	conflict	with	many	influential	
businessmen,	including	Yevhen	Shcherban,	who	was	murdered	in	1996.	La-
zarenko’s	position	became	so	strong	that	it	even	put	Kuchma	at	threat,	who	
wanted	to	get	rid	of	this	inconvenient	competitor.	Lazarenko	was	charged	
with	corruption,	embezzlement	of	state	property	and	the	illegal	transfer	of	
money	abroad5.	The	Verkhovna	Rada	cancelled	his	immunity	in	1999.	Laza-
2	 Киевская семерка, Инвестгазета,	10	March	2003,	http://www.investgazeta.net/politika-
i-ekonomika/kievskaja-semerka-144187/
3	 In	 1996–2000,	Hryhoriy	 Surkis	was	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Professional	 Football	 League	 of	
Ukraine	and	a	deputy	president	of	the	Football	Federation	of	Ukraine	(FFU).	Since	2000,	he	
has	uninterruptedly	held	the	function	of	the	president	of	the	FFU.	Ihor	Surkis	has	been	the	
president	of	the	football	club	Dynamo	Kyiv	since	2002.	
4	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 ‘Ukraińska	 metalurgia:	 gospodarcze	 ogniwo	 oligarchicznego	 systemu	
władzy’,	Analizy	OSW,	1	May	2002.	
5	 ‘Upadek	Pawła	Łazarenki’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	127,	25	February	1999.	
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renko	managed	to	escape	abroad,	but	he	was	detained	in	New	York,	where	
he	faced	a	court	trial	on	charges	of	money	laundering.	These	charges	con-
cerned	a	sum	of	US$114	million	which	was	laundered	when	he	was	prime	
minister6.	 In	2006,	a	court	in	San	Francisco	sentenced	him	to	nine	years	
in	prison.	The	fall	of	Lazarenko	put	an	end	to	the	prosperity	of	YESU.	The	
company	was	ousted	from	the	gas	market,	and	its	assets	were	taken	over	by	
other	business	groups,	one	of	which	was	Viktor	Pinchuk’s	Interpipe7.	
Lazarenko’s	case	 is	 interesting	because	no	other	oligarch	of	such	signifi-
cance	 has	 since	 fallen	 in	 Ukraine.	 However,	 the	 Lazarenko	 case	 would	
have	 probably	 not	 been	 worth	mentioning	 if	 not	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 Yulia	
Tymoshenko,	who	directed	YESU	in	1995–1997,	embarked	on	her	political	
and	business	 career	by	his	 side.	Later	 she	was	elected	 to	 the	parliament	
and	acted	as	Lazarenko’s	deputy	 in	his	party,	Hromada.	 In	 1999,	when	 it	
became	clear	that	Lazarenko’s	fall	was	inevitable	(and	also	to	protect	her	
own	assets),	Tymoshenko	established	her	own	party,	Batkivshchyna	 (Fa-
therland),	which	 she	 is	 still	 the	 leader	 of.	 The	YESU	 case	has	 been	used	
against	Tymoshenko	in	the	past.	At	the	beginning	of	2001,	she	was	arrested	
for	one	month	on	charges	which	included	illegal	gas	export	and	tax	frauds.	
The	YESU	case	re-emerged	in	October	2011,	when	the	Security	Service	of	
Ukraine	announced	that	criminal	proceedings	had	been	launched	against	
Tymoshenko.	She	was	accused	of	burdening	the	state	budget	with	the	cor-
poration’s	debts	exceeding	US$400	million.	Furthermore,	the	prosecution	
authorities	 are	 conducting	 an	 investigation	 into	 Tymoshenko’s	 possible	
participation	in	soliciting	the	murder	of	Shcherban.
Initially,	in	the	second	half	of	the	1990s,	the	system	which	emerged	in	Ukraine	
was	quite	similar	 to	 the	Russian	system,	where	President	Boris	Yeltsin’s	au-
thority	was	restricted	by	powerful	oligarchs,	such	as	Boris	Berezovsky.	How-
ever,	when	Vladimir	Putin	came	to	power	in	2000,	these	two	models	became	
increasingly	different.	Putin	managed	to	make	big	business	subordinate	to	the	
government	in	several	years.	A	milestone	in	this	process	was	the	state’s	takeo-
ver	of	the	assets	of	Russia’s	largest	oil	company,	Yukos,	whose	owner,	Mikhail	
6	 ‘Pavlo	Lazarenko	 is	 facing	dirty	money	 laundering	 charges’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	
no.	186,	8	June	2000.	
7	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 ‘Ukraińska	 metalurgia:	 gospodarcze	 ogniwo	 oligarchicznego	 systemu	
władzy’,	Analizy	OSW,	1	May	2002.
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Khodorkovsky,	was	sentenced	to	nine	years	in	prison8.	This	process	in	Ukraine	
moved	in	the	opposite	direction:	 the	government	was	becoming	weaker	and	
weaker,	and	the	oligarchs	were	gaining	strength.	A	trial	analogous	to	the	Rus-
sian	Khodorkovsky	case	has	never	 taken	place	 in	Ukraine.	On	 the	contrary,	
Kuchma’s	 position	was	 essentially	 undermined	 in	 2000	due	 to	 the	 ‘Cassette	
Scandal’9,	and	he	became	more	and	more	dependent	on	big	business.	
3. The beginnings of a system crisis
At	the	end	of	Kuchma’s	presidency,	the	decomposition	of	the	clan	system	was	
more	and	more	evident.	However,	this	did	not	mean	that	the	oligarchs’	influ-
ence	 had	weakened.	As	 individual	 businessmen	were	 gaining	 strength,	 the	
need	to	maintain	regional	bonds	was	lessening,	while	the	need	to	protect	in-
dividual	interests	was	growing.	The	process	of	the	disintegration	of	the	clans	
was	uneven.	The	Dnipropetrovsk	 group	broke	up	 fastest	 of	 all,	 the	Donetsk	
clan	remained	most	consolidated,	but	disagreements	also	started	to	emerge	in-
side	it.	First	of	all,	Akhmetov’s	conflict	with	Hayduk	and	Taruta	(the	ISD	group)	
was	escalating.	
The	process	of	 legalising	 the	 fortunes	of	representatives	of	big	business	was	
also	developing	at	a	fast	rate.	Before	that,	their	ownership	was	usually	infor-
mal	 and	was	manifested	 through	 the	 distribution	 of	 shares	 among	 various	
representatives	of	a	given	group.	Non-transparent	structures	and	companies	
registered	in	tax	havens	were	used	very	often10.	However,	the	most	powerful	
oligarchs	began	to	gradually	concentrate	their	assets	in	groups,	such	as	Pin-
chuk’s	Interpipe	or	Akhmetov’s	SCM.
At	this	time,	the	RUE	group	also	entered	the	scene11.	Its	name	is	derived	from	
RosUkrEnergo,	 a	 company	which	 was	 established	 in	 July	 2004	 to	 act	 as	 an	
8	 Ewa	Paszyc,	‘Wyrok	w	sprawie	szefów	Jukosu	–	pyrrusowe	zwycięstwo	Kremla’,	Tydzień na 
Wschodzie,	no.	398,	2 June	2005.
9	 The	scandal	was	over	recordings	of	talks	from	Kuchma’s	office	made	by	his	bodyguard,	Ma-
jor	Mykola	Melnychenko,	which	could	suggest	that	the	president	was	involved	in	the	mur-
der	of	Georgiy	Gongadze,	a	journalist	of	Ukrayinska Pravda,	who	was	linked	to	the	opposi-
tion.	The	recordings	were	being	published	piece	by	piece	and	led	to	a	severe	internal	crisis	
in	Ukraine	and	Kyiv’s	partial	isolation	within	the	international	community.
10	 Cyprus	and	some	Swiss	cantons,	with	the	most	liberal	laws,	were	very	popular.	Александр 
Дубинский, ‘Тигипко бьется за Кипр’,	Экономические Известия,	20	March	2012,	http://fi-
nance.eizvestia.com/full/tigipko-betsya-za-kipr
11	 To	avoid	ambiguity,	the	term	RUE	refers	to	the	oligarchic	group,	while	the	name	RosUkr-
Energo	is	used	to	refer	to	the	gas	trade	agent	company.
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intermediary	 in	 gas	 imports	 to	 Ukraine	 from	 Central	 Asia	 and	 Russia	 (see	
Frame	2).	At	 that	 stage,	 representatives	of	 this	 group,	 the	 then	head	of	Naf-
togaz,	 Yuriy	 Boyko,	Kuchma’s	 advisor,	 Serhiy	 Lyovochkin	 and	 businessman	
Dmytro	Firtash,	were	playing	rather	limited	roles	in	Ukrainian	politics.	This	
however	was	to	change	soon.	RUE	is	believed	to	be	the	most	pro-Russian	group	
inside	the	Ukrainian	political	and	business	elite	since	its	representatives	have	
lobbied	 for	Russian	 interests	 on	numerous	 occasions.	 The	 view	 that	 Firtash	
is	merely	a	figurehead,	who	only	represents	the	interests	of	other	people	(not	
necessarily	originating	from	Ukraine),	is	quite	widespread12.	
Frame 2. RosUkrenergo and gas imports from Russia
Gas	trade	with	Russia	and	Turkmenistan13	was	one	of	the	most	profitable	
ways	of	doing	business	 in	Ukraine	and	Russia	 alike.	The	way	of	making	
money	was	 simple.	 Instead	 of	 signing	 contracts	 directly	with	 the	 state-
controlled	monopolies,	Naftogaz	and	Gazprom,	the	services	of	intermedi-
ary	firms	were	used.	 In	 1994–2001,	 this	 function	was	performed	by	 Itera	
company,	and	later,	until	2005,	by	Eural	Trans	Gas.	The	incomes	generated	
by	their	activity	were	transferred	to	the	bank	accounts	of	the	government	
elites	in	both	countries14.	A	new	agent,	RosUkrEnergo,	was	established	un-
der	the	aegis	of	presidents	Kuchma	and	Putin	in	2004.	This	company	was	
registered	in	Switzerland.	However,	no	concrete	information	regarding	its	
ownership	structure	was	available	at	first.	Data	on	its	shareholders	became	
known	only	in	200615.	Half	of	the	shares	in	RosUkrEnergo	were	owned	by	
Gazprom,	while	the	holders	of	the	Ukrainian	half	of	the	company	turned	
out	to	be	Dmytro	Firtash	(45%)	and	Ivan	Fursin	(5%).	It	was	later	reported	
in	certain	media	that	the	real	owner	of	the	shares	held	by	Fursin	was	Ser-
hiy	Lyovochkin16.	No	hard	evidence	has	been	presented	in	this	case,	but	it	
has	been	proven	that	Fursin	and	Lyovochkin	have	close	business	contacts17.	
12	 Ukraine:	Firtash	Uses	Crisis	To	Expand	Into	Banking,	Wikileaks.org,	http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2008/11/08KYIV2294.html#
13	 Before	the	gas	war	of	2006,	most	of	gas	imported	to	Ukraine	originated	from	Turkmenistan.
14	 Katarzyna	 Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,	 Iwona	 Wiśniewska,	 ‘Rosyjsko-ukraiński	 kompromis	 ga-
zowy’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	422,	5	January	2006.
15	 Владимир Бережной, ‘Кто владеет украинским газом’,	Известия, 26	April	2006,	http://
izvestia.ru/news/313258
16	 Сергей Никонов, ‘Хамодержавие или донецкие уже передрались’,	ОРД,	 6	March	 2010,	
http://ord-ua.com/2010/03/06/hamoderzhavie-ili-donetskie-uzhe-peredralis/?lpage=1
17	 Сергей Лещенко, ‘Фирташизация Януковича’,	Украинскaя Правда, 12	October	2007,	http://
www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2007/10/12/4425697/
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It	is	believed	that	the	head	of	Naftogaz,	Yuriy	Boyko,	who	has	had	close	con-
tacts	with	Firtash,	was	the	person	who	came	up	with	the	idea	of	creating	
RosUkrEnergo18.
RosUkrEnergo	reinforced	its	position	as	a	consequence	of	the	gas	war	be-
tween	Ukraine	and	Russia	in	2006.	In	addition	to	the	exclusive	right	to	act	
as	an	agent	in	gas	imports	(this	time	exclusively	from	Russia)19,	Naftogaz	
and	RosUkrEnergo	established	their	subsidiary,	UkrGazEnergo,	which	was	
to	deal	with	gas	sales	to	industrial	recipients20.	In	2009,	following	another	
gas	war,	RUE	lost	its	function	as	an	agent	in	gas	imports	(for	more	details	
of	what	later	happened	to	RosUkrEnergo,	see	part	II,	section	2	and	part	III,	
section	3).
A	specific	model	of	political	class	emerged	under	Kuchma’s	rule.	In	this	model,	
most	politicians	were	clients	of	big	business	and	represented	its	 interests	 in	
the	parliament	and	government.	The	oligarchs	themselves	also	became	politi-
cians	(as	with	the	SDPU(o)	and	the	Party	of	Regions).	
In	 the	final	period	of	Kuchma’s	 second	 term	 in	office,	 one	 could	observe	 in-
creasingly	strong	tension	in	the	system	he	had	created.	Following	the	unsuc-
cessful	attempts	to	extend	the	president’s	rule,	it	became	clear	that	a	different	
politician	would	take	power	in	Ukraine	in	2004	and	would	have	very	extensive	
rights	as	provided	by	the	constitution.	It	was	also	obvious	that,	no	matter	who	
was	elected,	this	politician	would	not	be	respected	by	the	oligarchs	to	the	ex-
tent	that	Kuchma	had	been.	The	election	of	a	politician	who	would	represent	
any	of	the	groups	posed	a	very	serious	threat	to	the	interest	of	all	the	others.	
The	awareness	of	the	need	to	secure	the	political	base	resulted	in	an	increase	
of	the	influence	of	big	business	on	the	party	system.	In	the	parliamentary	elec-
tion	 in	 2002,	 the	 parties	which	 represented	 the	 oligarchic	 groups	 achieved	
very	good	results.	A	mixed	electoral	system	applied	at	the	time	of	the	parlia-
mentary	election	in	2002	(half	of	the	seats	were	granted	through	the	first	past	
the	post	system	and	half	through	proportional	representation).	In	most	cases,	
18	 Мустафа Найем, ‘Семья RosUkrEnergo. Тайна отношений Фирташа и Бойко раскрыта’,	
Украинскaя Правда,	5	July	2007,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2007/07/5/4420882/
19	 Ukraine	giving	up	gas	imports	from	Turkmenistan	was	one	of	the	elements	of	the	compro-
mise	following	the	gas	war.	Since	2006,	Gazprom	has	bought	Turkmen	gas	and	resold	it	to	
Ukraine.	
20	 Arkadiusz	Sarna,	‘RosUkrEnergo	zwycięzcą	„wojny	gazowej”?’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	
no.	427,	9 February	2006.	
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local	businessmen	won	in	the	single-member	constituencies.	They	were	for-
mally	 independent	but	 in	 fact	 they	were	willing	 to	co-operate	with	 the	 rul-
ing	camp21.	Apart	from	the	SDPU(o),	the	key	groupings	which	represented	big	
business	 were	 the	 Labour	 Party	 (the	 Dnipropetrovsk	 group)	 and	 the	 Party	
of	Regions	(the	Donetsk	group).	The	two	latter	parties	entered	parliament	as	
members	of	the	pro-presidential	bloc	For	United	Ukraine.	Although	this	bloc	
received	rather	 low	support	 in	 the	election	(11.7%),	 the	MPs	from	the	single-
member	constituencies	enabled	it	to	form	the	largest	faction	in	the	Verkhovna	
Rada	(175	of	the	450	MPs)22.	
The	parliamentary	election	in	2002	also	revealed	another	important	phenom-
enon.	 The	 significance	 of	 people	 representing	 medium-sized	 business	 was	
growing.	They	centred	around	Our	Ukraine,	the	bloc	led	by	Viktor	Yushchen-
ko,	which	was	 the	main	opposition	 force.	Our	Ukraine	clearly	won	 the	pro-
portional	election,	with	its	level	of	support	at	23.5%.	It	was,	however,	unable	to	
form	a	coalition,	because	its	results	in	the	single-member	constituencies	were	
much	worse.	Unlike	all	the	aforementioned	groupings,	it	could	not	be	said	that	
Our	Ukraine	was	an	oligarchic	bloc,	since	most	of	the	parties	which	formed	it	
had	their	own	political	manifestos	(ideology).	However,	as	its	popularity	was	
growing,	Our	Ukraine	began	 to	attract	 less	 influential	 (usually	 local)	 repre-
sentatives	of	big	business.	Petro	Poroshenko	and	David	Zhvania	were	among	
them.	These	circles	were	gradually	gaining	strength	as	the	presidential	elec-
tion	was	approaching	and	Yushchenko	was	among	the	frontrunners.	
4. The Orange Revolution
It	is	possible	to	state	many	reasons	why	the	Orange	Revolution	of	2004	broke	
out	and	was	successful.	The	main	reasons	included	the	interests	and	actions	
of	the	oligarchs.	The	increasingly	strong	political	 influence	and	the	problem	
with	succession	to	the	presidency	caused	representatives	of	big	business	to	be	
more	and	more	interested	in	introducing	the	parliamentary	political	system	
in	Ukraine.	Although	most	of	the	oligarchs	had	made	their	assets	legal,	it	was	
feared	that	when	a	new	president	took	power,	major	ownership	changes	could	
take	place	in	big	business.	A	reduction	of	the	presidential	prerogatives	would	
essentially	neutralise	the	threat	linked	to	the	election	of	a	new	person	to	this	
21	 This	is	also	interesting	since	similar	voting	regulations	will	apply	during	the	parliamen-
tary	elections	in	October	2012.	
22	 ‘Верховна Рада України 4-го скликання’,	Wikipedia,	16	March	2012,	http://uk.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Верховна_Рада_України_4-го_скликання 
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post.	Furthermore,	more	extensive	competences	for	the	parliament	and	gov-
ernment	would	make	 it	possible	 for	 the	oligarchs	 to	participate	 to	a	greater	
extent	in	ruling	the	country,	above	all	to	influence	the	nominations	of	senior	
state	officials.	Before	the	presidential	election	in	2004,	the	ruling	team	made	
a	number	of	attempts	 to	amend	the	constitution.	However,	all	of	 them	were	
unsuccessful	due	to	the	lack	of	consensus	over	the	details	of	the	new	system23.	
The	approaching	election	was	also	a	problem	for	Kuchma	himself	and	his	clos-
est	aides.	Although	the	Constitutional	Court24	had	ruled	that	he	could	seek	to	
be	elected	for	a	third	term	in	office	as	president25,	Kuchma	did	not	use	this	op-
portunity	because	the	level	of	public	support	for	him	was	low.	Another	option	
was	 to	 indicate	 a	 successor,	 a	 variant	which	 had	 been	 successfully	 put	 into	
practice	 in	Russia	 in	2000.	The	 successor	would	at	best	make	 it	possible	 for	
Kuchma	to	influence	the	way	in	which	the	country	was	governed	and	at	least	
give	him	a	guarantee	of	security.	The	main	problem	was	finding	a	suitable	can-
didate	–	a	person	who	would	be	acceptable	to	Kuchma	and	who	would	not	upset	
the	subtle	balance	of	interests	of	individual	oligarchic	groups	and	who	would	
have	a	chance	of	winning	the	election.	Finally,	the	then	prime	minister,	Vik-
tor	Yanukovych,	became	the	ruling	team’s	candidate.	However,	this	was	a	con-
sequence	of	inertia	and	not	Kuchma’s	choice.	The	search	for	a	more	adequate	
person	had	lasted	so	long	that	Yanukovych	as	the	leader	of	the	strongest	party	
inside	the	government	team	became,	along	with	Yushchenko,	one	of	the	most	
popular	candidates.	Yanukovych,	who	represented	the	Donetsk	clan	and	was	
closely	linked	to	Akhmetov,	was	not	a	satisfactory	candidate	to	other	oligar-
chic	groups.	Despite	their	dislike	of	Yanukovych,	most	representatives	of	big	
business	backed	him	in	the	election	mainly	because	they	feared	the	liberal	re-
forms	promised	by	Yushchenko.	
Paradoxically,	the	fear	of	Yanukovych	present	among	some	oligarchs	was	one	
of	the	causes	of	success	of	the	Orange	Revolution	at	the	end	of	2004	since	he	
would	have	extensive	competences.	When	it	became	clear	that	the	only	way	of	
putting	down	the	protests	against	the	forgery	of	the	results	of	the	presidential	
23	 Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	‘Parlament	Ukrainy	nie	zdołał	uchwalić	zmian	w	konstytucji’,	OSW,	
Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	349,	15	April	2004.
24	 ‘Sąd	Konstytucyjny	o	dopuszczalności	trzeciej	kadencji	prezydenta	Kuczmy’,	OSW,	Tydzień 
na Wschodzie,	no.	335,	8	January	2004.	
25	 The	constitution	of	Ukraine	provided	that	one	person	could	hold	the	presidency	for	a	maxi-
mum	of	two	terms.	The	main	argument	of	Kuchma’s	supporters	for	his	running	for	presi-
dency	the	third	term	in	office	was	the	fact	that	he	had	been	elected	for	the	first	time	in	1994,	
and	the	constitution	had	come	into	force	in	1996.	
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runoff26	was	 through	 the	 use	 of	 force,	 some	 representatives	 of	 big	 business	
chose	a	compromise	with	Yushchenko.	One	of	these	groups	was	ISD.	Although	
this	group	originated	from	the	Donetsk	clan,	its	conflict	with	Akhmetov	was	
escalating	and	it	did	not	want	him	to	become	stronger.	Kuchma	also	withdrew	
his	support	for	Yanukovych	at	a	crucial	moment,	when	he	did	not	agree	to	law	
enforcement	agencies	being	ordered	 to	use	 force	against	 the	demonstrators.	
The	president	 agreed	 for	 the	 runoff	 to	be	 repeated	 in	 exchange	 for	 security	
guarantees.	The	price	for	allowing	a	fair	election	to	be	held	was	Yushchenko’s	
consent	 to	 a	 constitutional	 reform	 under	 which	 the	 parliamentary	 system	
would	be	introduced	in	Ukraine	with,	however,	quite	broad	competences	left	
for	the	president27.	Yushchenko	won	the	repeated	runoff	on	26	December	2004,	
with	support	at	52%.	Soon	thereafter,	Our	Ukraine	managed	to	form	a	parlia-
mentary	majority	since	some	of	the	MPs	from	the	government	camp	change	
sides	to	join	‘the	Orange’.	The	‘Orange’	government	led	by	Yulia	Tymoshenko	
was	formed	in	February	2005.
26	 In	the	runoff	on	21	November	2004,	which	was	fixed,	the	election	results	were	49.4%	for	
Viktor	Yanukovych	and	46.7%	for	Viktor	Yushchenko.	
27	 The	constitutional	reform	came	into	force	in	2006.	This	system	resembled	the	one	which	
existed	in	the	1990s	in	Poland,	following	the	adoption	of	the	Small	Constitution	of	1992.	The	
president	was	in	charge	of	the	law	enforcement	sectors	and	foreign	policy,	and	the	govern-
ment	was	responsible	for	the	economy.	
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II. The OlIGARchs IN 2005–2010 
The	Orange	Revolution	was	not	without	reason	branded	a	 ‘revolt	of	 the	mil-
lionaires	against	the	billionaires’28,	since	Viktor	Yushchenko	was	supported	by	
business	circles	of	a	lesser	significance.	During	Leonid	Kuchma’s	second	term	
the	political	system	became	so	rigid	that	it	limited	the	possibilities	for	medi-
um-sized	 business	 to	 develop.	 For	 similar	 reasons	 Yushchenko	was	 backed	
by	the	middle	class,	especially	representatives	of	small	business.	Later,	their	
support	shifted	to	a	great	extent	to	the	Yulia	Tymoshenko	Bloc,	which	in	the	
parliamentary	election	in	2006	replaced	Our	Ukraine	as	the	strongest	‘orange’	
grouping.	
As	has	already	been	mentioned,	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	oligarchs	supported	
Kuchma	and	later	Yanukovych	was	their	fear	of	thorough	reforms.	Later	–	dur-
ing	the	election	campaign,	which	was	quite	ruthless,	the	fear	of	revenge	and	
accountability	was	added	to	that,	especially	since	part	of	Yushchenko’s	aides	
resorted	to	radical	slogans	during	the	campaign,	such	as	“send	the	crooks	to	
prison”.	It	could	appear	initially	that	the	new	team	would	indeed	bring	about	
real	change.	In	April	2005,	Borys	Kolesnikov,	a	businessman	and	politician	be-
longing	to	the	Party	of	Regions,	who	at	that	time	was	the	head	of	the	Donetsk	
Oblast	Council,	was	arrested	for	a	few	months	on	charges	of	the	illegal	takeo-
ver	of	shares.	
Frame 3. The Kolesnikov case
Kolesnikov	was	one	of	 the	most	 influential	 politicians	 from	 the	Party	of	
Regions	 and	 a	 business	 partner	 of	 Rinat	 Akhmetov.	 In	November	 2004,	
he	 took	 part	 in	 a	 congress	 in	 Sievierodonetsk29	 (Luhansk	Oblast),	where	
he	backed	 the	 idea	of	 creating	 an	Autonomous	South-Eastern	Ukrainian	
Republic.	Part	of	the	victorious	 ‘orange’	team	had	a	particularly	bad	per-
ception	of	him.	Kolesnikov	was	 interrogated	by	 the	prosecution	authori-
28	 This	phrase	is	believed	to	have	been	coined	by	Anders	Aslund,	a	Swedish	political	expert	deal-
ing	with	Ukraine.	Jim	Hoagland,	‘Ukraine’s	lesson	for	Putin’,	The Washington Post,	27	January	
2005,	http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40072-2005Jan26.html.	How-
ever,	Dmytro	Vydryn,	a	Ukrainian	political	expert,	claims	that	it	was	he	to	use	this	defini-
tion	for	the	first	time.	Дмитрий Выдрин, ‘Революция без лидера – все равно, что секс без 
партнера’,	forUm,	1	December	2012,	http://for-ua.com/authornews/2010/12/01/070343.html
29	 This	congress	of	representatives	of	regional	governments	was	convened	in	response	to	the	
Orange	Revolution	and	was	an	attempt	from	Yanukovych’s	supporters	to	put	pressure	on	
the	government	in	Kyiv.
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ties	 in	connection	with	 this	matter	but	was	arrested	 for	another	reason.	
Borys	Penchuk,	the	president	of	the	Anti-Corruption	Foundation	and	the	
author	of	the	book	entitled	‘Donetsk	Mafia:	Anthology’,	made	a	report	to	the	
prosecution	authorities	accusing	Kolesnikov	of	a	 raider	 takeover30	of	 the	
shares	in	a	shopping	centre	in	Donetsk	owned	by	Penchuk.	Kolesnikov	was	
arrested	in	April	2005.	However,	he	was	released	more	than	three	months	
later,	 in	 July,	 and	proceedings	 against	him	were	discontinued	by	 the	At-
torney	General’s	Office	in	2006.	A	year	later,	Kolesnikov	sued	Borys	Pen-
chuk,	accusing	him	of	extortion.	Penchuk	was	arrested	 in	2008	and	was	
sentenced	to	eight	years	in	prison	(the	penalty	was	later	reduced	by	half)	
and	confiscation	of	 assets	 in	October	200931.	When	Yanukovych	won	 the	
presidential	election,	Kolesnikov	was	nominated	deputy	prime	minister	in	
charge	of	the	preparations	for	Euro	2012.
Another	sign	of	change	appeared	in	the	first	half	of	2005,	when	Tymoshenko	
invalidated	the	privatisation	of	Kryvorizhstal,	Ukraine’s	largest	metallurgical	
plant.	Kryvorizhstal	had	been	 sold	 to	Pinchuk	and	Akhmetov	by	 the	end	of	
Kuchma’s	rule	for	US$800	million,	a	price	which	was	seen	as	being	significant-
ly	too	low.	This	company	was	renationalised	in	October	2005,	and	the	privati-
sation	tender	was	held	once	more.	Kryvorizhstal	was	sold	to	a	foreign	investor,	
Mittal	Steel,	for	US$4.8	billion.	This	was	the	largest	sum	in	the	history	of	pri-
vatisation	in	Ukraine	so	far32.	
Tymoshenko	did	not	intend	to	limit	her	actions	to	one	company	and	announced	
that	the	privatisations	of	around	three	thousand	companies	would	be	invali-
dated.	However,	the	oligarchs’	fears	that	this	was	a	beginning	of	the	cancel-
lation	 of	 all	 the	 other	 dubious	 takeovers	 of	 state-controlled	 assets	 proved	
groundless.	 In	 fact,	 the	 Kryvorizhstal	 case	 was	 unique,	 and	 it	 was	 mainly	
about	punishing	the	most	disgraced	beneficiaries	of	the	Kuchma	regime,	i.e.	
Pinchuk,	(Kuchma’s	son-in-law)	and	Akhmetov,	the	main	sponsor	of	the	Party	
of	Regions	and	Yanukovych.	The	negative	stance	taken	by	the	West	on	taking	
away	assets	from	businessmen	was	not	insignificant33.	A	clear	difference	could	
30	 This	means	the	illegal	takeover	of	all	or	part	of	assets,	usually	on	the	basis	of	forged	documents	
backed	with	a	bought	court	decision,	not	infrequently	accompanied	by	threat	or	the	use	of	force.	
31	 Юлия Рябчун, ‘Борис Пенчук оказался неусидчивым’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	24	Febru-
ary	2010,	http://kommersant.ua/doc/1327358
32	 Anna	Górska,	‘Sukces	prywatyzacyjny	ukraińskich	władz’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	
414,	27	October	2005.
33	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 ‘Ukraina:	 „Sprawa	 Achmetowa”	 –	 wojna	 z	 oligarchami	 czy	 kampania	
wyborcza?’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	406,	25	August	2005.	
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be	seen	already	at	that	time	between	Tymoshenko,	who	was	the	key	represent-
ative	of	the	‘hawk’	faction	in	the	‘orange’	team,	who	wanted	to	settle	her	scores	
with	her	political	opponents,	and	President	Yushchenko,	who	preferred	a	com-
promise	between	the	government	and	business34.	Tymoshenko’s	dismissal	in	
September	2005	meant	that	no	major	changes	would	take	place.	
1. The orange ‘oligarchic democracy’
Following	the	victory	of	Viktor	Yushchenko,	the	following	three	political	cen-
tres	formed	in	Ukraine:	(1)	the	presidential	team	along	with	the	Our	Ukraine	
party,	 (2)	 the	 Yulia	 Tymoshenko	 Bloc,	 whose	 leader	 held	 the	 post	 of	 prime	
minister	 for	 the	greater	part	 of	 the	period	 in	question35,	 and	 (3)	 the	opposi-
tion	among	whom	the	Party	of	Regions	played	the	key	role.	The	amendment	
of	 the	 constitution	which	 reduced	 the	 president’s	 power	 and	 reinforced	 the	
government	and	parliament	guaranteed	that	none	of	these	centres	would	pre-
vail	over	the	others.	The	oligarchic	groups	supported	either	of	these	camps	to	
various	extents,	sometimes	shifted	their	support	and	–	which	was	not	rare	–	
did	not	limit	their	backing	to	only	one	of	them.	None	of	these	centres	clearly	
outweighed	the	others,	and	this	contributed	to	competition	among	them	and	
the	political	parties.	One	effect	of	this	system	was	a	continuous,	bitter	political	
struggle,	which	later	led	to	an	almost	total	paralysis	of	the	state.	
The	results	of	the	parliamentary	election	in	2006	and	of	the	early	election	in	
2007	finally	fixed	 in	place	 the	 change	 in	 the	map	of	 influence	 from	 the	key	
oligarchic	groups	which	had	begun	with	 the	Orange	Revolution.	The	results	
of	both	elections	were	similar:	the	Party	of	Regions	won,	while	the	Yulia	Ty-
moshenko	 Bloc	 received	 slightly	 lower	 support	 and	 remained	 the	 strongest	
grouping	 in	 the	 ‘orange’	 camp.	 Our	Ukraine	 achieved	 a	much	worse	 result,	
which	was	linked	to	a	dramatic	fall	in	public	support	for	Viktor	Yushchenko36.	
The	parliamentary	elections	sealed	the	key	change	which	had	appeared	among	
the	oligarchic	groups	after	the	Orange	Revolution,	namely	the	falling	signifi-
cance	of	 the	Kyiv	clan.	The	SDPU(o),	on	which	 the	clan’s	 influence	had	been	
34	 ‘Kolejny	dwugłos	w	sprawie	reprywatyzacji’,	OSW,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	385,	17	Febru-
ary	2005.	
35	 Yulia	Tymoshenko	was	prime	minister	from	January	to	September	2005	and	from	Decem-
ber	2007	to	March	2010.	
36	 In	the	election	in	2007,	the	Party	of	Regions	gained	175	of	the	450	seats	in	the	Verkhovna	
Rada,	BYuT	gained	156	seats	and	Our	Ukraine	gained	72.	The	other	two	groupings	to	enter	
parliament	were	the	Communist	Party	of	Ukraine	(27	seats)	and	the	Lytvyn	Bloc	(20	seats).	
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based,	no	longer	had	representatives	in	the	Verkhovna	Rada.	The	Surkis	broth-
ers	maintained	their	 influence	 in	business,	 including	football,	but	 their	role	
in	politics	had	also	significantly	weakened.	The	case	with	Viktor	Medvedchuk	
was	similar:	although	he	had	not	been	marginalised	completely	(mainly	ow-
ing	to	his	close	contacts	with	representatives	of	senior	Russian	officials37),	his	
influence	was	incomparably	smaller	than	it	had	been	at	the	end	of	Kuchma’s	
presidency,	when	he	was	commonly	perceived	as	the	second	most	important	
person	in	the	state.	
In	2006	and	2007,	Ukraine	was	the	scene	of	major	political	upheaval	and	fre-
quent	reshuffles	in	the	government.	Following	the	election	of	2006,	Viktor	Ya-
nukovych	was	prime	minister	for	a	year	or	so.	From	the	end	of	2007	to	2010,	
this	function	was	held	by	Yulia	Tymoshenko.	At	that	time,	the	orange	team	was	
split	completely	into	two	camps,	the	pro-Yushchenko	and	the	pro-Tymoshenko	
camps,	which	were	fighting	against	one	another.	
1.1. The business circles linked to the Party of Regions 
A	number	of	major	business	groups	whose	representatives	originated	mainly	
from	the	Donbass	region	could	be	distinguished	in	the	Party	of	Regions.	In	this	
context	it	is	worth	mentioning	the	brothers	Andriy	and	Serhiy	Klyuyev,	Vasyl	
Khmelnytsky	 and	Valentyn	Landyk.	However,	 this	 party’s	 policy	was	 influ-
enced	strongest	of	all	by	the	two	oligarchic	groups	which	were	at	the	same	time	
its	major	financial	sponsors:	the	group	centred	around	Ukraine’s	richest	busi-
nessman,	Rinat	Akhmetov,	and	the	RUE	group.	In	many	cases,	the	oligarchs	
linked	to	the	Party	of	Regions	held	seats	in	parliament	and	used	it	to	lobby	for	
their	own	 interests,	and	 their	position	 (especially	Akhmetov’s)	was	very	es-
sential	for	determining	the	party’s	policy.	
The Akhmetov group
The	business	circles	linked	to	Rinat	Akhmetov	were	the	principal	financial	base	
of	the	Party	of	Regions.	In	contrast	to	the	preceding	years,	when	Akhmetov	had	
not	been	an	active	participant	in	political	life,	in	2006	and	2007,	he	took	part	in	
the	elections	and	became	an	MP.	Furthermore,	almost	half	of	the	MPs	from	the	
37	 According	 to	Ukrainian	media,	Vladimir	Putin	and	Dmitry	Medvedev’s	wife	 in	2004	be-
came	 the	 godparents	 of	 one	 of	Medvedchuk’s	 daughters; Тарас Козуб, Елена Галаджий, 
‘Медведчук возвращается в политику, чтобы бороться за Евразию’, Комсомольская 
Правда в Украине, 22	March	2012,	http://kp.ua/daily/220312/330450/	
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Party	of	Regions	were	people	linked	to	Akhmetov38.	Borys	Kolesnikov,	the	head	
of	this	party’s	campaign,	was	believed	to	be	Akhmetov’s	closest	aide.	The	loss	
of	Kryvorizhstal	was	not	a	serious	blow	to	Akhmetov’s	business	empire,	which	
continued	its	expansion,	for	example	in	the	power	engineering	sector.	
The RUe group
Following	the	Orange	Revolution,	representatives	of	another	influential	busi-
ness	group,	RUE,	also	developed	links	with	the	Party	of	Regions.	Members	of	
this	group	had	already	performed	significant	functions	in	the	state	adminis-
tration	at	the	time	of	Kuchma’s	presidency	(Boyko	was	the	head	of	Naftogaz,	
and	Lyovochkin	was	an	advisor	to	Kuchma).	However,	they	were	linked	to	po-
litical	 forces	unrelated	 to	 the	Donetsk	clan.	They	sought	election	 in	2006	as	
representatives	of	 other	parties	but	none	of	 them	won	a	 seat	 in	parliament.	
It	was	only	in	2007	that	Boyko	and	Lyovochkin	became	MPs,	this	time	as	mem-
bers	of	 the	Party	of	Regions.	When	Yanukovych	was	prime	minister	 (2006–
2007),	Boyko	held	the	function	of	the	minister	for	energy,	and	Lyovochkin	was	
the	head	of	the	prime	minister’s	secretariat.	
At	that	time,	the	group	strengthened	its	position	in	business.	As	a	consequence	
of	 the	 gas	 war	 of	 2006,	 RosUkrEnergo	 became	 the	 only	 importer	 of	 gas	 to	
Ukraine,	and	UkrGaz-Energo,	a	company	controlled	by	Naftogaz	and	RUE,	was	
granted	the	right	to	sell	5	billion	m3	of	gas	to	industrial	recipients	in	Ukraine39,	
which	ensured	constant	income	to	Firtash.	At	the	same	time,	Firtash	managed	
to	take	over	part	of	the	local	gas	distribution	networks,	known	as	oblhaz.	
1.2. ‘Orange’ business
While	since	2004	the	business	circles	supporting	the	Party	of	Regions	have	not	
changed	their	political	sympathies,	the	oligarchs’	backing	for	the	orange	camp	
has	been	clearly	less	stable.	The	main	difference	between	‘the	orange’	and	the	
Party	of	Regions	was	the	scope	of	business’s	 influence	on	the	policy	adopted	
by	a	given	party.	This	influence	was	definitely	more	limited	in	Our	Ukraine,	
and	even	more	so	in	the	case	of	BYuT.	This	was	partly	due	to	the	significantly	
38	 Виктор Чивокуня, ‘Янукович с Ахметовым получили билет на войну’, Yкраинская 
Правда,	3 April	2007,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/4b1aaf6b37fef/
39	 Алла Еременко, ‘Реанимация «Укргаз-Энерго» = агония «Нафтогаза»?’, Зеркало Недели, 
1	April	2011,	http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/reanimatsiya_ukrgaz-energo__agoniya_nafto-
gaza-78741.html
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smaller	financial	potential	of	the	‘orange’	oligarchs	as	compared	to	those	from	
Donetsk.	The	personality	of	the	leaders	of	these	parties	had	an	even	stronger	
impact:	 Tymoshenko’s	 party	 clearly	 relied	 on	 its	 leader,	 while	 Yanukovych	
would	always	have	to	balance	various	interests	inside	his	party.	
Kostyantin	Zhevago	was	 the	 richest	businessman	 in	 the	BYuT	parliamenta-
ry	club.	His	key	assets	were	in	the	banking	sector	and	metallurgy	(iron	ores).	
Another	oligarch	MP	who	belonged	to	BYuT	was	Tariel	Vasadze,	the	owner	of	
the	UkrAvto	Group,	Ukraine’s	 largest	car	manufacturer40.	The	Buriak	broth-
ers,	Oleksandr	 and	 Serhiy,	who	 own	 the	 Brokbiznes	 bank,	 one	 of	Ukraine’s	
largest	financial	institutions,	were	also	BYuT	members41.	
Some	support	was	also	offered	to	the	‘orange’	camp	by	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	and	
Henadiy	Boholyubov	(Privat	Group).	Capitalising	on	the	conflict	between	the	
president	and	the	prime	minister,	Privat	was	taking	care	of	its	interests	and	
backed	either	Yushchenko	or	Tymoshenko,	depending	on	its	needs.	It	did	not	
become	engaged	on	either	of	the	sides.	
Our	 Ukraine	 received	 even	 less	 support	 from	 big	 business	 than	 the	 Yulia	
Tymoshenko	Bloc.	One	of	the	most	powerful	oligarchs	who	backed	Our	Ukraine	
and	Viktor	Yushchenko	was	Petro	Poroshenko,	the	owner	of	the	Ukrpromin-
vest	holding42.	In	2005,	Poroshenko	was	the	secretary	of	the	National	Security	
and	Defence	Council	(NSDC),	and	held	the	post	of	the	minister	of	foreign	affairs	
for	several	months	in	late	2009/early	2010.	
Representatives	of	the	RUE	group	also	had	close	contacts	with	Yushchenko’s	
camp.	Yushchenko	 treated	 the	 support	 from	 this	 group	as	 a	way	 to	become	
partly	independent	from	the	circles	linked	to	Our	Ukraine43.	In	2006,	Valeriy	
Khoroshkovskyi,	the	owner	of	the	TV	channel	Inter,	who	was	believed	to	be	
40	 In	 2005,	Vasadze	 bought	Warsaw’s	 FSO	 car	 factory;	Danuta	Walewska,	 ‘Tarieł	Wasadze:	
człowiek,	 który	 zbawił	 FSO’,	 Rzeczpospolita,	 29	 May	 2006,	 http://archiwum.rp.pl/ar-
tykul/618209_Tariel_Wasadze:_czlowiek_ktory_zbawil_FSO.html
41	 According	to	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	(data	as	of	1	October	2011)	Brokbiznes	was	ranked	
14th	in	terms	of	assets	owned	in	the	banking	system.
42	 Yushchenko	is	the	godfather	of	Petro	Poroshenko’s	two	daughters.
43	 One	example	of	this	was	the	discontinuation	of	the	investigation	by	the	SBU	into	the	case	
of	RosUkrEnergo	shareholders	following	an	intervention	from	Oleksandr	Tretyakov,	who	
was	an	advisor	to	Yushchenko.	According	to	media	reports,	Firtash	also	allegedly	paid	for	
the	Yushchenko	family’s	flight	from	the	United	States	to	the	inauguration	of	Yushchenko’s	
presidency.	Arkadiusz	Sarna,	‘Atmosfera	wokół	RosUkrEnergo	zagęszcza	się’,	OSW,	Tydzień 
na Wschodzie,	no.	439,	11	May	2006.
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a	business	partner	of	Firtash44,	was	nominated	by	the	president	as	deputy	sec-
retary	of	the	NSDC.	Later,	from	2007	to	January	2009,	he	was	the	head	of	the	
National	Customs	Service,	and	in	March	2009	he	was	nominated	deputy	head	
and	then	head	of	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	(SBU).	Khoroshkovskyi,	as	
an	official	of	both	the	Customs	Service	and	the	SBU,	was	acting	to	the	benefit	
of	 Firtash	 during	 his	 dispute	 with	 Tymoshenko	 and	 Naftogaz	 (see	 section	
2	below).	Akhmetov	also	had	some	influence	in	the	Yushchenko	administra-
tion.	In	2007,	Raisa	Bogatyreva,	who	was	linked	to	Akhmetov,	was	nominated	
secretary	of	the	National	Security	and	Defence	Council.	
Public	support	for	Yushchenko	fell	rapidly	during	his	presidency.	When	it	be-
came	clear	that	he	had	no	chance	of	being	re-elected,	some	of	the	businessmen	
linked	to	Our	Ukraine	began	to	shift	their	support	to	Tymoshenko.	This	was	the	
case	with	ISD	controlled	by	Hayduk	and	Taruta,	who	had	backed	Yushchenko	
during	the	Orange	Revolution,	but	later	embarked	on	active	co-operation	with	
Yulia	Tymoshenko.	Due	to	the	economic	crisis	in	late	2009,	Hayduk	decided	to	
sell	his	shares	in	ISD,	which	was	taken	over	by	Russian	investors.	
Frame 4. Russian capital takes over IsD 
Ukrainian	business	was	preventing	Russian	capital	 from	expanding	 into	
Ukraine’s	most	 important	 branch	 of	 industry,	metallurgy.	The	 economic	
crisis	 of	 2009	 caused	 the	 Industrial	 Union	 of	 Donbass	 (ISD),	 which	 had	
excessive	 debts	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 investments	made	 in	 the	 preceding	
years,	 to	be	on	the	verge	of	bankruptcy.	For	this	reason,	Vitaliy	Hayduk,	
who	co-owned	ISD,	decided	to	sell	his	shares.	At	the	end	of	2009,	50%	+2	
shares	were	taken	over	by	a	consortium	of	Russian	investors	organised	by	
the	Swiss-based	firm,	Carbofer,	in	which	Russia’s	Vnesheconombank	held	
stakes.	The	deal	concerned	two	steelyards	in	Ukraine	and	plants	in	Poland	
(Czestochowa	Steelworks)	and	Hungary.	This	was	the	first	instance	when	
Russian	business	took	over	assets	in	the	Ukrainian	metallurgy	sector45.	
One	person	who	contributed	greatly	to	ISD’s	problems	was	its	main	com-
petitor	 in	Ukraine,	Rinat	Akhmetov.	Apart	from	the	business	aspect,	 the	
44	 Сергей Никонов, ‘Как Хорошковский на госслужбе разбогател’,	ОРД,	20	May	2009,	http://
ord-ua.com/2009/05/20/horosh/?lpage=1
45	 Anna	 Górska,	 Iwona	 Wiśniewska,	 ‘Russian	 investors	 enter	 the	 Ukrainian	 metallurgy	
sector’,	 OSW,	 EastWeek,	 13	 January	 2010,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-
week/2010-01-13/russian-investors-enter-ukrainian-metallurgy-sector
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struggle	between	ISD	and	Akhmetov	also	had	a	political	undertone.	ISD	sup-
ported	President	Yushchenko,	and	later	Yulia	Tymoshenko,	while	Akhme-
tov	was	the	main	sponsor	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	One	of	the	problems	ISD	
had	was	the	lack	of	its	own	iron	ore	deposits.	Ore	mining	in	Ukraine	is	mo-
nopolised	by	MetInvest	owned	by	Akhmetov,	who	capitalised	on	his	posi-
tion	when	competing	with	ISD.	Taruta	and	Hayduk	were	forced	to	buy	the	
more	expensive	raw	material	from	Brazil	and	Russia46.	Paradoxically,	the	
infighting	between	the	Ukrainian	oligarchs	contributed	to	their	most	dan-
gerous	competitor,	Russian	business,	entering	this	market.	
In	2010,	more	metallurgical	assets	were	taken	over	by	Russians	in	Ukraine:	
the	 Ilyich	Steel	 and	 Iron	Works	 in	Mariupol	 and	Zaporizhstal.	However,	
the	sale	of	the	former	was	invalidated	by	the	Ukrainian	government,	and	
Zaporizhstal	was	finally	bought	by	Akhmetov	(for	more	details	on	this	sub-
ject,	see	part	III,	section	3).	The	expansion	of	Russian	capital	in	Ukrainian	
metallurgy	has	been	frozen	since	then.
1.3. The others
Viktor Pinchuk,	one	of	the	key	oligarchs	during	Kuchma’s	presidency,	with-
drew	from	political	activity	and	removed	himself	from	the	spotlight	after	the	
Orange	Revolution.	He	did	not	run	for	a	parliamentary	seat	in	the	election	of	
2006.	He	also	decided	to	sell	part	of	his	assets	which	he	did	not	see	as	essential	
for	his	business,	such	as	Ukrsocbank,	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	banks47,	and	kept	
his	assets	in	metallurgy	and	the	media.	Pinchuk	became	increasingly	engaged	
in	supporting	cultural	projects	(for	example,	the	modern	art	gallery	Pinchu-
kArtCentre)	and	promoting	European	 integration,	 including	holding	annual	
YES	(Yalta	European	Strategy)	summits,	a	forum	for	meetings	of	politics	and	
business	representatives	from	Ukraine	and	the	West.	
Unlike	Pinchuk,	Privat	Group	was	playing	an	increasingly	important	role	in	
politics	and	was	successfully	lobbying	for	its	own	interests,	regardless	of	who	
ruled	the	country.	Privat	was	known	for	its	extremely	aggressive	way	of	do-
ing	 business.	 In	 2008–2010,	 through	 dubious	 legal	 operations,	 Kolomoyskyi	
46	 Anna	 Górska,	 ‘Rosja–Ukraina:	 pogłębiona	 współpraca	 czy	 fuzja	 w	 metalurgii?’,	 OSW,	
Tydzień na Wschodzie,	no.	472,	22	February	2007.	
47	 This	 bank	 was	 sold	 in	 2007	 for	 US$2	 billion	 to	 Italy’s	 UniCredit	 Group, Елена Губарь, 
Александр Черновалов, ‘Суммашествие UniCredit	Group	приобрел Укрсоцбанк за $2,07 
млрд’, Коммерсантъ Украина, 6	July	2007,	http://kommersant.ua/doc/780617
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managed	to	take	control	of	Ukrtatnafta,	which	owns	Ukraine’s	largest	refinery	
in	Kremenchuk.	As	a	consequence	of	actions	taken	by	Privat,	Russian	share-
holders,	who	formally	held	55%	of	the	shares,	were	forced	out	of	the	company.	
Frame 5. The war over the Kremenchuk refinery
Ukrtatnafta,	 a	 company	whose	 key	 asset	 is	Ukraine’s	 largest	 refinery	 in	
Kremenchuk,	 was	 the	 object	 of	 what	was	 so	 far	 the	most	widely	 publi-
cised	dispute	between	 representatives	of	Russian	and	Ukrainian	 capital.	
The	company	was	established	in	1994	by	the	governments	of	Ukraine	and	
Tatarstan	(in	the	Russian	Federation).	In	1998,	part	of	the	Ukrainian	stake	
was	taken	over	by	companies	controlled	by	Russian	businessmen.	In	2007,	
Ukraine	held	43%	of	the	shares	(they	were	managed	by	Naftogaz),	while	the	
Russian	partner	(the	government	of	Tatarstan	and	the	companies	Tatneft,	
SeaGroup	International	and	AmRuzTrading)	owned	in	total	over	55%	of	the	
shares.	Furthermore,	a	1.2%	stake	was	held	by	Korsan,	a	company	linked	
to	Privat	Group.	In	2008,	the	economic	court	in	Kyiv	deemed	the	takeover	
of	18.3%	the	shares	by	SeaGroup	International	and	AmRuzTrading	illegal48.	
The	 shares	 taken	 away	 from	 these	 companies	 were	 bought	 by	 Korsan.	
In	2009,	the	court	also	ordered	that	the	28.8%	stake	held	by	the	government	
of	Tatarstan	be	taken	away49.	A	year	later,	the	court’s	verdict	was	upheld	by	
Ukraine’s	Supreme	Economic	Court.	These	shares	were	also	taken	over	by	
Privat,	which	–	holding	in	total	a	47%	stake	–	began	to	control	the	manage-
ment	of	Ukrtatnafta50.	Of	the	remaining	shares,	43%	are	held	by	Naftogaz	
and	the	other	10%	by	Tatneft.
In	retaliation,	Tatneft,	 the	key	supplier	of	oil	 for	 the	Kremenchuk	refin-
ery,	cut	oil	supplies.	Privat	could	ensure	alternative	supplies.	Since	it	con-
trolled	the	management	of	UkrTransNafta	(the	operator	of	oil	pipelines	in	
Ukraine,	which	is	formally	state-controlled),	it	changed	the	direction	of	oil	
flow	in	Ukrainian	pipelines	and	started	supplying	oil	to	the	Kremenchuk	
refinery	from	Azerbaijan.	This	also	caused	a	cut	of	supplies	to	the	refinery	
in	Odessa,	owned	by	Russia’s	LUKoil,	which	had	been	using	these	pipelines.	
48	 ‘Суд подтвердил права государства на оспариваемые 18,3% акций „Укртатнафты”’,	
Зеркало недели, 7	June	2008,	http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/sud_podtverdil_prava_gosudarst-
va_na_osparivaemye_18,3_aktsiy_ukrtatnafty-53884.html
49	 ‘Суд признал незаконной покупку Татарстаном 28,8% „Укртатнафты”, Новости 
Донбасса, 19	March	2009,	http://novosti.dn.ua/details/77408/
50	 Олег Гавриш, Андрей Леденев, ‘„Приват” сконцентрировался на „Укртатнафте”, Ком­
мерсантъ Украина, №37 (1085),	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1330369
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Although	the	seizure	of	the	shares	from	the	Russian	shareholders	has	been	
discussed	on	numerous	occasions	at	the	time	of	meetings	of	the	most	senior	
Ukrainian	and	Russian	officials,	this	issue	has	not	as	yet	been	resolved.
2. Tymoshenko’s conflict with the RUe Group
As	has	been	mentioned	earlier	in	this	text,	representatives	of	the	RUE	Group	
formed	the	business	base	 for	both	 the	Party	of	Regions	and	President	Yush-
chenko.	Tymoshenko	 saw	RUE	as	 a	dangerous	opponent	because	 it	 support-
ed	 two	 camps	 which	 were	 hostile	 to	 her	 and	 had	 great	 financial	 capacity.	
Tymoshenko	was	trying	to	block	Firtash’s	main	source	of	income	–	gas	trade.	
To	achieve	this,	she	was	making	attempts	to	eliminate	RosUkrEnergo	as	the	
agent	in	gas	imports.	This	was	difficult	because	in	gas	issues	President	Yush-
chenko	de facto	backed	RUE	by	emphasising	the	need	to	maintain	the	continu-
ity	of	supplies,	while	Tymoshenko	wanted	to	change	the	system	and	get	rid	of	
the	agent,	even	at	the	cost	of	another	gas	crisis	with	Russia.	Prime	Minister	
Tymoshenko	achieved	this	goal	on	the	occasion	of	the	gas	war	between	Russia	
and	Ukraine	in	January	2009.	However,	Ukraine	had	to	pay	a	very	high	price	
for	this.	Gas	contracts	signed	by	Naftogaz	and	Gazprom	for	the	timeframe	be-
tween	2009	and	2019	turned	out	to	be	extremely	unfavourable	for	Kyiv	due	to	
the	high	price	of	gas	set	in	them.	However,	these	contracts	excluded	RosUkr-
Energo	as	an	agent,	which	Tymoshenko	saw	as	a	success,	considering	the	up-
coming	presidential	 campaign.	Gazprom	also	 allowed	Naftogaz	 to	 take	 over	
11	billion	m3	of	gas	owned	by	RosUkrEnergo.	
3. The attempt to form a grand coalition
The	incessant	political	crises	following	the	Orange	Revolution,	especially	af-
ter	2006,	posed	a	serious	impediment	to	the	oligarchs	in	doing	business.	The	
high	costs	they	incurred	in	connection	with	the	two	campaigns	preceding	the	
parliamentary	elections	in	2006	and	2007	were	also	an	important	factor51,	and	
President	 Yushchenko	 made	 another	 attempt	 at	 dissolving	 the	 parliament	
in	2008.	Furthermore,	a	deep	economic	crisis	began	in	Ukraine	in	late	2008.	
Since	Tymoshenko	had	limited	funds	at	her	disposal,	in	her	anti-crisis	policy	
she	 directed	 state	 support	 to	 the	 businessmen	 linked	 to	 BYuT,	 and	 left	 the	
51	 The	 estimated	 cost	 of	 election	 campaign	 which	 enables	 winning	 one	 seat	 in	 parlia-
ment	 ranged	 between	 US$1	 billion	 and	 US$20	 billion,	 depending	 on	 the	 constituency,	
Сколько стоит депутатский мандат?,	 Siteua.org,	 14	 November	 2011,	 http://siteua.org/
Украина/311794/Сколько_стоит_депутатский_мандат_
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firms	of	the	oligarchs	from	the	Party	of	Regions	with	no	support	whatsoever.	
Therefore,	 part	 of	 the	 Party	 of	Regions’	 financial	 base	 linked	 to	Akhmetov	
wanted	to	reach	a	compromise	with	BYuT	so	as	to	improve	the	state’s	finan-
cial	 capacity	and	put	an	end	 to	 the	political	war	by	dividing	 the	 spheres	of	
influence.	Although	the	divides	on	the	Ukrainian	political	scene	between	the	
orange	and	the	white-and-blue52	teams	were	very	clear,	the	oligarchs	linked	to	
the	Party	of	Regions	had	already	shown	that	they	were	pragmatic	as	regards	
their	alliances53.	
Talks	behind	the	scenes	aimed	at	forming	a	grand	coalition	of	the	Party	of	Re-
gions	and	BYuT	began	in	2008.	A	new	draft	constitution	was	prepared.	It	was	
supposed	to	introduce	a	new	parliamentary	system,	where	the	president	would	
be	 elected	 by	 the	 parliament.	 According	 to	 initial	 arrangements,	 Yanuko-
vych	was	to	become	the	head	of	state	(with	very	limited	competences),	while	
Tymoshenko	would	keep	her	post	as	prime	minister.	An	extension	of	parlia-
ment’s	tenure	until	2014	was	also	planned54.	The	group	centred	around	Akhme-
tov	backed	the	compromise	as	it	would	guarantee	political	stabilisation	for	the	
next	few	years.	
The	compromise	was	opposed	for	obvious	reasons	by	Yushchenko	and	the	RUE	
Group,	which	had	come	into	bitter	conflict	with	Tymoshenko.	A	grand	coali-
tion	would	mean	total	defeat	and	the	final	 loss	of	 their	business	position	for	
this	group.	The	RUE	faction	succeeded	in	convincing	Yanukovych	that	it	was	
better	 to	 take	 the	risk	and	take	power	as	a	consequence	of	 the	general	elec-
tion	than	to	accept	the	presidency	in	a	system	where	the	real	power	would	rest	
with	Tymoshenko55.	The	breakdown	of	talks	in	June	2009	proved	how	strong	
an	 influence	 the	RUE	Group	had	on	Yanukovych,	while	Akhmetov’s	connec-
tions	turned	out	insufficient	to	push	through	a	compromise.	
52	 The	official	colours	of	the	Party	of	Regions.
53	 A	coalition	of	the	Party	of	Regions	and	Our	Ukraine	was	a	scenario	which	was	seriously	con-
sidered	after	the	parliamentary	election	in	2007.	‘Preparing	for	the	next	drama’,	The Econo-
mist,	27	September	2007,	http://www.economist.com/node/9867554?story_id=9867554
54	 This	draft	constitution	also	included	a	number	of	regulations	which	would	limit	the	freedom	
of	speech	and	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	and	upset	voting	rules	in	parliament,	thus	
leading	to	curbing	the	possibility	to	act	for	the	opposition.	Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	‘Ukraine:	
Coalition	talks	between	the	Tymoshenko	Bloc	and	the	Party	of	Regions	break	down’,	OSW,	
EastWeek,	no.	97,	17	June	2009,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/EastWeek_172.pdf
55	 Сергей Лозунько, ‘Нас прибют, но попозже’,	 2000,	 19-25	 June	 2009,	 http://2000.net.ua/	
2000/forum/puls/46691
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4.  The presidential election of 2010
As	the	coalition	talks	ended	in	failure,	the	stakes	in	the	presidential	election	
grew	 significantly.	Were	 Yanukovych	 to	 lose	 the	 election,	 this	 would	 most	
likely	have	spelt	the	end	of	his	political	career.	If	Tymoshenko	won,	she	would	
gain	complete	power	 in	Ukraine	 for	 the	first	 time.	The	majority	of	big	busi-
ness	preferred	Yanukovych,	believing	that	he	would	be	a	weak	president,	like	
Yushchenko.	Tymoshenko	was	an	 independent	player	 to	a	much	greater	ex-
tent.	This	raised	fears	among	the	oligarchs	that,	 if	she	won	the	election,	she	
could	bring	about	fundamental	changes	in	the	ownership	structures	of	the	oli-
garchic	groups,	and	even	change	the	very	nature	of	relations	between	business	
and	politics.	This	did	not,	however,	mean	 that	 it	was	easier	 for	Yanukovych	
to	conduct	the	election	campaign.	Tymoshenko	managed	to	ensure	adequate	
funding	for	her	campaign	and	won	the	favours	of	the	television	media.	Even	
the	television	channels	owned	by	the	oligarchs	linked	to	the	Party	of	Regions	
(see	Frame	6)	embarked	on	an	information	policy	which	was	beneficial	for	Ty-
moshenko56.	Despite	all	this,	Yanukovych	won	the	presidential	runoff	in	Feb-
ruary	2010,	the	difference	between	the	support	levels	for	them	was	three	per	
cent.	In	the	following	month,	he	successfully	caused	the	creation	of	a	majority	
coalition	in	parliament	with	the	Communists,	the	Lytvyn	Bloc	and	some	venal	
MPs	from	BYuT	and	Our	Ukraine,	and	then	the	formation	of	a	government	led	
by	Mykola	Azarov.	
Frame 6. The oligarchs and the media
The	media	are	a	special	example	of	the	domination	the	oligarchs	wield	in	
the	 economy	and	which	 translates	directly	 into	 their	political	 influence.	
The	media	are	not	treated	as	ordinary	business,	but	primarily	as	a	tool	to	
defend	one’s	own	interests.	This	has	a	direct	impact	on	limiting	journalists’	
independence,	which	is	misused,	especially	in	television.	This	was	also	evi-
dent	during	Yushchenko’s	presidency,	when	a	channel’s	information	policy	
would	change	depending	on	the	relations	between	its	owner	and	the	gov-
ernment.	Since	the	Party	of	Regions	took	and	consolidated	power,	all	the	
major	stations	have	adopted	a	pro-government	stance	to	various	extents.	
56	 This	 even	affected	 the	 Inter	 channel	owned	by	Khoroshkovsky	 (RUE	Group),	which	was	
the	most	hostile	to	Tymoshenko.	She	backed	businessman	Kostyantin	Grigorishin,	who	de-
manded	at	court	that	the	sale	of	Inter	to	Khoroshkovsky	should	be	cancelled.	The	channel	
was	not	taken	away	from	the	oligarch,	but	Inter	ceased	its	attacks	on	Tymoshenko.,	К. Усов, 
О. Довженко, ‘Охота на «Интер»’,	Зеркало недели, 21	April	 2009,	http://zn.ua/POLITICS/
ohota_na_inter-56707.html	
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Furthermore,	the	media	are	a	very	serious	means	of	pressure	on	individual	
politicians	and	business	competitors.	
The	degree	of	oligarchisation	of	the	media	is	directly	proportionate	to	the	
strength	of	their	impact.	The	television	market	has	been	monopolised	al-
most	completely.	The	five	channels	with	the	highest	viewership	levels	(In-
ter,	“Ukraina”,	1+1,	ISTV	and	STB)	are	owned	by	four	people,	of	whom	three	
are	in	the	top	positions	on	the	lists	of	the	richest	people	in	Ukraine.	Addi-
tionally,	each	of	them	has	several	thematic	channels.	The	other	oligarchs	
from	Ukraine57	 and	national	 television	have	practically	no	 say.	Owing	 to	
their	connections	in	the	government,	the	dominating	oligarchs	are	able	to	
prevent	any	attempts	 for	other	channels	 to	develop,	 including	 the	chan-
nels	which	have	more	independent	teams	of	journalists.	One	example	is	the	
cancellation	of	the	right	to	use	the	frequency	with	nation-wide	coverage	for	
the	news	channel	5	Kanal	and	the	television	TVi	in	2010,	as	a	consequence	
of	which	their	viewership	levels	dropped	to	around	1%.	
Big	business	 is	 also	predominant	on	 the	printed	press	market.	However,	
this	segment	is	not	monopolised	to	such	a	degree	by	the	representatives	of	
the	‘four	television	tycoons’.	This	is	so	because	the	press	market	in	Ukraine	
is	poorly	developed	(there	is	a	small	circulation,	which	also	means	a	weak-
er	impact)	and	offers	low	rates	of	return.	The	situation	is	also	similar	in	the	
case	of	Internet	portals,	the	only	difference	being	that	–	given	their	abun-
dance	–	it	is	usually	very	difficult	to	track	down	their	real	owners.	
The	largest	non-tabloid	newspaper,	Segodnya,	is	owned	by	Akhmetov.	Fur-
thermore,	the	company	Segodnya	Multimedia	controls	a	part	of	the	region-
al	press,	predominantly	 in	 the	Donetsk	Oblast.	Pinchuk	owns	 two	of	 the	
few	most	significant	economic	magazines	(Delo	and	InvestGazeta).	Other	
major	players	on	the	media	market,	in	addition	to	the	four	tycoons,	include	
Petro	Poroshenko,	Vitaliy	Hayduk	and	Serhiy	Taruta.	Poroshenko	owns	the	
news	channel	5	Kanal	and	KP	Media,	which	controls,	for	example,	the	in-
fluential	weekly	Korrespondent	and	the	portal	of	the	same	name.	Hayduk	
and	Taruta	are	believed	to	be	co-owners	of	Evolution	Media	Holding,	which	
controls	 the	Kommentarii	weekly	 and	 Internet	 portal	 and	 the	WeeklyUA	
magazine,	 and	 Media	 Invest	 Group,	 which	 includes	 the	 economic	 daily	
57	 Russian	TV	channels	still	have	some	degree	of	significance.	However,	their	role	has	less-
ened	significantly	in	comparison	to	the	1990s.	At	present,	their	audience	figures	are	in	sin-
gle	figures	in	terms	of	percentage.
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newspaper	Ekonomicheskie	Izvestia	and	the	weekly	Expert	dealing	with	
business	issues.	
In	contrast	to	television,	Ukraine’s	press	market	and	Internet	have	at	least	
a	few	influential	titles	which	are	not	linked	(at	least	not	in	a	visible	way)	
with	 big	 business.	 Examples	 of	 these	 are	 the	 opinion-forming	 weekly	
Zerkalo	Nedeli	and	the	internet	portal	Ukrayinska	Pravda.	
As	with	other	sectors	of	the	Ukrainian	economy,	in	some	cases	it	is	impossi-
ble	to	identify	beyond	all	doubt	the	owner	of	a	given	title.	Akhmetov’s	SCM	
controls	Media	Group	Ukraine	and	Segodnya	Multimedia,	while	Pinchuk’s	
EastOne	Group	owns	StarLight	Media.	In	turn,	it	is	very	difficult	to	prove	
the	formal	ownership	structure	of	the	media	assets	which	are	believed	to	
be	connected	to	Kolomoyskyi.	It	is	also	not	completely	clear	who	owns	U.A.	
Inter	 Media	 Group	 Limited,	 which	 includes	 Ukraine’s	 most	 popular	 TV	
channel.	Officially,	it	is	owned	by	Valeriy	Khoroshkovskyi,	however	there	
is	a	long-standing	common	belief	that	its	real	owner	is	Dmytro	Firtash.	
Rinat 
Akhmetov
Ihor Kolo-
moyskyi
Viktor 
Pinchuk
Valeriy 
Khoroshkovskyi
TV
Ukraina
Football
Football+
1+1
2+2
TET
1+1	Interna-
tional
Novyi	
Kanal
ISTV
STB
M1	and	M2
Inter
K1	and	K2
NTN
MTV	Ukraine
Newspa-
pers and 
maga-
zines
Segodnya,
Salon Dona  
i Basa,
Donetskie 
Novosti,
Priazovskiy 
Rabochiy
Glavred,
Profil,
Telekritika,
Izvestia  
v Ukraine,
UNIAN,
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po-kievski
Fakty  
i Kommen-
tarii,
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Data:	based	on	information	published	on	the	companies’	websites	and	in	the	press
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III. The OlIGARchs AFTeR VIKTOR yANUKOVych’s 
VIcTORy
Big	business	welcomed	the	introduction	of	the	new	parliamentary-presiden-
tial	 system	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Orange	 Revolution.	 This	 resolved	 their	
problem	with	the	strong	presidential	administration,	which	could	have	posed	
a	threat	to	the	oligarchs.	However,	the	chaos	and	the	incessant	political	crisis	
resulting	 from	the	amendment	of	 the	constitution	turned	out	 to	be	harmful	
and	expensive	to	business.	Furthermore,	it	did	not	guarantee	a	sufficient	level	
of	protection	for	their	interests.	As	Yanukovych	won	the	presidential	election	
in	2010	and	one	grouping	took	complete	power,	the	return	of	political	stability	
was	guaranteed.	The	government	also	managed	to	stabilise	the	macroeconom-
ic	situation	in	a	relatively	short	time	span.	
In	October	2010,	the	Constitutional	Court	repealed	the	political	system	reform	
of	2004.	This	gave	President	Yanukovych	the	same	powers	as	had	been	vested	
in	Leonid	Kuchma.	At	the	same	time,	an	unprecedented	process	of	the	execu-
tive	becoming	dominated	by	representatives	of	one	party	and	 the	oligarchic	
groups	 connected	 to	 it	 –	 the	Donetsk	 clan	 and	 the	RUE	 group	 –	was	 taking	
place.	 The	 significance	 of	 the	 other	 political	 groupings	 and	 political	 parties	
was	limited	to	a	great	extent.	
1. The key groups of influence in the state administration
Serhiy	 Lyovochkin	was	 nominated	 head	 of	 the	 Presidential	 Administration	
which,	following	the	amendment	of	the	constitution,	again	became	the	pivotal	
decision-making	body	in	the	executive	system,	as	it	had	been	under	Kuchma’s	
rule.	To	maintain	balance,	 Iryna	Akimova	–	who	was	 linked	to	Akhmetov	–	
was	appointed	as	his	first	deputy.	Despite	this,	Lyovochkin	has	been	successful	
at	dominating	the	flow	of	information	which	reaches	the	president58.	The	Na-
tional	Security	and	Defence	Council	(NSDC),	which	was	directed	until	Febru-
ary	2012	by	Raisa	Bogatyreva	(who	is	also	linked	to	Akhmetov)	–	despite	the	
fact	that	 it	 is	vested	with	extensive	powers	under	the	constitution	–	became	
totally	marginalised	by	the	Presidential	Administration.	In	February	2012,	Bo-
gatyreva	 lost	her	post	as	secretary	of	the	NSDC	and	was	replaced	by	Andriy	
Klyuyev,	who	had	been	the	first	deputy	prime	minister	and	the	minister	for	
58	 Хара: ‘Левочкин и компания ограничивают Януковича в информации’,	Зеркало Недели, 
31	 October	 2011,	 http://news.zn.ua/POLITICS/hara_levochkin_i_kompaniya_ogranichiv-
ayut_yanukovicha_v_informatsii-90610.html
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the	economy	before	 that.	This	politician	and	entrepreneur	originating	 from	
Donetsk	is	one	of	the	key	figures	in	the	Party	of	Regions.	He	and	his	brother	
Yuriy	form	a	separate	group	of	interest,	which	is	oriented	primarily	towards	
President	Yanukovych.	The	 fact	 that	he	has	been	put	 in	charge	of	 the	NSDC	
may	mean	that	this	institution	will	be	given	more	significance	in	the	future,	
but	now	it	is	too	early	to	draw	such	conclusions.	
Until	 the	 end	 of	 2011,	most	members	 of	 the	 government	were	 linked	 to	 the	
Donetsk	clan,	which	was	predominant	in	the	Party	of	Regions.	It	was	only	at	
the	beginning	of	2012	that	the	influence	of	‘the	family’	grew	(see	below).	Prime	
Minister	Mykola	Azarov	is	an	independent	politician	and	does	not	represent	
any	of	the	oligarchs.	He	belongs	to	the	‘old	Donetsk’	group	and	the	old	nomen-
klatura,	dating	back	to	the	1990s.	He	seems	to	be	devoid	of	political	ambitions	
(mainly	because	of	his	age:	he	was	born	 in	 1947)	and	remains	 loyal	 to	Presi-
dent	Yanukovych.	However,	much	seems	to	indicate	that	he	will	be	dismissed	
and	replaced	by	someone	more	popular	after	the	parliamentary	election	(Oc-
tober	2012).	Akhmetov’s	interests	are	represented	in	the	government	by	Borys	
Kolesnikov,	the	deputy	prime	minister	in	charge	of	Euro	2012	and	the	minister	
of	infrastructure,	whose	main	task	was	to	prepare	Ukraine	for	the	European	
football	championship	(and	control	of	the	budget	of	Euro	2012,	the	estimated	
value	of	which	was	US$7.6	billion59).	Bogatyreva,	who	following	her	removal	
from	the	NSDC	was	nominated	deputy	prime	minister	and	healthcare	minis-
ter,	also	represents	Akhmetov’s	interests.	
Initially	RUE	group’s	influence	in	the	government	was	much	weaker	than	in	
the	Presidential	Administration,	but	it	grew	in	two	years.	In	2010,	Yuriy	Boyko	
was	nominated	energy	minister,	and	this	allowed	him	to	take	control	of	the	
gas	sector,	which	was	of	primary	significance	for	Firtash’s	interests.	For	two	
years,	one	more	person	linked	to	Firtash	held	a	senior	position	outside	the	gov-
ernment.	This	was	Valeriy	Khoroshkovskyi,	who	was	the	head	of	the	Security	
Service	of	Ukraine	between	2010	and	2011.	In	February	2012,	he	was	nominated	
first	deputy	prime	minister.	
59	 Николай Туманов, Сколько стоит Евро-2012,	Комментарии,	15	April	2011,	http://smi.liga.
net/articles/2011-04-15/763142-skolko-stoit-evro2012.htm;	during	the	four	years	of	prepa-
rations,	 the	 state	 spent	 41.7	 billion	 hryvnias; ‘За четыре года подготовки к Евро-2012 
государство потратило 42 млрд. грн.’,	Делo,	 13	March	 2012,	 http://delo.ua/ukraine/za-
chetyre-goda-podgotovki-k-evro-2012-gosudarstvo-potratilo-42-m-174744/
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It	may	be	stated	generally	that	the	RUE	group	gained	much	more	influence	than	
could	have	been	expected	on	the	basis	of	its	position	in	the	Party	of	Regions,	
which	is	much	weaker	than	that	of	the	Donetsk	group.	The	reason	why	Yanu-
kovych	agreed	to	offer	such	a	disproportionally	large	number	of	senior	state	
positions	to	Firtash’s	group	was	the	need	to	distance	himself	from	the	Donetsk	
group,	and	first	of	all	from	Akhmetov.	Firtash	in	financial	terms	is	much	weak-
er	than	Akhmetov	and	relies	to	a	much	greater	extent	on	state	support	in	his	
business.	Furthermore,	the	RUE	group	was	opposed	to	the	idea	of	a	grand	coa-
lition	being	formed	by	the	Party	of	Regions	and	BYuT,	and	it	finally	persuaded	
Yanukovych	 to	break	off	 talks,	while	Akhmetov	wanted	a	compromise	with	
Tymoshenko,	which	would	have	led	to	Yanukovych	becoming	a	president	with	
very	limited	power.
The	other	political	groupings	which	form	the	government	coalition	are	of	little	
political	significance.	Serhiy	Tihipko,	the	leader	of	the	party	Strong	Ukraine,	
who	had	received	the	third	highest	support	in	the	presidential	election	of	2010,	
was	nominated	deputy	prime	minister	in	Azarov’s	cabinet,	but	his	influence	
on	the	actions	taken	by	the	government	is	limited60.	Talks	on	Strong	Ukraine	
joining	the	Party	of	Regions	began	in	2011.	In	March	2012,	Strong	Ukraine	was	
dissolved,	and	its	leader,	Tihipko,	was	nominated	deputy	president	of	the	Party	
of	Regions61.
The	 situation	 is	 similar	with	 the	 coalition	 partners	 of	 the	 Party	 of	 Regions	
in	parliament	–	the	Lytvyn	Bloc	(People’s	Party)	and	the	Communist	Party	of	
Ukraine.	As	Yanukovych	and	the	Party	of	Regions	have	been	becoming	more	
powerful,	these	two	groupings	have	been	gradually	turning	into	satellites	of	
the	predominant	coalition	partner.	Volodymyr	Lytvyn,	who	is	the	parliamen-
tary	speaker,	still	has	a	rather	extensive	ability	to	take	action,	but	his	People’s	
Party	depends	financially	on	the	Party	of	Regions62	and,	with	the	present	low	
level	of	support,	he	has	little	chance	of	entering	parliament	following	the	next	
60	 Tihipko,	who	came	third	in	the	presidential	election,	began	to	be	seen	as	a	serious	future	
competitor	to	Yanukovych.	When	he	joined	the	government,	he	was	put	in	charge	of	pre-
paring	and	conducting	unpopular	reforms	(including	the	tax	code	and	the	pension	system	
reform),	which	resulted	in	a	sudden	decline	in	public	support	for	him.	
61	 Ольга Куришко, Сергей Сидоренко, ‘Партия сыграна’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	 19	March	
2012,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1895908?isSearch=True
62	 According	to	some	sources,	the	main	sponsor	of	the	Lytvyn	Bloc	is	Vasyl	Khmelnytsky,	an	
MP	of	the	Party	of	Regions	and	a	less	powerful	oligarch,	Мустафа Найєм, Сергій Лещенко, 
‘Орбіти уряду Миколи Азарова’,	Украинскaя Правда,	13	March	2010,	http://www.pravda.
com.ua/articles/2010/03/13/4859050/	
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election.	The	Communists	have	some	more	autonomy.	They	have	several	posi-
tions	in	the	government	and	state	administration63	and	will	take	part	 in	the	
election	as	an	independent	party.	
In	addition	to	subjugating	his	coalition	partners,	Yanukovych	also	succeeded	
in	marginalising	the	opposition	almost	completely.	This	became	possible	be-
cause	Yulia	Tymoshenko	was	imprisoned	in	August	2011,	and	the	other	poli-
ticians	representing	the	opposition	had	no	clear	strategy	for	action.	Another	
equally	 important	 reason	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 representatives	 of	 big	 business	
had	 reduced	 their	financial	 support	 for	Batkivshchyna	 (the	key	grouping	 in	
the	Yulia	Tymo	shenko	Bloc)	and	the	parties	which	had	emerged	following	the	
breakup	of	Our	Ukraine.	Part	of	 the	oligarchs	who	had	been	elected	as	MPs	
from	the	BYuT	lists,	following	Yanukovych’s	victory,	either	joined	the	Party	of	
Regions	(for	example,	Tariel	Vasadze)	or	formally	still	belonged	to	the	opposi-
tion	but	significantly	reduced	their	financial	support	(for	example	Kostyantin	
Zhevago).	
The	balance	of	power	which	emerged	a	few	months	after	the	presidential	elec-
tion	proved	to	be	quite	durable,	and	the	government	reshuffles	carried	out	as	
a	consequence	of	the	state	administration	reform	in	 late	2010	(including	the	
reduction	in	the	number	of	deputy	prime	ministers	and	ministries)	have	only	
made	it	more	entrenched64.	
2.  ‘The family’ – an attempt at a new quality
The	growing	significance	of	 the	people	who	have	personal	connections	with	
Viktor	Yanukovych	and	his	family	is	a	new	phenomenon	in	Ukrainian	busi-
ness.	Some	analogy	to	this	can	only	be	found	in	Kuchma’s	relations	with	his	son-
in-law,	Viktor	Pinchuk65.	However,	later,	neither	Yushchenko	nor	Tymoshenko	
managed	to	build	up	a	loyal	business	support	base	of	their	own66.	
63	 For	example,	Vasiliy	Tsushko	was	initially	nominated	minister	for	the	economy,	and	later	
became	the	head	of	the	Anti-Monopoly	Committee	of	Ukraine.	
64	 ‘Ukraine’s	President	balances	out	groups	of	influence’,	OSW,	EastWeek,	no.	159,	15	December	
2010,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-12-15/ukraine-s-president-
balances-out-groups-influence
65	 The	difference	is	that	Pinchuk	was	already	one	of	Ukraine’s	most	powerful	businessmen	
before	he	married	Olena	Franchuk	(Kuchma’s	daughter)	in	2002.	
66	 Yushchenko	also	made	such	an	attempt,	but	the	influence	of	his	brother,	Petro,	was	very	
limited	in	both	business	and	political	terms.	
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Yanukovych	has	been	a	political	representative	of	the	Donetsk	group	since	the	
mid	 1990s.	He	was	however	 to	a	great	extent	dependent	on	 the	Donetsk	oli-
garchs,	first	of	all	Akhmetov.	Although	Yanukovych	already	in	2006	managed	
to	partly	reduce	this	dependence	(the	RUE	group,	which	did	not	belong	to	the	
Donetsk	clan,	became	the	second	most	influential	faction	inside	the	Party	of	
Regions),	co-operation	within	the	Donetsk	group	has	not	encountered	any	seri-
ous	problems	since	his	victory	in	the	presidential	election.
When	Yanukovych	became	the	president	of	Ukraine	and	the	constitution	was	
amended	offering	him	extensive	competences,	he	made	an	attempt	to	create	
his	own	business	and	to	base	it	on	the	people	he	trusted	most	of	all:	his	sons	and	
little-known	politicians	who	were	loyal	exclusively	to	the	president.	
Yanukovych	 managed	 to	 accumulate	 some	 assets	 already	 before	 his	 presi-
dency67.	His	fortune	is	incomparable	to	those	of	the	most	powerful	oligarchs,	
but	no	completely	trustworthy	information	concerning	this	issue	is	available.	
Reportedly,	Yanukovych	at	that	time	held	stakes	in	fuel	and	property	develop-
ment	firms,	predominantly	based	in	the	Donetsk	Oblast,	which	were	controlled	
by	Anton	Pryhodsky,	an	MP	from	the	Party	of	Regions,	and	Rinat	Akhmetov.	
Yanukovych’s	 interests	were	 represented	 by	 his	 sons:	 Oleksandr,	who	 is	 in	
charge	of	business,	and	Viktor,	who	since	2006	has	been	an	MP	representing	
the	Party	of	Regions68.	
The	topic	of	‘the	family’	and	its	expansion	was	not	mentioned	in	the	Ukrain-
ian	media	for	many	months.	It	is	still	raised	almost	exclusively	in	independent	
Internet	portals	which	 support	 the	opposition.	Little	 reliable	 information	 is	
available,	 so	 it	 is	difficult	 to	assess	 the	scale	of	 this	phenomenon.	 In	 turn,	 it	
is	relatively	easy	to	track	the	increasing	influence	of	‘the	family’	in	the	state	
administration.	 Serhiy	Arbuzov,	who	was	 reputed	 to	have	been	 the	person-
al	 banker	 of	 the	 Yanukovych	 family,	was	 appointed	 as	 the	 president	 of	 the	
National	Bank	of	Ukraine	 in	 late	2010.	 In	 turn,	Oleksandr	Klimenko,	who	 is	
67	 Сергей Гармаш, ‘Тайны семейного бизнеса Януковича’,	Остров,	 21	March	2007,	http://
www.ostro.org/articles/article-1030/
68	 Oleksandr	was	the	deputy	general	director	of	Donbassnefteprodukt,	and	Viktor	junior	was	
the	deputy	general	director	of	BK-Engineering,	a	property	development	firm	which	built	
large	 shopping	 and	 residential	 buildings	 in	Donetsk	 and	 co-operated	with	Embrol-Engi-
neering,	which	was	owned	by	Anton	Pryhodsky,	an	MP	from	the	Party	of	Regions.	Сергей 
Гармаш, ‘Тайны семейного бизнеса Януковича’,	Остров,	21	March	2007,	http://www.os-
tro.org/articles/article-1030/.
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believed	to	be	a	man	of	Oleksandr	Yanukovych,	became	the	head	of	the	State	
Tax	Service	in	November	2011.	
In	late	2011	and	early	2012,	people	linked	to	‘the	family’	were	put	in	charge	of	
the	key	law	enforcement	agencies.	Vitaliy	Zakharchenko	has	been	the	minis-
ter	of	internal	affairs	since	November	2011,	and	Henadiy	Reznikov	became	the	
head	of	the	State	Special	Communications	Service69	in	December	2011.	They	are	
both	believed	to	be	connected	to	Oleksandr	Yanukovych.	Ihor	Kalinin	was	ap-
pointed	as	the	head	of	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	and	Dmytro	Salamatin	
as	the	minister	of	defence	in	February	2012.	These	two	nominations	are	also	
commonly	viewed	in	Ukraine	as	being	a	reinforcement	of	‘the	family’,	although	
the	biographies	of	these	officials	do	not	indicate	that	they	have	been	linked	to	
Yanukovych	or	his	sons	for	a	long	time70.	
Although	the	aforementioned	functions	are	important,	considering	that	over	
two	years	have	passed	since	Yanukovych	was	elected	president,	it	is	still	dif-
ficult	to	claim	that	‘the	family’	has	gained	very	strong	influence.	Control	of	the	
law	enforcement	agencies	may	turn	out	to	be	very	important	in	a	crisis	situa-
tion71,	but	these	services	have	played	a	much	lesser	role	in	the	current	politics	
of	Ukraine	than	in	other	countries	in	this	region	(especially	in	Russia	and	Bela-
rus),	although	they	have	been	used	(especially	since	2010)	for	harassing	politi-
cal	opponents	and	for	raider	practices.	
It	 is	 clearly	 more	 difficult	 to	 determine	 the	 real	 influence	 ‘the	 family’	 has	
gained	in	business.	Economic	issues	are	supervised	by	Oleksandr	Yanukovych	
and	Yuriy	Ivanyushchenko,	an	MP	and	a	member	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	‘The	
family’	 is	 currently	 the	most	aggressively	operating	group	 in	Ukraine.	Both	
Ivanyushchenko	and	Oleksandr	Yanukovych	have	been	accused	by	part	of	the	
69	 The	State	Service	for	Special	Communications	and	Information	Protection	of	Ukraine	was	
made	separate	from	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	in	2005.	Its	main	tasks	include	secur-
ing	classified	information.	It	is	also	in	charge	of	the	security	of	the	government’s	communi-
cations.	
70	 Kalinin	and	Salamatin	have	connections	with	Russia.	They	were	both	born	outside	Ukraine:	
Kalinin	in	Russia,	and	Salamatin	in	Kazakhstan.	Kalinin	worked	for	the	KGB	from	1984,	
and	later	for	the	SBU.	Salamatin	settled	in	Ukraine	as	late	as	1999.	He	is	the	son-in-law	to	
Oleg	Soskovets	(deputy	prime	minister	of	the	Russian	Federation	in	1993–1996).	However,	
there	are	no	grounds	 to	state	 that	 the	pro-Russian	 faction	 in	 the	Ukrainian	government	
has	been	strengthened	due	 to	 their	nominations.	Cf.	Юлия Мостовая, ‘Эх ты, ксивушка 
моя богатырская!’,	Зеркало недели,	 10	February	2012,	http://zn.ua/POLITICS/eh_ty,_ksi-
vushka_moya_bogatyrskaya-97141.html
71	 Although	it	is	an	open	question	how	these	agencies	will	behave	in	this	kind	of	a	situation.	
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media	 and	 opposition	 politicians	 of	 using	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 to	 take	
over	businesses	from	other	entrepreneurs72.	Ivanyushchenko	has	assets	in	the	
coal,	machine-building,	food	and	agriculture	sectors	and	in	retail	trade73.	Re-
cently,	more	and	more	information	on	his	conflict	with	Yanukovych’s	older	son	
has	been	appearing	in	the	Ukrainian	media.	
Frame 7. The mysterious yura yenakievskiy
Yuriy	 Ivanyushchenko,	 who	 is	 commonly	 known	 in	 the	 media	 as	 Yura	
Yenakievskiy,	 over	 the	 past	 two	 years	 has	 had	 the	 reputation	 of	 being	
a	grey	eminence	in	the	Ukrainian	ruling	class.	In	2010,	he	grew	from	being	
an	anonymous	MP	to	one	of	the	key	figures	in	the	Ukrainian	economy.	In	
2011,	Korrespondent	weekly	placed	Ivanyushchenko	second	after	President	
Yanukovych	in	its	annual	ranking	of	the	100	most	influential	Ukrainians74.	
Ivanyushchenko	had	never	been	mentioned	in	this	ranking	before.	
Ivanyushchenko	 comes	 from	 Yenakieve,	 the	 hometown	 of	 Yanukovy-
ch,	which	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 speculation	 in	many	 publications	 that	 he	 is	
a	childhood	friend	of	the	president75.	This	is,	though,	rather	unlikely	since	
Ivanyushchenko	 is	 nine	 years	 younger	 than	 Yanukovych.	 According	 to	
his	official	biography,	he	was	working	between	1981	and	1996	for	the	Coke	
Chemical	Plant	 in	Yenakieve,	and	 later	he	ran	the	companies	Alvi-Invest	
and	UGK-2000.	In	2007	he	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	from	the	list	
of	the	Party	of	Regions	although	he	does	not	belong	to	any	political	party76.	
However,	it	is	suspected	that	in	fact	Ivanyushchenko	was	involved	in	more	
special	operations.	In	2010,	the	media	published	a	copy	of	a	note	concerning	
Ivanyushchenko,	which	was	reportedly	made	by	Russian	military	intelli-
gence	(GRU).	According	to	the	note,	Ivanyushchenko	led	a	squad	of	killers,	
72	 ‘Янукович и Иванющенко используют УБОП для рейдерства’ – Томенко, Газета.уа,	
22	 November	 2011,	 http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/_yanukovich-i-ivanyuschenko-
ispolzuyut-ubop-dlya-rejderstva-tomenko/406043
73	 ‘Рассекречена бизнес-империя Юры Енакиевского’,	Комментарии Запорожье,	24	March	
2012,	http://zp.comments.ua/article/2012/03/24/124108.html	
74	 ‘Top	 100’,	Корреспондент.net,	 accessed	 on	 16	March	 2012,	 http://files.korrespondent.net/
projects/top100
75	 ‘2 место Юрий Иванющенко’, Корреспондент.net,	accessed	on	16	March	2012,	http://files.
korrespondent.net/projects/top100/2011/1254829
76	 ‘Іванющенко Юрій Володимирович’,	Партия Регионов официальный сайт,	 accessed	 on	
16	March	2012,	http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/ru/deputy_faction/deputies/show/586
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active	in	the	1990s	in	Donetsk	Oblast,	who	were	responsible	for	a	number	
of	infamous	murders	(including	the	murder	of	Akhat	Bragin)77.	Ivanyush-
chenko	sued	the	journalist	who	had	disclosed	this	information.	In	2011,	the	
court	found	that	Ivanyushchenko	had	not	been	linked	to	the	criminal	un-
derworld	in	the	past78.
A	lot	of	information	on	Ivanyushchenko’s	current	activity	was	published	in	
the	media	throughout	the	whole	of	2011.	However,	in	most	cases	this	material	
was	very	difficult	to	verify.	Ivanyushchenko	was	reportedly	given	a	sphere	
of	influence	in	the	Zaporizhia	and	Odessa	Oblasts,	where	he	took	control	of	
the	ports	and	illegal	business	linked	to	them,	including	smuggling79.	It	is	dif-
ficult	to	determine	the	credibility	of	this	information.	However,	the	high	lev-
el	of	activity	of	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	and	other	state	control	agen-
cies	in	Odessa	in	2011	could	be	seen	as	indirect	proof	of	this.	Ivanyushchenko	
has	been	mentioned	on	the	occasions	of	numerous	takeovers	of	companies	
in	 the	machine-building	 and	 coal	 industries,	 but	 he	 himself	 has	 claimed	
that	his	family	holds	only	a	21%	stake	in	Odessa’s	Seventh-Kilometer	Market.	
Ivanyushchenko’s	task	was	to	ensure	funds	for	the	election	campaign	so	that	
Yanukovych	would	become	less	dependent	on	funding	from	the	RUE	group,	
Akhmetov	and	the	other	oligarchs	from	Donetsk.	
However,	much	seems	to	indicate	that	at	the	end	of	2011	Ivanyushchenko	
came	into	conflict	with	the	president	(or	his	son),	the	reported	pretext	for	
which	was	his	having	been	pushing	through	taking	actions	against	Akhme-
tov80.	The	State	Tax	Service	(directed	by	Oleksandr	Yanukovych’s	trusted	
man)	embarked	on	audits	of	transactions	concluded	by	the	business	struc-
tures	which	were	believed	to	be	linked	with	Ivanyushchenko81.	It	was	also	
77	 Сергей Никонов, ‘Простые хищные вещи’, ОРД,	16	March	2012,	http://ordua.com/	2010	/03/06/
prostyie-hischnyie-veschi/
78	 Артем Скоропадский, ‘Суд навел справку’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	 12	 July	 2011,	 http://
www.kommersant.ua/doc/1677368
79	 Соня Кошкина, ‘Именем Семьи’, LB.ua,	 2	 September	 2010,	 http://lb.ua/news/	2010	/	-
09/	02/63436_imenem_semi.html
80	 ‘Источник: Янукович поссорился со своей „правой рукой”’, Росбалт,	 1	 January	 2012,	
http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2012/01/17/934165.html
According	to	another	version,	the	conflict	was	between	Ivanyushchenko	and	Lyovochkin	
over	nominations	to	positions	in	the	government	as	a	consequence	of	the	staff	reshuffles	in	
late	2011	and	early	2012; ‘«Сливает» ли «семья» Юру Енакиевского?’, Хвиля,	6	March	2012,	
http://hvylya.org/analytics/politics/20566-slivaet-li-semja-juru-enakievskogo.html
81	 Сергій Щербина, ‘Чому Юрія Іванющенка перевіряє податкова’, Экономическая Правда,	
22	February	2012,	http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2012/02/22/316622/
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reported	that	 Ivanyushchenko	had	 left	Ukraine82.	 It	seems	however,	 that	
the	conflict	has	been	resolved	and	Ivanyushchenko	has	been	granted	24th	
place	on	the	electoral	list	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	This	guarantees	him	a	seat	
in	the	next	parliament.
A	little	more	knowledge	is	available	about	the	business	of	the	president’s	el-
der	son.	Oleksandr	Yanukovych	is	the	owner	of	the	All-Ukrainian	Develop-
ment	Bank,	and	has	some	shares	in	the	Ukrainian	Business	Bank,	which	was	
directed	by	Arbuzov	between	2003	and	2010.	Both	of	these	institutions	are	of	
low	significance	for	the	Ukrainian	banking	system83.	Furthermore,	Oleksan-
dr	Yanukovych	controls	several	property	development	firms.	Reports	have	
also	appeared	about	his	attempts	 to	 take	over	businesses	on	 the	electronic	
media	market.	He	reportedly	took	over	a	small	TV	channel	called	Tonis	(al-
though	he	himself	has	denied	this)	and	made	a	proposal	to	buy	out	the	news	
TV	channel,	5	Kanal.	
The	most	widely	publicised	cases	involving	‘the	family’	included	the	govern-
ment’s	imposition	of	quotas	on	grain	exports	and	the	activity	of	Khlib	Invest-
Bud	firm.	The	official	reason	provided	for	the	new	regulations	was	the	need	
to	protect	the	market	from	food	price	rises	which	could	result	from	excessive	
exports.	It	turned	out	that	a	definite	majority	of	the	orders	went	to	Khlib	In-
vestBud,	a	firm	which	had	not	previously	been	operating	on	 the	agricultur-
al	market.	The	company	 is	 49%	state-controlled,	 and	 the	 remaining	 stake	 is	
owned	by	shareholders	from	Cyprus	and	Russia,	yet	some	Ukrainian	experts	
have	claimed	that	Khlib	InvestBud	is	in	fact	controlled	by	Ivanyushchenko84.	
The	Khlib	InvestBud	story	is	a	manifestation	of	both	the	strength	and	limita-
tions	of	‘the	family’.	Khlib	InvestBud	gained	a	very	strong	market	position	ow-
ing	to	state	contracts	and	the	withholding	of	orders	for	the	other	grain	traders.	
However,	it	did	not	manage	to	take	total	control	of	grain	trade,	and	the	govern-
ment	under	pressure	from	other	firms	operating	on	this	market,	which	were	
supported	by	Western	countries,	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank,	eventually	had	
to	lift	the	export	quotas.	
82	 ‘Иванющенко уехал из Украины?’,	Украинскaя Правда,	5	March	2012,	http://www.pravda.
com.ua/rus/news/2012/03/5/6960026/
83	 According	to	data	from	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	(as	of	1	January	2012),	the	All-Ukraini-
an	Development	Bank	was	ranked	88th	and	the	Ukrainian	Business	Bank	was	ranked	55th	in	
terms	of	assets.	
84	 ‘Квоты на сахар получили заводы регионалов и знакомого Иванющенко’, Украинская 
Правда,	19	July	2011,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2011/07/19/6400076/	
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Ukraine’s	 largest	 privatisation	 in	 recent	 history	 remains	 a	 mysterious	 case.	
A	92.8%	stake	in	Ukrtelecom,	the	state-owned	fixed-line	telephone	network	op-
erator,	was	sold	for	US$1.3	billion	in	December	2010.	The	tender	was	won	by	EPIC,	
a	little-known	Austrian	company,	which	had	no	previous	experience	in	telecom-
munications.	In	this	case,	too,	certain	Ukrainian	media	suggested	that	the	real	
buyer	was	‘the	family’,	although	no	proof	was	presented	to	support	this85.
Although	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess	 ‘the	 family’s	 real	 influence	 in	 the	 economy,	
some	facts	provide	grounds	to	suppose	that	this	influence	is	not	yet	very	great	
at	the	present	stage.	Its	actions	are	rather	focused	on	using	the	opportunities	
as	they	crop	up	and	are	not	the	effects	of	a	well-thought	out	strategy.	Further-
more,	 the	greater	part	of	 the	most	profitable	 segments	of	 the	economy	have	
already	been	divided	among	the	existing	oligarchs,	and	any	attempt	to	enter	
these	segments	made	by	representatives	of	 ‘the	family’	would	certainly	pro-
voke	a	conflict	which	would	be	difficult	to	conceal.	It	may	be	stated	that	most	
of	the	business	‘the	family’	is	running	is	of	minor	significance	on	the	scale	of	
the	state.	It	is	rather	unlikely	that	Oleksandr	Yanukovych’s	bank	could	become	
a	major	player	in	the	banking	sector	in	the	immediate	future.	
Frame 8. The oligarchs and the banks in Ukraine
The	banking	sector	is	one	of	the	few	branches	of	the	Ukrainian	economy	
to	have	a	rather	large	share	of	foreign	investors	(39%).	Out	of	the	177	banks	
operating	in	Ukraine,	56	have	foreign	capital,	and	21	of	them	are	100%	con-
trolled	by	foreign	capital86.	Russian	investors	are	especially	active	–	the	top	
ten	includes	as	many	as	three	banks	with	Russian	capital.	
The	banking	sector	is	also	distinguished	by	a	relatively	low	level	of	presence	
of	the	oligarchs.	Out	of	the	ten	largest	banks,	which	control	in	total	54.2%	
of	the	assets	in	the	banking	sector,	only	two	–	Privat	and	the	First	Ukrain-
ian	International	Bank	(FUIB)	–	are	owned	by	oligarchs	(see	Frame	9).	Al-
though	many	 of	 the	 other	 Ukrainian	 banks	 are	 controlled	 by	 oligarchs,	
these	are	medium-sized	or	small	institutions	and	have	no	decisive	impact	
85	 Бондарь: ‘«Укртелеком» купили под окружение Януковича’,	Дело,	12	March	2011;	http://
delo.ua/business/bondar-ukrtelekom-kupili-p-153780/.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 necessar-
ily	mean	 ‘the	 family’.	According	to	many	sources,	 the	person	behind	the	privatisation	of	
Ukrtelecom	 was	 Lyovochkin.	 Галина Каплюк, Альона Блохтур; ‘«Укртелеком» купив 
Льовочкін?’,	Главком,	12	March	2011,	http://glavcom.ua/articles/3159.html
86	 Data	from	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	as	of	1	July	2011.	
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on	the	sector	as	a	whole.	The	principal	task	for	most	of	them	is	to	take	care	
of	the	business	of	a	given	entrepreneur.	
The	most	powerful	exception	to	this	rule	is	Privat	Bank	owned	by	Ihor	Ko-
lomoyskyi	and	Henadiy	Boholyubov.	This	is	Ukraine’s	largest	bank	and	one	
of	the	few	which	managed	to	survive	the	crisis	relatively	painlessly.	While	
the	 entire	 sector	had	problems,	Privat	Bank	generated	a	profit	of	 almost	
UAH1	billion	in	the	first	three	quarters	of	2011.	
The	representative	of	big	business	who	could	play	a	great	part	in	this	sector	
is	Rinat	Akhmetov.	In	April	2012,	information	on	the	merger	of	two	banks	
from	the	SCM	group	was	made	public	–	Dongorbank	became	part	of	FUIB.	
This	merger	gave	FUIB	ninth	position	on	the	list	of	Ukraine’s	largest	banks.	
The	bank’s	development	strategy	envisages	that	it	will	find	itself	in	the	top	
five	by	2014.	Furthermore,	SCM	owns	a	smaller	bank,	Renaissance	Capital.	
At	present,	it	is	unclear	what	the	future	of	Nadra	bank	will	be.	This	used	to	
be	one	of	the	largest	banks,	but	the	crisis	led	it	to	such	a	difficult	situation	
that	it	faced	the	possibility	of	being	nationalised.	In	April	2011,	as	a	conse-
quence	of	an	additional	issue	of	shares,	control	of	this	bank	was	taken	over	
by	Dmytro	Firtash’s	Centragas	Holding.	
The	further	development	of	the	banking	sector	will	depend	primarily	on	
the	 condition	of	 the	global	 economy.	The	banking	 system	was	especially	
severely	affected	by	the	crisis	in	2009,	and	has	been	very	weak	ever	since.	
It	was	only	in	2011	that	the	situation	began	to	gradually	improve.	Despite	
this,	Ukrainian	banks	sustained	a	total	 loss	of	UAH5.6	billion	in	the	first	
three	quarters	of	2011.	They	still	have	to	deal	with	a	great	number	of	bad	
loans87	and	low	confidence	levels.	The	situation	is	additionally	complicated	
due	to	the	bad	condition	of	the	Western	European	banks	which	control	part	
of	the	Ukrainian	banks.	Some	foreign	investors	have	withdrawn	from	the	
Ukrainian	market,	 either	partly	or	 completely88.	Others,	 including	Com-
merzbank	and	BNP	Paribas	–	which	own	large	banks	in	Ukraine	–	are	also	
87	 According	to	estimates	by	the	McKinsey	consulting	firm,	bad	loans	make	up	35%	of	the	loan	
portfolio.	Елена Губарь, ‘Украину признали самой слабой’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	9	No-
vember	2011,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1811750?isSearch=True	
88	 The	Swedish	group	Skandinaviska	Enskilda	Banken,	which	owns	SEB	bank,	announced	in	
November	2011	the	sale	of	its	network	which	offers	services	to	individual	clients.	A	similar	
decision	was	taken	by	Swedbank	in	September	2011.
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considering	withdrawing	from	the	Ukrainian	market;	their	chief	problem	
in	 this	 is,	 though,	 the	 lack	of	 investors	who	would	wish	 to	purchase	 the	
institutions	they	control.	It	is	rather	unlikely	that	a	possible	sale	of	banks	
by	Western	investors	will	lead	to	a	‘re-Ukrainisation’	of	this	sector	since	it	
is	difficult	 to	 indicate	any	potential	buyers	among	 the	representatives	of	
Ukrainian	 big	 business.	 For	 this	 reason,	 a	 further	 expansion	 of	 Russian	
banks	 is	 the	most	 likely	 scenario.	 In	 2011,	 Sberbank	of	Russia	was	 espe-
cially	active;	it	has	tripled	its	assets	over	the	past	two	years	and	has	been	
rapidly	developing	the	network	of	its	banks	in	Ukraine.	
Frame 9. Ukraine’s largest banks (in terms of assets) as of 1 October 2011
Name
Assets 
(in mil-
lions of 
UAh)
share 
in the 
banking 
system
Owner (key shareholders 
and the country of origin)
1 Privat	Bank 141,363 13.7%
Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	and	
Henadiy	Boholyubov		
(Privat	Group,	Ukraine)
2 Oschadbank 75,349 7.3% state-owned
3 Ukreximbank 73,072 7.1% state-owned
4
Raiffeisen	Bank	
Aval
53,168 5.2%
Raiffeisen	Bank	International	
AG	(Austria)
5 UkrSibbank 42,235 4.1% BNP	Paribas	Group	(France)
6 Ukrsocbank 39,619 3.8%
Bank	Austria,	UniCredit	
Group	(Italy)
7 WTB	Bank 36,661 3.6%
a	subsidiary	of	Vneshtorg-
bank	(Russia)
8 Prominvestbank 35,279 3.4% Vnesheconombank	(Russia)
9 FUIB 29,278 2.8%
Rinat	Akhmetov	(SCM,	
Ukraine)
10 Alfa	Bank 26,157 2.5% Alfa	Group	(Russia)
11 Nadra 24,566 2.4%
Dmytro	Firtash	(Centragas	
Holding	GmbH,	Ukraine)
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Name
Assets 
(in mil-
lions of 
UAh)
share 
in the 
banking 
system
Owner (key shareholders 
and the country of origin)
12 OTP	Bank 22,826 2,2% OTP	Bank	(Hungary)
13
Finances	and	
Credit
21,698 2,1% Kostyantin	Zhevago	(Ukraine)
14 Brokbiznes	Bank 19,398 1,9%
Oleksandr	i	Serhiy	Buriak	
(Ukraine)
15 Ukrgasbank 15,941 1,5% state-owned
16 Kreditprombank 13,241 1,3%
mixed	shareholding	structure	
–	Ukrainian	and	international	
capital89	
17 Bank	Forum 12,453 1,2% Commerzbank	(Germany)
18 Delta	Bank 18,856 1,8% Mykola	Lagun	(Ukraine)
19 Sberbank	Rossii 15,118 1,5% a	subsidy	of	Sberbank	Rossii	
20 ING	Bank	Ukraina 10,843 1,1% ING Bank Н.В. (Holland)
Data:	National	Bank	of	Ukraine90
DZIKIE	PRZYPISY	89		90
The	situation	is	similar	on	the	media	market.	Even	if	Tonis	is	actually	owned	
by	Yanukovych,	and	if	5	Kanal	were	to	be	sold,	it	would	still	be	a	long	way	from	
the	creation	of	a	media	empire	that	would	ensure	independence	from	the	oli-
garchs.	The	takeover	of	5	Kanal	would	deal	a	painful	blow	to	the	opposition,	
since	this	is	one	of	the	two	television	stations	which	openly	do	not	support	the	
government91.	However,	its	range	and	significance	is	marginal	in	comparison	
to	the	main	channels,	which	are	in	the	hands	of	Akhmetov,	Kolomoyskyi	and	
Pinchuk.
89	 Александр Дубинский, ‘Кредитпромбанк пошел по рукам’,	 Экономические известия,	
6	October	2011,	http://finance.eizvestia.com/full/kreditprombank-poshel-po-rukam
90	 Національний банк України,	accessed	on	19	March	2012,	http://www.bank.gov.ua/docca-
talog/document?id=87230
91	 Another	 opposition	 television	 channel	 is	 TVi,	whose	 viewing	 figures	 are	 however	 even	
lower.;	Natalia	A.	 Feduschak,	Yuriy	Onyshkiv,	Media	 expert:	 ‘Only	 two	TV	 stations	 still	
give	viewers	fair	news	coverage’,	Kyiv Post,	5	March	2010,	http://www.kyivpost.com/news/
nation/detail/66674/
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Besides	President	Yanukovych’s	cautiousness	–he	wants	to	become	independ-
ent	from	the	oligarchs	but	at	the	same	time	to	avoid	coming	into	an	open	con-
flict	with	them	–	another	factor	which	is	holding	back	the	expansion	of	 ‘the	
family’	is	the	very	limited	number	of	reserve	staff.	There	are	few	people	who	
would	be	able	to	hold	senior	positions	and	who	are	at	the	same	time	fully	trust-
ed	by	Yanukovych.	In	turn,	a	greater	openness	towards	new	circles	poses	the	
risk	of	disloyalty	in	the	future.	The	nominations	of	the	head	of	the	SBU	and	of	
the	defence	minister	have	proven	how	poor	Yanukovych’s	staff	base	is.	Neither	
Ihor	Kalinin	nor	Dmytro	Salamatin	are	linked	to	any	major	group	of	influence	
in	Ukraine.	They	both	owe	their	present	positions	exclusively	to	the	president.	
However,	taking	into	account	their	biographies	so	far,	it	is	difficult	to	identify	
them	as	the	president’s	trusted	men.
3. The expansion of business linked to the Party of Regions
Their	extensive	influence	in	the	state	administration	has	made	it	possible	for	
the	oligarchs	linked	to	the	Party	of	Regions	to	continue	their	expansion.	Never	
before	in	the	history	of	Ukraine	have	representatives	of	one	region	dominat-
ed	the	entire	country	to	such	an	extent.	This	concerns	both	politics	and	state	
administration	and	business.	Those	who	benefit	from	this	most	are	above	all	
the	two	key	sponsors	of	the	Party	of	Regions	–	Rinat	Akhmetov	and	Dmytro	
Firtash.	Although	Akhmetov	gained	more	 through	 the	 takeovers	and	priva-
tisations	of	state-controlled	companies,	Firtash	achieved	the	greatest	success	
when	 seen	proportionally.	 The	 business	 of	 Firtash,	which	 as	 a	 consequence	
of	actions	taken	by	Tymoshenko	found	itself	on	the	verge	of	total	collapse	re-
turned	to	flourish	after	the	Party	of	Regions	took	power.
3.1. Dmytro Firtash
Firtash,	with	help	from	Energy	Minister	Yuriy	Boyko,	placed	his	men	in	the	
management	structures	of	Naftogaz	(Yevhen	Bakulin	became	its	Chief	Execu-
tive	Officer)	and	in	the	subsidiaries	of	Naftogaz,	including	Ukrgazvydobuvan-
nya,	Ukraine’s	largest	gas	producer,	and	Ukrtransgaz,	a	company	dealing	with	
gas	transport.
Firtash	 managed	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	 number	 of	 decisions	 were	 passed	 which	
were	beneficial	for	him.	This	made	it	possible	to	rebuild	the	position	of	RUE	
at	a	fast	rate.	At	the	beginning	of	2011,	the	court	rejected	Ukrtransgaz’s	claim	
against	UkrGazEnergo	 (a	 joint	venture	of	NAK	Naftogaz	and	RosUkrEnergo)	
for	the	collection	of	the	debt	at	UAH861	million	for	gas	transport	services	 in	
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the	preceding	years92.	The	fact	that	the	new	management	of	Ukrtransgaz	was	
loyal	to	Firtash	probably	had	an	impact	on	the	trial.	The	passive	stance	taken	
by	Naftogaz	 during	 the	 arbitration	 in	 Stockholm	was	 even	more	 important	
–	this	concerned	the	return	of	11	billion	m3	of	gas	which	had	been	taken	away	
from	RosUkrEnergo	in	2009.	 In	effect,	 the	arbitration	court	passed	a	verdict	
which	was	favourable	for	Firtash’s	company,	and	this	verdict	was	confirmed	
by	a	Ukrainian	court	in	late	201093.	This	verdict	meant	the	imposition	of	a	very	
heavy	burden	on	the	state	(the	gas	was	worth	approximately	US$3	billion),	and	
the	direct	losses	sustained	by	Ukraine	due	to	the	differences	in	gas	prices	be-
tween	2009	and	2011	reached	around	one	billion	US	dollars.	
Firtash	could	not	regain	his	role	as	an	agent	in	gas	imports	because	Naftogaz	
and	Gazprom	had	signed	contracts	for	direct	gas	supplies,	valid	until	the	end	
of	2019.	However,	he	successfully	re-entered	the	Ukrainian	internal	market,	
including	the	most	profitable	supplies	 to	 industrial	plants.	 In	April	2011,	 the	
government	cancelled	Naftogaz’s	monopoly	over	gas	imports,	and	thus	made	
it	possible	 for	Firtash	to	 import	gas	directly	 from	Russia.	The	National	Elec-
tricity	 Regulatory	 Commission	 of	 Ukraine	 granted	 to	 UkrGazEnergo	 a	 five-
year	licence	for	the	sale	of	up	to	4.8	billion	m3	of	gas	annually	on	the	domestic	
market94.	For	reasons	which	remain	unclear,	the	gas	was	in	fact	imported	not	
by	UkrGazEnergo,	but	by	Ostchem	holding	controlled	by	Firtash,	which	 im-
ported	around	5	billion	m3	of	gas	in	2011.	Part	of	this	gas	was	used	by	the	chem-
ical	plants	owned	by	Firtash,	and	part	of	 it	was	sold	 to	 industrial	 recipients	
in	Ukraine.	Firtash	was	able	to	buy	gas	at	lower	prices95	than	those	offered	by	
Gazprom	to	the	state-controlled	Naftogaz.	The	competition	from	Ostchem	was	
one	of	the	reasons	for	Naftogaz’s	worsening	financial	problems.	This	has	had	
a	direct	negative	impact	on	Ukraine’s	financial	condition.	
Firtash’s	business	activity	was	not	limited	to	the	gas	sector.	In	2010	and	2011,	he	
bought	a	number	of	companies	from	the	chemical	industry	specialising	in	the	
production	of	nitrogen	fertilisers.	As	a	consequence	of	the	takeovers,	Ostchem	
92	 ‘Суд отменил взыскание с «УкрГаз-Энерго» в пользу «Укртрансгаза» 860 млн. грн.’,	
Униан Экономика,	13	January	2011,	http://economics.unian.net/rus/detail/73694
93	 Ukraine	was	to	return	12.1	billion	m3	of	gas	(11	billion	m3	of	gas	received	and	1.1	billion	m3	as	
compensation).	
94	 In	September	2011,	Firtash	succeeded	at	obtaining	a	court	verdict	under	which	Naftogaz	
was	excluded	as	a	shareholder	of	UkrGazEnergo.
95	 Firtash	claims	that	he	imports	gas	from	Central	Asia.	However,	this	would	be	impossible	
without	consent	from	Russia,	which	since	2006	has	successfully	blocked	the	possibility	of	
direct	gas	imports	from	other	countries	through	its	territory.	
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owns	four	of	Ukraine’s	six	 largest	nitrogen	fertiliser	manufacturers,	 includ-
ing	Stirol	and	the	Severodonetsk	Azot	Association,	and	has	thus	become	a	near	
monopoly	in	Ukraine96	and	has	gained	a	key	position	on	the	global	market97.
The	expansion	in	the	chemical	sector	was	economically	feasible,	because	natu-
ral	gas	is	the	key	raw	material	used	for	the	production	of	fertilisers.	Therefore,	
the	rate	of	return	of	these	plants	is	inversely	proportional	to	the	price	of	gas.	
Since	Firtash	has	been	able	to	buy	gas	at	lower	prices,	he	has	also	been	able	to	
ensure	higher	profits.
Yanukovych’s	rule	has	made	it	possible	for	Firtash	to	maintain	his	position	in	
yet	another	branch,	the	titanium	industry.	Ostchem	de facto controls	the	state-
owned	plant,	Crimea	Titan,	although	 it	 is	 a	minority	 shareholder98.	 Firtash,	
through	his	managers,	also	controls	the	largest	state-owned	companies	in	this	
sector,	including	Titan	Ukraine.	One	vivid	example	of	how	Firtash	is	backed	by	
the	state	was	the	decision	passed	by	the	State	Property	Fund	of	Ukraine	at	the	
beginning	of	2012,	which	granted	consent	for	a	five	year	extension	to	Crimea	
Titan’s	lease	of	Ukraine’s	two	largest	plants	dealing	with	titanium	ore	produc-
tion	and	beneficiation,	the	Volnogorsky	and	Irshansky	mining	and	metallurgi-
cal	works.	The	monthly	lease	rent	is	around	US$200,000,	while	the	estimated	
profit	generated	by	only	one	of	the	works	ranges	between	US$150	and	200	mil-
lion99.	Firtash	has	also	announced	his	plans	to	create	a	titanium	holding,	which	
would	include	the	companies	from	this	sector,	where	the	state	would	only	hold	
a	blocking	 stake.	Talks	with	 the	government	 concerning	 this	 issue	are	now	
underway.	
Firtash	has	also	acquired	assets	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy;	for	example,	
he	took	over	Nadra	(one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	banks)	and	the	Nika-Tera	termi-
nal	at	Mykolaiv	sea	port,	one	of	the	functions	of	which	is	chemical	production	
96	 The	plants	controlled	by	Ostchem	manufacture	100%	of	Ukraine’s	production	of	ammonium	
nitrate	and	over	50%	of	ammonia	and	carbamide.	
97	 In	2000,	Ukrainian	exports	accounted	 for	approximately	 12%	of	 the	global	market	of	ni-
trogen	 fertilisers.	 However,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2009,	 Ukraine’s	
share	decreased	significantly	to	a	level	of	approximately	3%	in	2010;	Наталия Билоусова, 
‘Химическая перезагрузка’,	 Укррудпром,	 27	 April	 2011,	 http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/di-
gest/Himicheskaya_perezagruzka.html
98	 The	state	owns	50%	+	1	share	in	Crimea	Titan,	and	Ostchem	owns	50%	-	1	share.
99	 Валерий Мазур, ‘Сколько государство теряет на аренде титановых ГОКов’, Дело,	3	Feb-
ruary	2012,	http://delo.ua/opinions/skolko-gosudarstvo-terjaet-na-arende-titanovyh-gok-
ov-173046/
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export.	The	takeover	of	this	terminal	was	facilitated	by	actions	taken	by	state	
administration	agencies,	which	embarked	on	numerous	inspections	and	thus	
paralysed	the	operation	of	the	terminal100.	
It	is	not	entirely	clear	where	Firtash	got	the	money	from	for	the	takeovers.	The	
Severodonetsk	Azot	Association	alone	cost	US$400	million.	According	to	me-
dia	reports,	at	least	part	of	the	funds	was	offered	as	a	loan	by	Russia’s	Gazprom-
bank.	This	gives	rise	to	the	question	as	to	the	degree	of	Firtash’s	independence.	
Given	the	financial	support	from	the	Russian	bank	and	his	past	and	present	
unclear	dealings	with	Gazprom	linked	to	gas	imports	to	Ukraine,	a	significant	
part	of	Ukrainian	experts	believe	that	Firtash	is	the	main	figure	in	the	pro-
Russian	faction	among	the	Ukrainian	elite.	Furthermore,	 the	dependence	of	
the	rate	of	return	of	chemical	plants	on	price	of	gas	has	made	RUE	Group	one	
of	the	key	lobbyists	for	an	agreement	on	changing	the	gas	price	to	be	concluded	
as	soon	as	possible	between	Ukraine	and	Russia.	
3.2. Rinat Akhmetov
Yanukovych’s	rule	has	turned	out	to	be	equally	beneficial	for	Ukraine’s	richest	
businessman.	Since	2010,	Akhmetov	has	focused	on	reinforcing	his	position	in	
the	two	key	areas	of	his	activity	–	power	engineering	and	metallurgy.	
Akhmetov	managed	to	prevent	a	further	expansion	of	Russian	capital	(follow-
ing	the	takeover	of	ISD)	in	the	metallurgical	industry.	In	2010,	two	large	plants	
–	the	Ilyich	Steel	and	Iron	Works	in	Mariupol	(Ukraine’s	second	largest	metal-
lurgical	plant)	and	Zaporizhstal	–	were	taken	over	by	Cypriot	companies,	which	
most	likely	represented	Russian	investors101.	In	June	2010,	Akhmetov	managed	
to	cause	the	invalidation	of	the	sale	of	the	Ilyich	Steel	and	Iron	Works	–	Prime	
Minister	Azarov	recognised	the	sale	of	this	plant,	which	had	been	made	a	year	
before,	 as	an	attempt	at	 an	 illegal	 takeover.	 In	effect,	 the	works	were	 taken	
over	by	MetInvest,	which	is	controlled	by	SCM.	In	July	2011,	MetInvest	bought	
a	majority	stake	of	Zaporizhstal’s	owner.
100	 Максим Гардус, Николаев; Александр Черновалов,	‘Group	DF	вошла в порт’,	Коммерсантъ 
Украина,	29	September	2011,	http://kommersant.ua/doc/1783373
101	 ‘Rosjanie	 przejmują	 ukraińską	 metalurgię?’,	 OSW,	 Tydzień na Wschodzie,	 no.	 138,	 9	 June	
2010,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2010-06-09/rosjanie-
przejmuja-ukrainska-metalurgie
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In	late	2011/early	2012,	DTEK,	which	is	owned	by	SCM,	significantly	strengthened	
its	position	on	the	power	engineering	market.	DTEK	bought	controlling	stakes	
in	three	power	plant	complexes	(Zakhidenerho,	Dnieproenergo	and	Kyivenerho)	
from	the	state	as	part	of	tenders.	This	takeover	and	the	assets	he	already	owned	
in	 the	 energy	 sector	 (Skhidenergo	 in	 the	Donetsk	Oblast)	 ensured	Akhmetov	
control	of	approximately	30%	of	the	electricity	produced	in	Ukraine102.	Further-
more,	Zakhidenerho,	which	includes	power	plants	integrated	with	the	system	
used	in	Western	Europe,	will	allow	Akhmetov	to	control	very	profitable	exports	
of	electricity	to	EU	member	states.	The	tenders	for	electricity	export	to	Ukraine’s	
neighbours	(including	Belarus	and	Moldova)	held	by	the	state	are	usually	won	
by	firms	which	belong	to	DTEK,	while	state-owned	companies	and	the	other	oli-
garchs	(Kostyantin	Zhevago)	are	only	given	limited	export	possibilities103.	
Furthermore,	in	November	2011,	DTEK	was	granted	a	49-year	lease	of	Roven-
kyantratsyt	and	Sverdlovantratsyt,	companies	which	control	Ukraine’s	eight	
largest	coal	mines,	which	ensured	him	a	share	of	over	50%	in	the	production	
of	energy	coal,	which	is	used	as	fuel	in	power	plants.	Thus	Akhmetov	became	
independent	 from	external	 suppliers	 –he	now	has	 an	 integrated	production	
chain:	from	coal	mining	and	enrichment	to	the	production	and	distribution	of	
electricity.	
In	addition	to	its	spectacular	expansion	in	industry,	SCM	has	also	embarked	on	
activity	in	agriculture,	a	sector	where	it	had	not	previously	been.	The	Ilyich	Steel	
and	Iron	Works,	apart	from	the	metallurgical	plants,	owned	also	200,000	hectares	
of	arable	land	and	100,000	pigs	and	cattle.	Using	these	assets	as	a	base,	SCM	and	
Smart	Holding	owned	by	Vadym	Novinsky,	Akhmetov’s	business	partner,	created	
HarvEast	Group.	This	group,	should	adequate	financial	investments	be	made,	may	
become	one	of	the	top	players	on	the	agricultural	market	in	a	few	years’	time104.	
3.3. The other oligarchs
Contrary	 to	 the	 situation	with	 the	 two	aforementioned	oligarchs,	much	 less	
is	known	about	the	ways	in	which	the	other	businessmen	linked	to	the	Party	
102	 Approximately	 50%	 of	 electricity	 in	Ukraine	 is	 produced	 by	 state-owned	nuclear	 power	
plants.	There	are	no	plans	to	privatise	them.	
103	 Юрій Віннічук, Роман Іванченко, ‘Ахметову знову віддали експорт електроенергії’,	Экономи­
ческая Правда,	15	December	2011,	http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/	2011	/	12/15/309807/
104	 ‘Ukraine’s	largest	oligarch	enters	the	agricultural	market’,	OSW,	EastWeek,	no.	181,	15	June	2011,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-06-15/ukraine-s-largest-oligarch-en-
ters-agricultural-market
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of	Regions	have	been	amassing	their	assets.	This	is	the	case	because	no	major	
takeovers	 associated	with	 Borys	 Kolesnikov	 or	Oleksandr	 Yaroslavsky	 have	
taken	 place	 over	 the	 past	 two	 years.	 The	media	 have	 regularly	 reported	 on	
large-scale	scandals	with	members	of	 the	government	 involved,	yet	no	hard	
evidence	has	been	presented105.	The	most	widely	publicised	case	was	the	pur-
chase	of	an	oil	rig	at	a	price	inflated	by	US$150	million	by	the	Ministry	of	En-
ergy	 led	by	Yuriy	Boyko106.	 It	has	 also	been	 speculated	 that	Andriy	Klyuyev	
as	the	first	deputy	prime	minister	has	backed	the	activity	of	Livela,	the	com-
pany	which	was	granted	 the	 right	 to	 import	duty-free	 fuel	 to	Ukraine,	 thus	
generating	a	loss	of	UAH3	billion	in	the	Ukrainian	budget107.	Furthermore,	Kly-
uyev	has	most	likely	used	state	support	to	develop	his	own	business	with	solar	
power	plants.	According	to	information	from	certain	media,	EU	funds	for	the	
improvement	 of	 energy	 efficiency	have	 been	 spent	 on	 connecting	Klyuyev’s	
power	plants	to	the	power	grid108.	
Many	doubts	 have	 also	 been	 raised	 about	 the	way	money	was	 spent	 on	 the	
preparations	for	Euro	2012,	especially	given	the	fact	that	work	was	not	usually	
preceded	by	tenders.	It	is	very	likely	that	only	part	of	the	information	on	scan-
dals	of	this	kind	has	been	leaked	to	the	media.	Given	the	special	characteristic	
of	the	Ukrainian	business,	where	only	part	of	business	is	openly	declared,	and	
great	fortunes	are	deposited	in	accounts	in	tax	havens109,	positions	in	the	gov-
ernment	translate	into	real	power	in	the	economy.	
4. The other oligarchic groups
The	two	largest	oligarchs	among	those	who	are	not	dependent	on	the	Party	of	
Regions	are	Pinchuk	and	Kolomoyskyi	but	the	takeover	of	total	political	power	
by	the	Party	of	Regions	has	as	yet	not	led	to	the	economic	positions	of	these	two	
105	 Very	many	publications	on	this	topic	can	be	found	on	the	Ukrainian	Internet.	Here	is	an	
example	of	an	article	describing	the	best-known	cases:	А. Шалайский, В. Трегубов, ‘Топ-
7 схем облегчения бюджета’, Зеркало недели,	29	December	2011,	http://zn.ua/POLITICS/
top7_shem_oblegcheniya_byudzheta__reyting_effektivno_osvoennyh_sredstv_v_
uhodyaschem_godu-94878.html
106	 Ю. Николов, А. Шалайский, ‘Вышка для Бойко’,	Зеркало недели,	27	May	2011,	http://zn.ua/
POLITICS/vyshka_dlya_boyko-81790.html
107	 Problems	of	refineries	in	Ukraine,	OSW,	EastWeek,	no.	162,	27	May	2011,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-01-19/problems-refineries-ukraine
108	 Сергей Сидоренко, ‘Украина предстала в новом свете’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	8	February	
2012,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1868231?isSearch=True
109	 The	true	scale	of	this	phenomenon	appears	to	be	impossible	to	assess.	
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men	being	upset,.	Some	measures	aimed	against	Privat	Group	were	however	
taken	in	2010110.	This	attack	was	so	evident	that	speculations	appeared	in	the	
media	that	Yanukovych	was	preparing	the	role	of	a	‘Ukrainian	Khodorkovsky’	
for	Kolomoyskyi111.	However,	given	the	high	level	of	corruption	in	the	Ukrain-
ian	 judiciary,	Privat	 still	had	enough	 funds	and	 influence	 to	obtain	verdicts	
which	were	beneficial	 for	 it.	The	 attempt	 to	deprive	Kolomoyskyi	 of	 control	
of	Ukrnafta,	which	is	formally	a	state-controlled	company,	was	unsuccessful.	
No	real	action	has	been	taken	to	 take	Ukraine’s	 largest	refinery	 in	Kremen-
chuk	away	from	Kolomoyskyi	despite	the	fact	that	Russia	has	been	endeavour-
ing	 for	 this.	The	only	 successful	 step	was	 the	prevention	of	 the	purchase	of	
Ukraine	International	Airlines	(MAU),	which	would	have	made	Privat	a	total	
monopoly	in	air	transport.	All	this	indicates	that	after	several	months	of	con-
frontation,	Kolomoyskyi	managed	to	reach	a	compromise	with	representatives	
of	the	Party	of	Regions.	
The	government	has	also	taken	some	steps	aimed	against	Viktor	Pinchuk.	One	
of	the	reasons	behind	the	criminal	proceedings	launched	in	2011	against	Kuch-
ma	was	most	probably	an	attempt	to	put	pressure	on	his	son-in-law.	However,	
no	 information	 is	 available	on	possible	 concessions	made	by	Pinchuk112,	 and	
the	court	decided	to	discontinue	the	case	in	December	2011.	However,	the	fact	
that	the	measures	taken	against	the	representatives	of	big	business	who	do	not	
form	the	direct	financial	base	of	the	Party	of	regions	have	been	given	up	does	
not	mean	that	such	steps	will	not	be	taken	again	in	the	future.
Frame 10. The president, the party and the oligarchs
It	is	not	easy	to	draw	the	scheme	of	mutual	connections	between	the	gov-
ernment	and	big	business	which	has	formed	since	2010.	Since	the	present	
ruling	class	is	very	hermetic,	information	on	the	real	relations	between	its	
representatives	is	strongly	restricted.	
It	appears	that	the	top	position	in	the	hierarchy	is	held	by	President	Yanu-
kovych,	who	has	a	decisive	influence	on	both	the	ruling	Party	of	Regions	
110	 Алексей Педосенко, ‘Донецкие пилят бизнес Коломойского?’,	 Главком,	 15	 September	
2010,	http://glavcom.ua/articles/1704.html
111	 Олег Полищук, ‘Коломойского отправляют в эмиграцию’,	Finance.ua,	20	September	2010,	
http://news.finance.ua/ru/~/2/2010/09/20/210228
112	 The	fact	that	the	TV	channels	owned	by	Pinchuk	(whose	information	policy	used	to	be	rela-
tively	critical	of	the	government)	became	more	pro-governmental	when	the	Kuchma	case	
started	may	serve	as	indirect	proof	for	this.	
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and	the	key	businessmen.	However,	this	is	a	bilateral	relation	–	no	proof	
has	been	seen	as	yet.	As	has	been	previously	described,	‘the	family’	is	oper-
ating	in	the	areas	which	big	business	is	not	interested	in.	
The	 Party	 of	 Regions	 is	 more	 a	 platform	 on	 which	 individual	 oligarchs	
strike	deals	than	an	independent	and	powerful	centre	of	influence.	Some	
oligarchs	have	either	belonged	to	the	Party	of	Regions	from	the	beginning	
(Akhmetov	and	Klyuyev)	or	 supported	 it,	while	 formally	 remaining	out-
side	any	political	parties	(Firtash).	Others,	like	Vasadze,	joined	it	only	after	
Yanukovych	won	the	presidential	election.	However,	it	is	relations	with	the	
president	which	decide	on	the	significance	of	a	given	businessman	in	the	
first	place.	
Oligarchs	who	are	unallied	with	the	ruling	team	form	a	separate	category.	
Most	of	them	have	reached	some	form	of	compromise	with	the	president	
(Petro	Poroshenko	even	became	a	member	of	the	government).	Kostyantin	
Zhevago	is	an	exception,	since	he	still	belongs	to	the	opposition113.
113	 It	is	difficult	to	put	pressure	on	Zhevago,	since	his	firm,	Ferrexpo,	is	listed	on	the	London	
Stock	Exchange.
Viktor Yanukovych
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Kolomoyskyi
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Oligarchs who are members of the Party of regions
or support it financially
Oligarchs who are not linked
to the Party of Regions
Andriy
Klyuyev
Rinat
Akhmetov
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5. Other tendencies in the economy
Since	the	Party	of	Regions	took	power,	a noticeable increase in raider prac-
tices, i.e.	forced	takeovers	of	other	people’s	property,	has	been	observed.	This	
is	done,	for	example,	by	forcing	the	owner	of	a	firm	to	sell	it	for	a	price	which	is	
much	lower	than	its	real	value	or	through	forging	notarised	documents	or	buy-
ing	 judges.	Raider	practices	 are	used	primarily	against	Ukrainian	business-
men,	but	this	problem	is	also	affecting	more	and	more	foreign	investors.	It	is	
difficult	to	assess	the	scale	of	this	phenomenon	due	to	the	dispersal	of	the	ma-
terials	concerning	this	issue	and	also	due	to	the	fact	that	most	likely	a	majority	
of	the	illegal	takeovers	have	never	been	made	public.	The	high	rate	of	develop-
ment	of	this	practice	is	proven	by	the	number	of	complaints	received	by	the	In-
terdepartmental	Commission	on	Combating	Illegal	Acquisition	and	Takeover	
of	Companies114.	While	75	complaints	concerning	raider	practices	were	sent	to	
it	in	2010,	this	number	reached	almost	1,000	in	2011115.
It	 is	also	unclear	whether	 the	wave	of	 raids	originates	 from	one	source	 (the	
most	likely	culprit	would	be	‘the	family’)	or	if	other	oligarchic	groups	linked	to	
the	Party	of	Regions	are	also	acting	in	the	same	wave.	Companies	could	also	be	
raided	in	the	interest	of	local	governments,	for	example.	
It	seems	that	this	problem	does	not	concern	the	most	powerful	oligarchs	who	
are	not	allied	with	the	present	ruling	class,	such	as	Kolomoyskyi	or	Pinchuk,	
or	that	it	affects	only	to	a	very	limited	extent.	However,	due	to	tacit	support	
from	the	government	and	a	corrupt	 judiciary,	smaller	businesses	are	unable	
to	 counteract	 these	 practices.	 The	 situation	 of	 foreign	 entrepreneurs,	 even	
though	they	can	expect	help	from	their	respective	countries,	is	better	only	to	
a	 limited	extent.	 In	 the	opinion	of	Western	diplomats,	 raider	practices	were	
used	with	regard	to	at	least	fifty	firms	from	the	EU,	including	Poland,	at	the	
end	of	2011116.	
The	scale	of	this	phenomenon	is	 illustrated	by	the	fact	that	even	Kryvorizh-
stal,	the	largest	Western	investment	in	Ukraine,	faced	similar	problems.	Kry-
vorizhstal,	which	was	taken	away	from	Akhmetov	and	Pinchuk	in	2005	and	
114	 An	advisory	body	to	the	Council	of	Ministers.
115	 Андрій Парубій, ‘Лихі 90-ті повертаються’,	 Украинская Правда. Блоги,	 28	March	 2012,	
http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/parubiy/4f72e73bef10f/
116	 Andrew	Rettman,	‘EU	companies	at	risk	of	‘raiders’	in	Ukraine’,	Euobserver.com,	16	Decem-
ber	2011,	http://euobserver.com/24/114646
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sold	to	Arcelor	Mittal,	began	to	have	problems	soon	after	the	Party	of	Regions	
took	power.	These	problems	were	linked	to	accusations	of	a	failure	to	perform	
obligations	made	during	the	privatisation.	The	management	of	Kryvorizhstal	
complained	that	the	company	did	not	receive	the	due	VAT	rebate	and	needed	to	
undergo	a	larger	number	of	inspections	than	usual.	It	was	only	a	personal	re-
quest	from	the	French	president,	Nicolas	Sarkozy,	to	Yanukovych,	that	helped	
a	little,	but	even	this	has	not	put	an	end	to	the	company’s	problems117.	
Frame 11. Ukraine’s ratings after two years of rule by the Party of Regions
Ukraine	has	never	been	rated	high	in	terms	of	the	economy	and	the	invest-
ment	climate.	The	conflict	between	the	president	and	the	prime	minister	
following	the	Orange	Revolution	and	the	economic	crisis	in	2009	only	forti-
fied	this	trend.	The	concentration	of	total	power	in	the	hands	of	the	repre-
sentatives	of	one	political	camp	(the	Party	of	Regions)	after	the	presidential	
election	in	2010	boosted	the	performance	of	the	executive.	One	side	effect	
of	this	was	the	deterioration	in	the	evaluation	of	democratic	standards	in	
Ukraine	–	according	to	the	Economist	Intelligence	Unit’s	Democracy	Index,	
Ukraine	fell	from	53rd	position	in	2009	to	79th	in	2011118.	
The	macroeconomic	situation	has	improved	as	the	country	has	been	grad-
ually	overcoming	the	crisis,	but	this	has	not	 led	to	a	better	evaluation	of	
Ukraine’s	economy,	and	some	indices	have	even	deteriorated.	Ukraine	is	at	
the	bottom	of	the	list	in	almost	all	economic	rankings,	and	it	often	is	rated	
worst	in	the	region.	
Ukraine	 is	 in	 163rd	position	 in	 the	 Index	of	Economic	Freedom,	which	 is	
compiled	by	the	Heritage	Foundation	in	co-operation	with	the	Wall Street 
Journal119.	This	is	one	of	the	worst	results,	comparable	to	that	achieved	by	
North	Korea.	The	World	Bank’s	Doing	Business	ranking	places	Kyiv	in	152nd	
position120.	The	conditions	 in	which	 foreign	 investors	are	 forced	 to	oper-
ate	are	not	evaluated	any	better.	According	to	the	survey	conducted	by	the	
117	 ‘«АрселорМиттал»: им не простили «Криворожсталь»’,	LB.ua,	15	March	2011,	http://lb.ua/
news/2011/03/15/88141_ArselorMittal_im_ne_prostili_.html
118	 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index	
119	 Data	for	2012.	Country	Rankings,	accessed	on	19	March	2012,	http://www.heritage.org/in-
dex/ranking
120	 Data	for	2012.	Economy	Rankings,	Doing	Business,	19	March	2012,	http://www.doingbusi-
ness.org/rankings
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European	 Business	 Association121,	 the	 investment	 climate	 in	 the	 fourth	
quarter	of	2011	was	worse	than	at	the	time	of	the	crisis	in	2009.	The	main	
problems	mentioned	included	numerous	controls	by	various	state	agencies,	
which	hinder	doing	business122.	
The	surveys	reflecting	 the	corruption	 levels	show	Ukraine	 in	a	similarly	
bad	light.	In	Transparency	International’s	corruption	perception	report	for	
2011,	Ukraine	was	ranked	152nd	(it	had	dropped	from	134th)123.	According	to	
estimates	by	the	International	Financial	Corporation	(IFC),	10%	of	compa-
nies’	incomes	are	in	slush	funds124.	
In	the	World	Economic	Forum’s	competitiveness	ranking,	Ukraine	is	listed	
82nd	out	of	the	142	countries.	However,	it	owes	this	relatively	high	position	
to	the	good	evaluation	of	such	areas	as	education	or	labour	market	efficien-
cy.	In	turn,	it	was	ranked	116th	in	terms	of	the	development	of	the	financial	
sector,	129th	in	terms	of	the	goods	and	services	market	and	116th	in	terms	of	
administration	efficiency125.	According	to	the	rating	agency	S&P	(BICRA)126,	
the	Ukrainian	banking	system	is	among	the	weakest	in	the	region,	and	has	
been	classified	to	the	highest-risk	group	9	(out	of	a	possible	10)127.
The	 tendencies towards monopolisation and a concentration of	 the	 oli-
garchs’	activity	in	individual	sectors,	which	had	already	been	observed,	have	
intensified	over	the	past	two	years.	Although	it	would	be	an	overstatement	to	
claim	that	the	entire	Ukrainian	economy	has	been	divided	up	among	big	busi-
ness,	important	steps	have	been	made	to	achieve	that	starting	in	2010.	Akhme-
tov	has	strengthened	his	dominant	position	in	metallurgy	(iron	and	steel)	and	
electricity	 production,	 and	 Firtash	 in	 the	 chemical	 industry.	 Kolomoyskyi’s	
121	 The	surveys	are	conducted	among	members	of	the	association	of	foreign	businessmen	doing	
business	in	Ukraine.	
122	 Юрий Панченко, ‘Больше не привлекает’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	21	October	2011,	http://
www.kommersant.ua/doc/1842866
123	 Corruption	Perception	Index	2011,	accessed	on	19	March	2012,	http://cpi.transparency.org/
cpi2011/results/
124	 Юрий Панченко, ‘Рынок взяток показал рост’,	Коммерсантъ Украина,	2	November	2011,	
http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1808368
125	 Ирина Ковальчук, ‘Экономика Украины вернулась к докризисному уровню’,	Сегодня,	
8	September	2011,	http://www.segodnya.ua/news/14286314.html
126	 Banking	Industry	Country	Risk	Assessment.	
127	 Леся Выговская, ‘Украина попала в девятку’,	Экономические известия,	11	November	2011,	
http://finance.eizvestia.com/full/ukraina-popala-v-devyatku
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position	in	the	petrochemical	industry	and	air	transport	has	remained	intact.	
The	concentration	of	assets	has	been	taking	place	either	through	the	privatisa-
tion	of	state-owned	companies	or	through	sale	of	business	by	other	oligarchs.	
For	 example,	 Firtash	 bought	 the	 nitrogen	 fertiliser	 factory	 in	 Cherkasy	 for	
US$800	 million	 from	 Yaroslavsky128.	 Characteristically,	 the	 Anti-Monopoly	
Committee	of	Ukraine	did	not	make	any	reservations	to	any	of	the	aforemen-
tioned	takeovers.	
Currently,	Ukraine	is	scene	to	a	game	for	two	profitable	branches	of	the	econo-
my:	agriculture	and	the	gas	sector.	Agriculture is the last highly attractive 
section of the Ukrainian economy where the influence of the most power-
ful oligarchs is still relatively limited. Considering	the	quality	of	Ukrainian	
soil	and	the	country’s	climate,	agriculture	may	potentially	become	one	of	the	
key	branches	of	the	economy.	The	Verkhovna	Rada	is	likely	to	pass	an	act	on	
land	reform	in	2012	and	thus	make	it	possible	to	trade	in	arable	 land	for	the	
first	time	since	Ukraine	regained	independence.	At	present,	the	battle	for	the	
final	form	of	this	act	is	taking	place	behind	the	scenes.	When	the	moratorium	
on	land	trade	expires,	which	may	happen	already	on	1	January	2013,	the	own-
ership	of	land,	which	is	now	being	used	informally,	will	be	codified.	Given	the	
financial	potential	of	SCM,	one	may	expect	that	HarvEast	will	be	playing	an	
increasingly	strong	role.	The	business	circles	linked	to	Yanukovych	will	most	
likely	make	attempts	to	enter	this	market,	as	well.	
Another	promising	area	may	be	the	gas sector, which	is	currently	state-con-
trolled.	However,	announcements	concerning	efforts	to	reform and partial 
privatise it	were	made	regularly	in	2011.	The	RUE	Group	is	the	natural	can-
didate	to	take	over	the	shares	of	Naftogaz,	should	they	be	put	on	sale	(around	
25%).	This	group	currently	controls	this	company	anyway	through	its	people.	
However,	it	is	still	an	open	question	whether	Yanukovych	will	agree	to	grant	
long	term	control	of	such	a	profitable	sector	to	one	group129.
The	 gas	 negotiations	with	 Gazprom	 are	 the	 greatest	 impediment	 to	 the	 re-
structuring	of	Naftogaz.	Gazprom,	wants	to	be	given	control	over	the	entire	
128	 Андрей Самофалов, ‘Дмитрий Фирташ высаживается в Черкассах’,	Укррудпром,	4	March	
2011,	http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/digest/Dmitriy_Firtash_visagivaetsya_v_Cherkassah.html
129	 The	plans	 to	divide	and	privatise	Naftogaz,	which	were	announced	by	Yuriy	Boyko	 (un-
derstood	as	being	in	the	interests	of	the	RUE	Group),	have	been	halted.	It	is	possible	that	
Naftogaz	will	be	restructured	in	2012,	but	too	little	is	currently	known	to	determine	which	
group	the	changes	will	be	made	in	favour	of.	
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Ukrainian	gas	sector	in	return	for	reducing	the	price	of	gas.	It	is	unclear	wheth-
er	Privat	will	be	able	to	maintain	control	Naftogaz’s	subsidiaries	operating	in	
the	oil	sector	(Ukrnafta	and	Ukrtransnafta)	should	Naftogaz	be	split	up.	It	is	
also	possible	that	the	part	of	Naftogaz	dealing	with	natural	gas	will	be	offered	
to	RUE	Group,	and	the	part	dealing	with	oil	will	remain	under	Kolomoyskyi’s	
control.	
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IV. The OlIGARchs’ INFlUeNce ON FOReIGN POlIcy
Since	regaining	independence,	Ukraine’s	foreign	policy	has	been	based	on	ma-
noeuvring	between	the	West	and	Russia.	Under	Kuchma’s	rule,	this	was	called	
a	 ‘multi-vector	policy’.	The	Orange	Revolution	changed	very	 little	 in	 this	 re-
spect	–	Ukraine,	as	had	previously	been	the	case,	verbally	declared	its	desire	
to	join	European	and	Euro-Atlantic	structures,	but	was	in	fact	doing	little	to	
achieve	 this.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	was	consistently	avoiding	participation	 in	
any	integration	initiatives	under	the	aegis	of	Russia.	Ukrainian	foreign	policy	
in	that	period	was	seriously	restricted	in	its	success	due	to	the	endless	conflict	
between	the	president	and	the	government.	
Yanukovych,	once	he	took	power	and	the	constitution	was	changed,	could	act	
much	more	efficiently	than	his	predecessors.	However,	the	international	situ-
ation	has	changed	since	Kuchma’s	 times	and	Ukraine’s	 room	for	manoeuvre	
has	been	reduced	significantly.	The	USA,	which	had	been	an	important	‘vector’	
in	Ukrainian	policy	in	the	1990s,	has	significantly	reduced	its	presence	in	the	
region.	In	turn,	Russia	has	intensified	its	efforts	to	push	through	its	integra-
tion	projects	(the	Customs	Union	and	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community)	and	
is	putting	more	and	more	pressure	on	the	government	in	Kyiv	to	make	Ukraine	
join	 these	 projects.	 The	 process	 of	 establishing	 closer	 institutional	 contacts	
with	the	European	Union,	on	the	other	hand	(signing	the	Association	Agree-
ment),	has	been	frozen	due	to	the	fact	that	Yulia	Tymoshenko	was	sentenced	to	
prison	in	2011.	
1. The political interests of the oligarchs
Contrary	to	what	is	the	case	with	domestic	policy,	it	is	more	difficult	to	track	
the	 role	 the	 oligarchs	 have	 played	 in	 the	 development	 of	 foreign	 policy	 in	
Ukraine.	This	 is	partly	due	 to	 the	 low	 level	 of	 success	 of	Ukraine’s	 foreign	
policy	and	is	partly	an	effect	of	the	limited	interest	big	business	shows	in	this	
area.	In	particular,	security	issues	have	been	given	marginal	attention	by	the	
oligarchs	because	 they	are	not	directly	related	to	 the	economy.	The	official	
agendas	concerning	external	relations	adopted	by	the	groupings	which	the	
businessmen	support	financially	or	are	members	of	are	of	 low	significance	
and	should	not	be	used	as	the	basis	for	making	any	conclusions130.	As	has	been	
previously	mentioned,	 the	oligarchs	treat	the	political	parties	as	tools.	The	
130	 Andrzej	Szeptycki,	‘Grupy	oligarchiczne	a	polityka	zagraniczna	Ukrainy’,	Sprawy Między-
narodowe,	2008,	no.	2,	page	74.
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fact	 that	Akhmetov	was	 a	member	 of	 the	Party	 of	Regions	when	 this	 par-
ty’s	agenda	included	establishing	closer	relations	with	Russia	did	not	mean	
that	he	was	pro-Russian.	Similarly,	Petro	Poroshenko’s	membership	in	Our	
Ukraine,	which	wanted	Ukraine	to	join	NATO,	did	not	prevent	him	from	in-
vesting	in	Russia.	
2. The economic interests
While	ideological	issues	play	a	minor	role	in	the	activities	of	big	business,	the	
situation	is	quite	different	 in	economic	relations.	The	interests	of	Ukrainian	
business	circles	in	this	area	are	diversified.	For many oligarchs, especially 
those less powerful, the Ukrainian market is the most important, and 
they do not attach much significance to foreign relations, unless these 
relations result in increasing competitiveness on the internal market. In 
turn, for the richest businessmen, such as Akhmetov and Pinchuk, access 
to foreign markets is of key significance. Ukrainian	exports	are	strongly	
diversified,	and	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 indicate	 the	predominant	direction.	Sales	of	
goods	to	the	three	groups	of	countries	–	the	CIS,	EU	and	others	–	are	distributed	
almost	evenly,	and	in	the	case	of	metallurgy,	which	is	the	most	important	sec-
tor	and	one	almost	completely	dominated	by	the	oligarchs,	the	most	significant	
countries	are	those	which	belong	neither	to	the	European	Union	nor	to	the	CIS	
(see	Frame	12).	
As	a	result,	the	oligarchs’	interests	in	foreign	policy	are	diversified.	As	regards	
the	less	powerful	businessmen,	the	protection	of	the	internal	market	from	im-
ports,	especially	from	the	West,	with	which	they	are	unable	to	compete	with-
out	support	from	the	state,	is	the	top	priority.	In	turn,	the	priority	for	export-
ers	 is	ensuring	as	 low	as	possible	customs	tariffs	for	their	goods.	 It	 is	worth	
noting	that	the	EU,	Russia	and	the	other	states	are	equally	important	in	this	
context	(albeit	to	different	extents	for	different	businessmen).	
Over	the	past	few	years,	the	exporters	have	been	more	successful	in	pushing	
through	their	own	interests.	It	was	this	group	which	lobbied	most	strongly	for	
Ukraine’s	accession	to	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO),	which	took	place	
in	2008.	In	this	case,	Ukraine	quite	quickly	carried	out	the	necessary	reforms,	
and	the	fact	that	WTO	membership	resulted	in	increasing	competition	on	the	
Ukrainian	market	did	not	matter	to	the	most	important	players.	
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Frame 12. economic integration – the east, the West or a third way?
Ukraine’s	difficulties	in	firmly	determining	the	direction	of	its	economic	in-
tegration	can	be	tracked	by	analysing	Ukrainian	exports.	When	all	exports	
are	considered	en	masse,	it	becomes	clear	that	there	is	no	predominant	di-
rection	–	38%	of	Ukrainian	goods	are	sold	to	CIS	countries,	26%	to	the	EU,	
and	36%	to	other	countries.	By	way	of	comparison,	80%	of	Polish	exports	go	
to	EU	member	states131.	This	trend	can	be	observed	when	analysing	the	five	
largest	sectors	of	the	Ukrainian	economy,	which	account	for	91%	of	total	ex-
ports.	CIS	countries	clearly	prevail	only	in	the	case	of	the	machine-building	
industry,	which	generates	17%	of	total	exports	(see	the	charts	below).	In	turn,	
in	 the	 case	of	 three	 sectors	 –	metallurgy,	 the	agricultural	 and	 food	 sector	
and	the	chemical	industry	–	which	account	for	more	than	half	of	Ukraine’s	
exports,	the	largest	outlets	for	their	products	are	countries	with	belong	to	
neither	the	European	Union	nor	the	CIS	(mainly	Middle	Eastern	and	South	
Asian	countries).	The	oligarchs	hold	strong	positions	in	each	of	these	sectors	
and	are	interested	in	maintaining	and	expanding	these	outlets.	
An	 analysis	 of	 exports	 reveals	 one	 more	 important	 phenomenon:	 from	
among	the	six	countries	with	which	Ukraine	has	a	positive	trade	balance	
exceeding	US$1	billion	only	one	(Italy)	is	a	member	state	of	the	EU132.	The	
DCFTA	agreement,	which	will	make	the	Ukrainian	market	more	open,	is	
unlikely	to	bring	about	a	significant	increase	in	Ukrainian	exports	to	the	
EU,	but	it	will	certainly	broaden	Ukraine’s	negative	trade	balance.	
131	 According	to	data	from	the	Polish	Central	Statistical	Office	for	2010;	http://www.stat.gov.pl/
cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_ch_handel_zagr_01-12_2010.pdf
132	 The	other	countries	are	Turkey,	India,	Lebanon,	Egypt	and	Iran.	
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Ukraine’s exports in 2011 (in Us$ billions)
Own	calculations	on	the	basis	of	data	from	the	State	Statistics	Committee
3. The attitude towards integration projects
Due	 to	 the	aforementioned	conflicts of interests, the oligarchs cannot be 
said to hold one common stance on integration processes in the region; 
this is true in the case of those initiated by Russia, and those regarding 
integration with the eU. It	appears	that	big	business	is	satisfied	most	with	the	
situation	currently	existing	 in	Ukraine.	The	mutual	permeation	of	business	
and	politics,	the	ability	to	buy	court	verdicts	and	to	adopt	laws	tailored	to	suit	
the	needs	of	certain	groups	create	perfect	conditions	for	the	rise	of	fortunes.	
In	this	context,	there	is	no	big	difference	between	Akhmetov,	whose	business	
is	relatively	transparent,	and	Firtash.	The integration processes offered by 
the eU and Russia alike may bring about both benefits and threats to the 
special Ukrainian model of relations between the government and busi-
ness, although they are quite different in nature.	
EU-27 Other countriesCIS countries
Total exports Base metals Mineral raw materials
Agricultural and food sector Chemical production Machine-building industry
24.4
17.8
26.2
10.6
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3.2
3.6
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1.1
1.6 2.1
8.5
1.0
67
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
12
3.1. Relations with the West
The	real	balance	of	Ukraine’s	profits	and	losses	resulting	from	the	implementa-
tion	of	the	Association	Agreement	(and	in	particular	the	DCFTA)	is	now	impos-
sible	to	assess	because	the	document	has	not	been	published.	Furthermore,	the	
available	materials	concerning	this	issue	are	too	vague133.	However,	it	is	highly	
likely	that	the	DCFTA	in	the	short	term	would	lead	to	a	significant	increase	in	
the	imports	of	EU	goods	to	the	Ukrainian	market,	thus	bringing	more	intensive	
competition	to	this	country.	Ukrainian	entrepreneurs	may	be	unable	to	cope	
with	this	competition.	In	the	longer	term,	the	implementation	of	the	Associa-
tion	Agreement	will	be	beneficial	for	Ukraine,	because	the	introduction	of	EU	
standards	and	practices	will	contribute	to	a	greater	influx	of	EU	investments	
and	the	modernisation	of	the	country.	
The	DCFTA	will	undermine	the	positions	of	some	oligarchs,	such	as	the	owner	
of	UkrAvto,	Tariel	Vasadze	 (who	once	belonged	 to	BYuT,	and	 is	now	a	mem-
ber	of	 the	Party	of	Regions),	and	Valentyn	Landyk	(also	an	MP	representing	
the	Party	of	Regions),	who	owns	Nord,	a	household	equipment	manufacturer.	
In	turn,	the	DCFTA	will	not	affect	strongly	most	exporters,	since	zero	or	mini-
mum	customs	duty	is	imposed	on	their	products	(mainly	steel	and	mineral	raw	
materials),	and	the	DCFTA	will	not	lead	to	a	significant	increase	in	their	share	
on	the	EU	market.	It	is	possible	to	indicate	the	sectors	in	which	Ukrainian	busi-
ness	has	great	potential	for	increasing	exports	and	could	be	competitive	in	the	
EU.	This	mainly	concerns	food	products	and	the	agricultural	and	food	indus-
try.	However,	in	this	case,	the	DCFTA	offers	no	real	trade	liberalisation,	and	
only	slightly	increases	the	export	quotas.	
133	 The	 cyclically	published	 reports	 concerning	 this	 issue,	depending	on	who	 the	author	 is,	
are	either	usually	focused	on	the	positives	(if	these	are	analytical	centres	from	the	EU	or	
Ukrainian	pro-Western	think	tanks	or	 list	 the	threats	and	possible	 losses	 the	Ukrainian	
economy	will	sustain,	highlighting	at	the	same	time	the	benefits	Ukraine	will	derive	from	
joining	the	Customs	Union	(Russian	think	tanks).	One	example	of	the	former	approach	can	
be	found	in	the	IFRI	report	entitled	‘Ukraine	at	the	Crossroads:	Between	the	EU	DCFTA	&	
Customs	 Union’,	 http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ve
d=0CE0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ifri.org%2Fdownloads%2Frnr11shumylotapiol
aapril2012.pdf&ei=Ah7XT-DeGo76sgak_uXcDw&usg=AFQjCNFqshQIeXk7mC0d47Rg2gKi
CHg5lw.	In	turn,	the	benefits	of	the	Customs	Union	were	described	in	a	text	prepared	by	
the	Eurasian	Development	Bank,	 ‘Комплексная оценка макроэкономического эффекта 
различных форм глубокого экономического сотрудничества Украины со странами 
Таможенного союза и Единого экономического пространства в рамках ЕврАзЭС’,	http://
www.eabr.org/general//upload/reports/Ukraina_doklad_rus.pdf
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None of the oligarchs is interested in introducing free and fair compe-
tition in Ukraine, since this would mean a major change in the nature 
of their business activity. Nevertheless, the introduction of some ele-
ments of Western standards, especially the respect of ownership rights, 
is viewed by big business as being desirable.	Although	no	spectacular	fall	
of	any	representative	of	big	business	has	been	seen	over	the	past	decade	or	so,	
present	 trends	–	 and	primarily	President	Yanukovych’s	 strengthening	posi-
tion	–,	are	causing	the	protection	of	ownership	rights	to	become	a	very	up-to-
date	issue.	
While	 the	 question	 of	what	 benefits	 the	Association	Agreement	 could	bring	
to	the	oligarchs	is	a	debatable	issue,	it	seems	certain	that	no representative 
of big business is interested in a further deterioration of relations with 
the West. Some	oligarchs	have	made	 investments	 in	 the	West	 (for	example,	
Akhmetov	has	metallurgical	works	in	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom).	Further-
more,	some	of	the	companies	controlled	by	big	business	are	listed	on	Western	
stock	exchanges	(for	example,	Zhevago’s	companies	on	the	London	Stock	Ex-
change,	and	agricultural	companies	on	the	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange),	and	some	
are	considering	such	plans	(Akhmetov	and	Pinchuk).	Even	if	businessmen	are	
not	 engaged	 economically	 in	 EU	member	 states,	 they	 often	 own	 real	 estate	
there134.	For	this	reason	a	development	of	relations	with	the	West	which	would	
see	 a	 repeat	 of	 the	Belarusian	 scenario	would	be	difficult	 for	 the	Ukrainian	
business	elite	to	accept.	Possible	political	sanctions,	such	as	visa	restrictions	
for	 those	businessmen	who	are	at	 the	same	time	 influential	members	of	 the	
Party	of	Regions	or	the	government	would	be	very	painful	for	them.	Economic	
sanctions	would	be	even	more	painful,	although	at	present	it	is	difficult	to	ex-
pect	that	the	West	could	take	such	a	step.
It	needs	to	be	emphasised	that	the	development	of	relations	with	the	EU	over	
the	past	year	or	so	is	proof	of	the	limited	influence	of	big	business	on	Ukraine’s	
foreign	policy.	Hardly	any	coordination	of	actions	has	been	seen	in	such	a	vi-
tal	 area	as	economic	 integration	with	 the	European	Union.	When	 it	became	
clear	 that	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Association	 Agreement	 and	 the	 DCFTA	would	
be	blocked	should	Tymoshenko	be	sentenced,	representatives	of	big	business	
134	 It	is	difficult	to	assess	the	scale	of	this	phenomenon,	but	it	most	likely	concerns	almost	all	
representatives	of	big	business.	At	times,	the	media	report	on	the	purchases	of	the	more	
expensive	properties	–	for	example	Akhmetov’s	apartment	building	in	London	for	£136	mil-
lion.	Alex	Hawkes,	‘Rinat	Akhmetov	pays	record	£136.4m	for	apartment	at	One	Hyde	Park’,	
The Guardian,	 19	 April	 2011,	 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/apr/19/rinat-akhmetov-
one-hyde-park
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made	no	attempt	to	avoid	this	scenario.	Theoretically,	the	adoption	of	the	As-
sociation	Agreement	alone,	even	if	its	provisions	were	not	implemented,	would	
strengthen	the	position	of	Ukrainian	business	in	its	dealings	with	Russia,	since	
this	would	pose	an	additional	impediment	to	Ukraine’s	joining	the	integration	
processes	initiated	by	Russia.	However,	the	failure	to	take	action	proves	that	
the	Ukrainian	business	elite	is	not	aware	of	this.	
3.2. co-operation with Russia
Russia	is	offering	Ukraine	a	regional	integration	project,	which	is	competitive	
to	 that	of	 the	EU,	namely	membership	of	 the	Customs	Union	of	 the	Russian	
Federation,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan,	and	at	further	stages	also	of	the	Eurasian	
Union,	where	a	common	market	based	on	the	principles	of	the	four	freedoms	
–	the	movement	of	goods,	services,	capital	and	labour	–	would	operate135.	In	ad-
dition	to	lifting	customs	tariffs,	Russia	offers	lower	prices	for	oil	and	gas	(al-
though	no	precise	promises	have	been	made	in	this	context).	
Russia	 is	 the	most	 important	 country	 for	 Ukrainian	 business.	 The	 Russian	
market	 receives	 29%	of	Ukraine’s	 exports136.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	EU,	 to	which	
Ukraine	sells	predominantly	raw	materials	(for	example,	iron	ores)	and	low-
processed	goods	(steel),	Russia	is	the	main	recipient	of	more	sophisticated	in-
dustrial	products	which	are	not	competitive	on	the	EU	market.	Although	the	
trade	balance	with	Russia	is	at	a	record-low	for	Ukraine	(-US$9.3	billion),	this	is	
mainly	the	effect	of	high	oil	and	gas	prices.	This	makes	it	possible	for	Moscow	
to	put	pressure	on	Ukraine	by	imposing	restrictions	(linked	to	customs	or	of	
other	kinds137)	on	selected	products.	Given	the	fact	that	oil	and	gas	account	for	
almost	70%	of	Ukrainian	 imports	 from	Russia	and	 that	Kyiv	must	buy	 them	
anyway,	the	possibilities	for	Ukraine	to	counteract	Russian	practices	are	very	
limited.	
considering the degree of dependence and the number of ways Moscow 
could put pressure on Kyiv, representatives of Ukrainian big business are 
135	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	Kamil	Kłysiński,	 Iwona	Wiśniewska,	 ‘Common	Economic	Space:	
another	 step	 towards	 integration	 focused	 on	 Russia,	 OSW,	EastWeek,	 15	 December	 2010,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-12-15/common-economic-space-
another-step-towards-integration-focused-russia
136	 Data	from	the	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine	for	2011.	http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/
operativ/operativ2011/zd/ztt/ztt_u/ztt1211_u.htm
137	 The	ban	on	imports	of	cheese	imposed	on	some	Ukrainian	manufacturers	in	February	2012	by	
Gennadiy	Onishchenko,	the	Chief	Sanitary	Inspector	of	Russia	may	serve	as	an	example	of	this.
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not interested in a direct dispute with Russia. They are even less inter-
ested in that because Russia is an important trade partner for most of the 
oligarchs, including	those	for	whom	other	markets	are	of	top	priority.	Both	
Akhmetov	 and	 Pinchuk	 sell	 steel	 pipes	 for	 pipeline	 construction	 to	 Russia.	
Therefore,	 closer	 co-operation	between	Russia	 and	Ukraine,	 especially	 a	 re-
duction	of	customs	barriers,	would	be	beneficial	for	the	Ukrainian	oligarchs.	
For	this	reason,	Ukraine	has	been	unsuccessfully	making	efforts	to	conclude	
a	free	trade	zone	agreement	–	with	no	exceptions	–	with	Russia138.	Despite	all	
this,	Kyiv is unlikely to agree to join the customs Union. The tariffs appli-
cable in the area covered by the customs Union are higher than the ones 
Ukraine was granted upon its accession to the WTO. The renegotiation of 
these tariffs would be very difficult and would be contrary to the inter-
ests of the exporter oligarchs. 
Another	equally	great	temptation	for	Ukraine	is	the	promise	of	lowering	the	
price	of	energy	raw	materials,	 especially	gas.	 In	 the	second	quarter	of	2012,	
Ukraine	paid	US$426	for	1,000	m3	of	gas,	while	the	gas	price	for	Belarus,	which	
belongs	 to	 the	Customs	Union,	was	only	US$165.	The	prices	are	essential	 for	
industry,	especially	 the	chemical	 sector,	 the	greater	part	of	which	 is	owned	
by	Dmytro	Firtash.	Due	to	the	high	prices	of	oil	and	gas.	Ukrainian	plants	are	
becoming	less	and	less	competitive.	
Moscow	 has	 declared	 the	 possibility	 to	 reduce	 gas	 prices	 in	 exchange	 for	
Ukraine’s	accession	 to	 the	Customs	Union	or	 for	very	extensive	concessions,	
which	would	de facto	mean	handing	over	control	of	the	entire	internal	gas	mar-
ket	in	Ukraine.	For	Kyiv	to	accept	these	proposals	would	result	in	a	very	seri-
ous	restriction	of	Ukraine’s	economic	sovereignty	and	would	facilitate	Russian	
business’s	expansion	in	Ukraine.	Russia	could	manipulate	the	gas	prices,	thus	
backing	the	companies	it	controls.	
The	Ukrainian	political	and	business	elites	are	divided	on	this	 issue.	On	the	
one	hand,	there	is	a	strong	lobby	(consisting	predominantly	of	representatives	
of	the	RUE	Group)	for	whom	a	reduction	of	Russian	gas	prices	is	a	priority,	no	
matter	what	expense	this	will	entail.	On	the	other	hand,	most	Ukrainian	oli-
garchs	fear	Russian	competition.	Ukraine	has	not	satisfied	Russia’s	demands	so	
far,	but	it	is	evident	that	some	politicians	and	businessmen	(for	example,	Yuriy	
138	 The	free	trade	zone	agreement	now	in	force	in	the	CIS	area	includes	hundreds	of	categories	
of	goods	on	which	high	customs	duty	rates	are	still	imposed.	
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Boyko	and	Dmytro	Firtash)	see	their	own	interests	as	more	important	than	the	
interests	of	their	state	as	a	whole.	
4. The primacy of individual interests
While	it	is	difficult	to	prove	the	thesis	that	the	oligarchs	are	conducting	a	well	
thought	out	and	consistent	foreign	policy,	it	is	possible	to	indicate	specific	cases	
where	the	individual	interests	of	certain	businessmen	had	an	impact	(very	often	
a	negative	one)	on	the	actions	taken	by	the	state	as	a	whole.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	
that	if the internal factor comes into conflict with state interests, the oli-
garchs (if they are able to) prefer to take care of their own interests. 
The	clearest	example	of	this	was	the	imprisonment	of	Tymoshenko,	which	rep-
resentatives	of	the	RUE	Group	were	intensively	lobbying	for.	Given	Tymoshen-
ko’s	hostile	attitude	towards	the	members	of	this	group,	this	move	was	under-
standable.	The	crisis	in	Ukraine’s	relations	with	the	West	was	a	side	effect139.
If	their	business	is	at	stake,	the oligarchs are able to successfully hold back 
any process of negotiations which they see as unfavourable for them-
selves.	One	of	the	greatest	problems	during	the	DCFTA	negotiations	was	the	
lack	of	consent	from	Ukrainian	negotiators	to	lifting	the	customs	duty	on	im-
ports	of	used	cars	and	household	appliances.	Most	 likely	Tariel	Vasadze	and	
Valentyn	Landyk	were	the	people	who	impeded	this	process	the	most.	Even	the	
significant	acceleration	of	the	DCFTA	talks	in	2011	could	not	make	the	Ukrain-
ian	negotiators	change	their	tough	stance	for	a	long	time.	Finally,	the	EU	and	
Ukraine	 reached	 a	 compromise	 regarding	 imports	 and	 adopted	 regulations	
which	can	be	seen	as	being	favourable	for	Vasadze140.	
The	 negotiations	 concerning	 the	 European	 Common	 Aviation	 Area	 (ECAA)	
were	another	example	of	sectoral	integration	with	the	EU	being	blocked	for	the	
benefit	of	the	oligarchs’	interests141.	This	is	a	bilateral	agreement	between	the	
EU	and	a	third	state	liberalising	passenger	flights.	A	country	which	accesses	
139	 Although	it	is	an	open	question	in	this	case	as	to	to	what	extent	the	actions	taken	by	the	RUE	
Group	were	inspired	by	Russia,	for	whom	the	prevention	of	Ukraine’s	economic	integration	
with	the	EU	was	a	top	priority	issue.	
140	 Imports	of	used	cars	will	be	duty-free	only	at	the	present	level	(45,000	cars	annually).	When	
this	 level	 is	exceeded,	10%	customs	duty	will	be	automatically	re-imposed.	Furthermore,	
a	very	long	(15	year)	transition	period	will	apply.	
141	 European	Common	Aviation	Area.	In	addition	to	the	EU	member	states,	it	extends	over	Nor-
way,	Iceland	and	the	Western	Balkan	countries.	
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the	ECAA	undertakes	 to	 implement	 the	 section	 of	 the	acquis communautaire	
concerning	air	transport	and	allows	flight	operators	from	the	EU	to	participate	
in	internal	flights	in	a	given	country.	Negotiations	with	Ukraine	regarding	this	
issue	commenced	already	in	2007	and	are	still	far	from	being	closed,	and	the	
announced	date	 for	 the	agreement	 to	be	 signed	has	already	been	postponed	
several	 times.	 At	 present,	 only	 one	 low-cost	 airline	 (Wizz	 Air)	 operates	 in	
Ukraine,	and	its	offer	is	very	limited.	Joining	the	ECAA	would	certainly	cause	
a	significant	reduction	in	the	prices	of	tickets	for	passengers,	but	this	would	
also	mean	that	Ukrainian	carriers	would	have	to	compete	with	European	air-
lines.	The	greater	share	of	the	Ukrainian	air	transport	market	belongs	to	the	
airlines	controlled	by	Privat	Group,	which	is	beyond	any	doubt	the	key	lobbyist	
for	holding	back	the	talks.	Theoretically,	the	agreement	would	offer	the	oppor-
tunity	 for	 the	Ukrainian	airlines	 to	expand	across	Europe,	but	Kolomoyskyi	
and	the	other	carriers	apparently	prefer	 to	protect	 their	own	market142.	The	
existing	situation	is	also	beneficial	for	the	government:	airlines	must	obtain	
licences	 from	state	officials,	while	 the	ECAA	provides	 the	possibility	 to	 sign	
contracts	directly	with	airports.	
The	 activity	 of	 Vasyl	 Hrytsak,	 a	 businessman	 and	 an	MP	 representing	 the	
Party	 of	 Regions,	 provides	 another	 similar	 example	 of	 successful	 lobbying.	
He	owns	EDAPS,	a	company	which	manufactures	biometric	passports	among	
other	things.	Hrytsak	was	making	efforts	to	cause	the	Verkhovna	Rada	to	pass	
the	document	act	in	a	form	which	would	grant	exclusive	right	to	EDAPS.	This	
was	opposed	by	the	Ministry	of	Justice.	The	adoption	of	this	act	is	among	the	
key	conditions	in	the	Action	Plan	for	lifting	the	visa	requirement	for	Ukrain-
ians	travelling	to	the	European	Union.	As	a	consequence	of	Hrytsak’s	actions,	
the	act	was	adopted	with	a	delay,	and	thus	Ukraine	failed	to	complete	the	first	
stage	of	the	Action	Plan143.	
It	does	not	appear	that	these	actions	result	from	any	broader	strategy	adopted	
by	Ukrainian	business	circles,	although	they	do	have	a	real	impact	on	the	coun-
try’s	foreign	policy.	It is difficult to classify the oligarchs as holding either 
pro-european or pro-Russian views. Any of their actions which could 
be interpreted as pro-Russian or pro-Western are rather by-products 
142	 Also	in	this	case	there	is	no	proof	that	it	was	Kolomoyskyi	who	was	responsible	for	holding	
back	the	negotiations.	
143	 Rafał	Sadowski,	‘Moldova	ahead	of	Ukraine	in	the	queue	for	EU	visa	liberalisation’,	OSW,	
EastWeek,	 15	 February	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-02-15/
moldova-ahead-ukraine-queue-eu-visa-liberalisation
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of the implementation of their own interests than a conscious policy. 
Kolomoyskyi	has	been	blocking	the	ECAA	in	order	to	restrict	the	competition	
to	his	own	business	and	not	due	to	any	ideology.	It	is	equally	difficult	to	prove	
the	 idea	 that	 the	 takeover	of	 the	Kremenchuk	refinery	 from	Tatneft,	which	
was	de facto a	corporate	raid	effected	by	Kolomoyskyi,	was	a	result	of	his	anti-
Russian	views.	
The	case	with	Akhmetov	is	similar.	The	Ilyich	Steel	and	Iron	Works	were	taken	
away	from	Russians	because	of	his	desire	to	maintain	the	dominant	position	in	
Ukrainian	metallurgy.	The	reluctance	towards	the	integration	projects	initi-
ated	by	Russia	is	based	on	the	presumption	that	Ukraine	would	be	the	weaker	
partner	 in	 this	 relationship,	 and	 the	Ukrainian	 big	 business	would	 become	
dominated	by	the	wealthier	Russian	oligarchs.	Ukraine’s	rejection	of	the	pos-
sibility	to	export	Russian	electricity	using	its	power	grids	is	another	example	
of	Russian	projects	being	blocked.	In	this	case,	the	most	likely	reason	appears	
to	be	Akhmetov’s	interests;	he	intends	to	export	his	electricity	to	EU	member	
states	himself,	and	he	would	be	competing	against	Russian	electricity,	which	
is	cheaper	than	Ukraine’s.	
The	example	of	Andriy	Klyuyev,	whose	active	and	successful	manipulation	of	
the	DCFTA	negotiations	made	some	EU	officials	believe	that	he	is	a	pro-Western	
politician	shows	to	what	degree	incorrect	conclusions	can	be	drawn	based	on	
one	specific	action.	At	the	same	time,	Klyuyev,	who	is	responsible	for	the	elec-
tion	campaign	of	the	Party	of	Regions,	was	intensively	lobbying	for	the	adop-
tion	of	a	new	electoral	code	in	a	form	which	would	facilitate	the	manipulation	
of	the	election	results	to	a	great	extent144.	
144	 To	make	the	picture	more	complicated,	Serhiy	Lyovochkin,	who	is	believed	to	be	a	pro-Rus-
sian	politician,	supported	the	electoral	code	which	was	closer	to	the	European	standards.	
Сергей Рахманин, ‘Наблюдение за скрытым боем’,	 Зеркало Недели,	 11	 November	 2011,	
http://zn.ua/POLITICS/nablyudenie_za_skrytym_boem-91382.html
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V. The ADVANTAGes AND The DIsADVANTAGes  
OF The OlIGARchIc sysTeM
It	is	not	easy	to	unambiguously	evaluate	the	role	the	oligarchs	have	played	in	
Ukraine.	At	first	glance,	their	impact	on	Ukraine	appears	to	be	negative.	How-
ever,	when	one	compares	 the	 system	which	has	 formed	 in	Ukraine	 to	 those	
existing	in	the	other	countries	from	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	
area,	the	answer	to	this	question	is	no	longer	so	obvious.	The	 ‘oligarchic	de-
mocracy’,	where	none	of	 the	clans	has	been	strong	enough	 to	become	domi-
nant	over	the	others	and	in	which	the	government	has	been	only	one	of	 the	
few	centres	of	 influence	 (in	 some	periods,	not	 the	most	 important	one),	 can	
be	recognised	as	a	kind	of	pluralism,	which	has	put	Ukraine	in	a	better	light	
than	Russia	or	Belarus.	Even	after	two	years	of	Yanukovych’s	rule,	despite	the	
obvious	deterioration	of	democratic	standards,	Ukraine	is	still	among	the	most	
democratic	countries	in	the	CIS	area.	
An evaluation of the impact the oligarchs have had on politics and the 
economy reveals some benefits for Ukraine. The greatest benefit is the 
protection of Ukraine’s economy from being dominated by Russian busi-
ness. however, the negative consequences of the oligarchic systems, for 
both the economy and the political life of Ukraine, are more evident and 
ultimately definitely prevail over the positives. 
The	evaluation	 is	 also	difficult	because	 the	oligarchs	do	not	 form	a	uniform	
group.	The	oligarchs’	political	influence	is	also	diversified	and	is	by	no	means	
always	proportionate	to	the	value	of	their	fortunes.	Some	of	the	richest	Ukrain-
ians	do	not	participate	in	current	politics	and	are	able	to	protect	(and	develop)	
their	businesses	without	becoming	public	figures	and	attracting	the	attention	
of	the	media.	Some	oligarchs	(for	example,	Privat	Group)	are	very	aggressive	
and	successful	in	their	business,	although	their	direct	influence	in	the	govern-
ment	is	very	limited.	In	turn,	others	derive	their	strength	from	their	influen-
tial	friends	in	the	government.	The	best	example	is	Firtash.	His	assets	when	
compared	 to	 the	 richest	oligarchs	 (Akhmetov,	Privat	Group	or	Pinchuk)	 are	
relatively	modest,	and	his	strength	is	mainly	based	on	support	and	favourable	
decisions	from	the	state145.	
145	 This	concerns	both	the	present	government	and	the	administration	of	President	Yushchenko.
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1. The negatives
•	 The dependence of the greater part of the political class on big busi-
ness is	a	 typical	 feature	of	 the	oligarchic	system.	With	the	present	rules	
of	party	financing,	no	political	grouping	is	able	to	operate	without	being	
financially	backed	by	the	oligarchs.	Furthermore,	the	oligarchs	control	the	
most	popular	TV	channels	and	this	additionally	entrenches	this	depend-
ence.	To	 claim	 that	politicians	 are	puppets	 in	 the	hands	of	businessmen	
would	certainly	be	an	exaggeration.	The	Ukrainian	political	system	gives	
real	 power	 to	 the	 government.	 Both	 Kuchma	 and	 Tymoshenko	 showed	
great	 sovereignty,	 and	Yanukovych	 is	 also	making	 efforts	 to	 become	 in-
dependent	from	his	business	support	base.	However,	a	real	change	in	the	
system	of	connections	between	politics	and	business	would	require	very	
deep	reforms.	Meanwhile,	there	are	no	real	candidates	among	the	present	
representatives	of	the	political	class,	including	those	from	the	opposition,	
who	would	be	ready	to	carry	out	such	reforms.	The	individuals	who	could	
give	such	hope	(for	example	Anatoliy	Hrytsenko)	have	been	deprived	of	fi-
nancial	 support	and	presence	 in	 the	media,	and	have	 thus	been	success-
fully	marginalised.	
•	 Actions	taken	by	Ukrainian	state	officials	in	an	attempt	to	 ‘pay	back’	the	
financial	support	during	the	elections	often	lead	to	the Ukrainian state 
sustaining multi-billion dollar losses, which the oligarchs benefit 
from. This	practice	has	been	used	by	all	administrations,	but	it	has	clearly	
intensified	 under	 Yanukovych’s	 rule.	 This	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	
case	of	 the	RUE	Group.	RosUkrEnergo	won	the	arbitration	 in	Stockholm,	
and	furthermore,	Ukrtranshaz	decided	to	write	off	RUE’s	significant	debts.	
Many	more	 scandals	which	have	 led	 to	 the	 state	budget	 incurring	 enor-
mous	losses	could	be	given	as	examples146.	
•	 The	oligarchs,	guided	by	their	own	interests,	are	making	quite	successful	
attempts	to	prevent	foreign	capital	from	entering	the	sectors	of	economy	
which	are	of	key	significance	for	them.	Special	protection	is	offered	to	the	
metallurgical	industry.	however, if necessary and if a good price is of-
fered, the oligarchs do not mind selling their assets, and in such cases 
Russian capital is usually the only buyer. The	clearest	example	of	this	
146	 А. Шалайский, В. Трегубов, ‘Топ-7 схем облегчения бюджета’,	Зеркало недели,	29	Decem-
ber	 2011,	 http://zn.ua/POLITICS/top_shem_oblegcheniya_byudzheta__reyting_effektiv-
no_osvoennyh_sredstv_v_uhodyaschem_godu-94878.html
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was	the	sale	of	metallurgical	assets	by	ISD	to	Russians,	who	pose	the	strong-
est	competition	to	Ukrainian	business	in	this	industry.	Such	transactions	
are	also	possible	in	the	future.	Unless	Firtash	manages	to	ensure	supplies	
of	cheap	gas	for	his	new	chemical	plants,	he	will	in	all	likelihood	decide	to	
sell	them;	and	Russian	capital	will	be	the	only	realistic	buyer.	
•	 The	oligarchisation	of	the	economy	is	among	the	main	causes	for	the	very 
unfavourable investment climate in Ukraine. As	a	consequence	of	the	
practices	described	in	the	preceding	chapter,	the	level	of	foreign	direct	in-
vestments	per	capita	in	Ukraine	is	still	low147,	and	the	investments	are	pre-
dominantly	limited	to	the	financial	sector,	which	contributes	to	the	mod-
ernisation	of	the	economy	and	the	implementation	of	new	technologies	to	
only	a	small	extent.	The	oligarchs	are	not	 the	only	ones	 to	blame	for	 the	
problems	with	 foreign	 investments.	 Other	 serious	 impediments	 include	
the	still	high	level	of	corruption	and	the	low	efficiency	of	the	state	admin-
istration.	However,	 it	 is	 the	 lobbying	 from	big	business	 that	 seems	 to	be	
the	main	reason	behind	these	phenomena.	Ukraine	has	always	been	a	very	
challenging	market	for	investors,	but	after	two	years	of	Yanukovych’s	rule,	
despite	macroeconomic	 stabilisation,	 the	 situation	 has	 deteriorated	 fur-
ther.	The	Ukrainian	government	has	not	taken	any	measures,	so	there	are	
no	grounds	to	expect	that	the	situation	will	improve	in	this	area.	
•	 The monopolisation which	can	be	observed	in	many	sectors	of	the	econ-
omy	is	causing a restriction of competition and	this	has	negative	con-
sequences.	The	state	allows	certain	businessmen	to	predominate	in	some	
areas	(for	example,	Firtash	in	the	nitrogen	fertiliser	sector),	and,	in	addi-
tion	to	that,	similar	practices	are	used	locally	(at	the	level	of	districts	and	
cities),	with	the	participation	of	regional	businessmen	and	with	the	aid	of	
representatives	of	the	state	administration.	
•	 In	many	cases,	the primacy of private interests over the interests of 
the state has negative results. The	clearest	example	of	this	is	the	prison	
sentence	 imposed	on	Yulia	Tymoshenko,	which	 the	RUE	Group	managed	
to	push	 through.	As	 seen	 from	the	perspective	of	Firtash’s	 interests,	 the	
147	 According	 to	 UNCTAD,	 the	 level	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investments	 in	 Ukraine	 in	 2005–2010	
reached	US$45.5	 billion.	 In	 the	 same	period,	US$91.6	billion	was	 invested	 in	Poland,	 and	
US$6.1	billion	was	invested	in	Georgia,	whose	population	is	ten	times	smaller	than	Ukraine’s	
and	which	was	scene	of	military	conflict	in	2008.	UNCTAD,	World	Investment	Report	2011,	
http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf
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elimination	of	Tymoshenko	from	political	 life	has	doubtless	been	benefi-
cial,	but	this	has	had	an	extremely	adverse	impact	on	Ukraine’s	relations	
with	the	West.	
•	 The	fact	that	the	oligarchs	built	their	fortunes	relatively	recently,	just	a	lit-
tle	more	than	a	decade	ago,	means	that	a	major	part	of	them	see their busi-
ness as temporary and they are attempting to maximise their profits 
and minimise the expenses. In	 effect,	most	 industrial	 plants	 have	 not	
been	modernised	 since	 Soviet	 times	 and	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	 out-
dated.	Even	those	businessmen	who	invest	some	money,	such	as	Akhme-
tov,	 usually	 do	 it	 at	 the	minimum	 level.	Given	 the	 low	political	 stability	
of	Ukraine,	this	approach	is	unlikely	to	change	in	the	predictable	future.	
•	 Even	if	the	oligarchs	see	the	need	for	comprehensive	reforms	to	be	imple-
mented	 in	Ukraine,	 they	are	successfully	 influencing	 the	government	so	
that	the	reforms	are	made	primarily	in	those	areas	which	are	not	linked	
directly	to	big	business	(for	example,	the	pension	system	reform).	In	turn,	
in	 those	 sectors	where	 the	 oligarchs	have	 a	 strong	 interest,	 the	 reforms	
announced	by	the	present	government	have	been	held	up	to	a	visible	de-
gree.	The	agricultural	reform	and	the	gas	sector	reform	are	good	examples	
of	this.	Although	both	reforms	are	inevitable	for	further	economic	devel-
opment,	the	conflicts	of	interests	among	the	oligarchs	are	among	the	key	
reasons	for	the	delay	in	their	implementation.	
•	 The concentration of capital in the hands of a relatively small group 
of people is impeding the development of a middle class. Big	business	
lobbies	for	solutions	which	are	favourable	to	itself,	so	when	it	is	necessary	
to	 increase	state	revenues,	 this	 is	usually	done	at	the	expense	of	the	 less	
powerful	businessmen.	This	became	especially	clear	 following	 the	adop-
tion	of	 the	new	fiscal	 code.	Although	 the	code	was	a	positive	move	 in	 it-
self,	it	imposed	heavier	fiscal	levies	primarily	on	small	and	medium-sized	
businesses.	These	have	 always	had	problems	with	 operation	 in	Ukraine,	
however,	their	owners	formed	an	important	part	of	the	electorate	of	Our	
Ukraine	and	later	of	BYuT.	The	Party	of	Regions,	whose	financial	base	is	big	
business	and	whose	core	electorate	are	manual	labourers	and	public	serv-
ants,	has	no	scruples	about	imposing	heavier	burdens	on	the	middle	class.	
This	is	not	limited	to	fiscal	levies.	Corporate	raids	and	smaller	businesses	
being	forced	to	share	their	profits	–are	both	trends	which	have	intensified	
over	the	past	two	years	and	are	impeding	the	development	of	a	middle	class	
equally	strongly.	
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2. The positives
•	 The	policy	of	restricting	the	influx	of	foreign	investment	–	which	big	busi-
ness	has	been	lobbying	for	–	apart	from	the	obvious	negative	consequences,	
also	helps	protect the country’s economic independence from the ex-
pansion of Russian capital. Although	Russian	capital	 is	strongly	repre-
sented	in	some	sectors	(for	example	the	banking	sector	and	telecommuni-
cation),	Russians	still	have	little	to	say	in	those	areas	which	are	believed	
to	be	the	most	important	for	the	oligarchs.	The	Ukrainian	refineries	(Kre-
menchuk,	Odessa	and	Lysychansk)	 serve	as	an	example;	 they	have	been	
taken	 over	 by	 Russian	 companies	 and	 still	 have	 problems	 in	Ukraine148.	
Although	Tatneft	was	backed	by	 the	Russian	state,	 it	was	unable	 to	pre-
vent	the	Kremenchuk	refinery	being	taken	away	from	it	by	Kolomoyskyi.	
LUKoil,	which	owns	the	refinery	in	Odessa,	has	also	encountered	problems	
due	to	aggressive	moves	from	Privat149.	
•	 Many	oligarchs,	especially	the	most	powerful	ones,	have	come	a	long	way	
from	being	regional	businessmen,	often	suspected	of	having	links	with	the	
criminal	 underworld,	 to	 being	 patrons	 of	 the	 arts	 and	 sport.	 This	 trend	
was	set	by	Viktor	Pinchuk,	who	is	the	main	sponsor	of	Ukrainian	modern	
art	 and	promoter	of	European	 integration	 since	he	organises	 the	annual	
YES	summits.	Pinchuk	is	also	the	organiser	and	sponsor	of	the	‘Ukrainian	
lunch’,	which	takes	place	during	the	World	Economic	Forum	in	Davos150.	
•	 Where the state fails to fulfil its functions, the oligarchs often take its 
role. Football	stadiums	were	built	partly	for	their	own	money	by	Akhme-
tov	in	Donetsk,	by	Kolomoyskyi	in	Dnipropetrovsk	and	by	Yaroslavsky	in	
Kharkiv.	Such	moves	mean	that	the	oligarchs	are	often	definitely	more	pop-
ular	in	their	respective	regions	than	the	local	politicians,	and	a	significant	
part	of	 the	residents	see	 them	as	 the	 ‘city	 fathers’.	Even	Dmytro	Firtash,	
who	had	shunned	publicity	for	many	years,	 in	autumn	2011	assumed	the	
function	of	the	president	of	the	Federation	of	Employers	of	Ukraine,	which	
148	 ‘Problems	of	refineries	in	Ukraine’,	OSW,	EastWeek,	19	January	2011,	http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-01-19/problems-refineries-ukraine
149	 The	most	glaring	example	was	when	oil	supplies	to	the	refinery	in	Odessa	were	cut	off	by	
Ukrnafta,	which	is	controlled	by	Privat.	
150	 In	 2010,	 Pinchuk	 climbed	 to	 first	 place	 in	 the	 ranking	 of	 the	world’s	main	 lobbyists	 for	
Ukraine	compiled	by	the	Kyiv-based	Institute	of	World	Policy,	‘Виктор Пинчук возглавил 
рейтинг ТОП-10 лоббистов Украины’,	Дело,	 21	 September	 2010,	 http://delo.ua/lifestyle/
viktor-pinchuk-vozglavil-rejti-145067/
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was	supposed	to	help	change	his	image	of	a	businessman	with	suspicious	
connections	 into	 a	 representative	 of	 Ukrainian	 entrepreneurs.	 Despite	
these	changes,	it	is	still	difficult	to	claim	that	Ukrainian	big	business	has	
become	similar	to	big	business	in	the	West.	
•	 The	influential	oligarchic	groups,	whose	interests	each	government	must	
respect,	also	reduce	the	room	for	manoeuvre	 in	foreign	politics.	The op-
position from the key oligarchic groups to a deeper integration with 
Russia has been among the main reasons why Ukraine has not decid-
ed to become seriously engaged in any integration project initiated 
by Russia. This	reluctance	 is	caused	mainly	by	the	Ukrainian	oligarchs’	
fear	of	 competition	 from	Russian	 investors.	Each	Ukrainian	government	
is	more	restricted	in	their	actions	than,	for	example,	the	president	of	Bela-
rus,	who	is	less	dependent	on	his	support	base.	However,	it	cannot	be	ruled	
out	that	the	opinion	that	it	is	necessary	to	reduce	the	gas	price	even	at	the	
expense	of	making	considerable	concessions	to	Russia	will	prevail	 in	the	
coming	months.	
•	 Ukraine,	despite	the	clear	deterioration	of	standards	under	Yanukovych’s	
rule,	is	still	one	of	the	most	democratic	countries	in	the	CIS	area.	Although	
Ukrainian	democracy	 is	 far	 from	perfect,	 it	 still	needs	 to	be	emphasised	
that	so	far	all	the	governments	have	changed	as	a	result	of	elections.	One 
of the reasons why this has been possible is the stance adopted by big 
business. The oligarchs do not form a homogeneous group and fierce-
ly compete with each other, supporting various political groupings. 
Although	the	oligarchs’	funding	of	opposition	groupings	was	seriously	re-
duced	in	2010,	it	is	too	early	to	prejudge	whether	this	is	a	durable	trend	in	
Ukrainian	politics.	
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VI. POssIBle FUTURe DeVelOPMeNTs OF The OlIGARchIc 
sysTeM
•	 It seems unlikely that President yanukovych could decide to upset the 
balance between the two key oligarchic groups, the ‘Donetsk clan’ and 
the RUe Group, in the immediate future.	 Beyond	any	doubt,	Yanuko-
vych	will	be	strengthening	‘the	family’	not	only	politically	but	also	finan-
cially.	The	reinforcement	of	 ‘the	family’s	position	in	business	will	 lead	to	
a	conflict	with	one	of	the	oligarchic	groups	sooner	or	later.	The	most	vul-
nerable	seems	to	be	the	RUE	Group.	Its	strength	is	based	on	enormous	polit-
ical	influence,	but	this	group	is	relatively	weak	financially151.	Firtash	owes	
the	business	successes	he	has	achieved	over	the	past	two	years	to	effective	
assistance	from	the	state	administration.	If	this	assistance	ceases,	his	fall	
could	come	quickly.	The	situation	with	Serhiy	Lyovochkin	is	similar.	Cur-
rently	he	is	among	the	key	players	on	the	Ukrainian	political	scene.	Were	
he	to	be	dismissed,	however,	he	could	easily	face	the	same	fortune	as	Vik-
tor	Medvedchuk.	At	the	moment,	there	are	not	many	signs	this	will	hap-
pen,	but	‘the	family’	may	become	interested	in	deriving	profits	from	the	gas	
market.	However,	at	present	it	is	difficult	to	conclude	whether	Yanukovych	
will	decide	to	risk	open	conflict	with	any	of	the	oligarchic	groups.
•	 Some	observers	of	the	Ukrainian	political	scene,	in connection with ‘the 
family’ gaining strength see the threat of Ukraine undergoing ‘Puti-
nisation’152. This threat, however, does not appear to be real.	It	is	pos-
sible	that	authoritarian	tendencies	will	be	strengthening	in	Ukraine,	and	
‘the	family’	will	certainly	continue	to	grow	in	power,	but	it	still	seems	quite	
unlikely	that	Yanukovych	will	be	able	to	make	all	the	big	business	groups	
subordinate	 to	himself	within	a	 timeframe	of	 a	 few	years.	Although	 the	
situation	existing	in	Ukraine	over	the	past	two	years	is	at	times	reminis-
cent	of	Russia	at	the	time	when	Putin	took	power,	there	are	still	a	few	fun-
damental	differences	between	 them.	First	of	 all,	Yanukovych	has	a	very	
limited	 support	 base.	 Putin	 used	 former	 KGB	 officers	 to	 strengthen	 his	
support	base,	while	Yanukovych	is	relying	on	his	friends	from	Yenakieve	
and	the	acquaintances	of	his	son,	Oleksandr,	most	of	whom	have	 limited	
151	 It	is	in	some	respects	similar	to	the	Kyiv	clan,	who	very	quickly	lost	their	political	influence	
when	the	government	changed.	
152	 Тарас Кузьо, ‘Украине грозит путинизация СБУ, МВД и информационной политики’,	
UNIAN,	25	June	2010,	http://www.unian.net/rus/news/383668-ukraine-grozit-putinizatsi-
ya-sbu-mvd-i-informatsionnoy-politiki.html	
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competences	to	rule	the	country.	It	is	also	open	to	doubt	whether	a	new	re-
gime	could	be	based	on	the	Ukrainian	civil	service,	which	is	too	corrupt	and	
heavily	dependent	on	big	business.	It	is	equally	important	that	Yanukovych	
is	unable	to	offer	any	ideology	to	the	Ukrainian	public,	and	the	popularity	
he	won	by	promising	stability	and	order	dramatically	decreased	only	a	few	
months	into	his	rule153.	
•	 To	make	big	business	subordinate,	a	solution	similar	to	the	Russian	‘Kho-
dorkovsky	case’	would	have	to	be	applied	and	this	would	mean	real	revo-
lution	 in	Ukrainian	 conditions.	 Some	 attempts	 to	 subjugate	 big	 business	
were	made	after	the	Orange	Revolution	(the	re-privatisation	of	Kryvorizh-
stal),	but	they	were	unsuccessful.	Furthermore,	if	representatives	of	all	the	
groups	felt	really	endangered	by	the	excessive	reinforcement	of	the	presi-
dent’s	position,	they	would	take	decisive	countermeasures154.	For	this	rea-
son,	the	speculations	about	the	weakening	position	or	even	imminent	fall	
of	some	of	the	most	influential	oligarchs,	which	frequently	appear	in	the	
Ukrainian	media,	should	be	treated	with	a	great	deal	of	caution,	since	no	
tangible	proof	for	this	thesis	can	be	found	at	present155.	
•	 The	deteriorating	technical	condition	of	the	large	industrial	plants,	which	
are	among	the	oligarchs’	key	assets,	is	a	very	serious	threat	to	big	busi-
ness	in	the	medium	term.	These	plants	are	still	predominantly	based	on	
Soviet	technologies	and	are	in	need	of	modernisation.	If	the	present	poli-
cy	of	limiting	investments	and	extensive	business	development	is	contin-
ued,	many of the plants (and probably even entire sectors) will not 
be able to come up against competition from developing countries in 
little more than ten years from now. Such	tendencies	can	already	be	
observed	in	metallurgy	and	the	chemical	sector,	and	they	will	most	likely	
advance.	
153	 It	seems	that	the	arguments	presented	above	are	more	reasonable	than	the	frequently	ap-
pearing	statements	that	Ukrainians	allegedly	have	an	‘anarchistic	nature’,	which	report-
edly	could	make	it	more	difficult	to	introduce	a	more	authoritarian	regime	in	Ukraine.	
154	 According	to	media	reports,	representatives	of	big	business	concerned	about	Yanukovych’s	
policy	have	already	met	for	consultations.	Юлия Мостовая, ‘Perpetuum-peredelum’,	Зеркало 
недели,	20	January	2012,	http://zn.ua/POLITICS/perpetuum-peredelum-95998.html
155	 In	this	context,	Akhmetov	and	Firtash	are	mentioned	most	frequently.	However,	the	facts	
prove	something	completely	different.	The	statements	made	by	Akhmetov	and	Firtash	that	
they	would	not	seek	election	as	MPs	in	the	election	in	2012,	which	were	to	a	certain	extent	
forced	by	Yanukovych,	may	mean	that	their	political	influence	has	reduced,	but	this	is	far	
from	certain.	
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•	 While	 future	 reshuffles	 among	 the	 groups	 of	 influence	 are	possible	 (and	
will	certainly	take	place),	there is still little chance that the model of re-
lations between the ruling class and big business will change, at least 
in the medium term. Even	if	Yanukovych	loses	power	in	2015,	there	are	no	
politicians	who	would	be	able	to	carry	through	such	radical	changes	among	
his	potential	successors	from	the	present	opposition.	Furthermore,	the	ex-
perience	after	the	Orange	Revolution	has	shown	that	those	politicians	who	
come	to	power	carrying	slogans	of	system	change	very	quickly	become	part	
of	this	system.
•	 The	threat	that	the	second	wave	of	the	economic	crisis	could	strike	is	a	fac-
tor	which	even	further	complicates	the	process	of	making	any	predictions.	
There	is	no	doubt	that,	should	the	crisis	come,	the	economy	will	be	affected	
very	strongly,	as	was	the	case	in	2008–2009.	Ukraine	still	relies	too	heavily	
on	exports	of	mineral	raw	materials	and	metal	goods	and	the	demand	for	
these	depends	on	very	strong	market	fluctuations.	It	also	has	an	extremely	
weak	banking	system.	If, however, the breakdown is deeper and lasts 
longer than the previous time, this may lead to radical changes in the 
economy, including	bankruptcies	of	a	number	of	industrial	plants.	It	is	im-
possible	to	predict	what	influence	such	changes	could	have	on	the	Ukrain-
ian	political	scene.	
słAWOMIR MATUsZAK
Work on this text finished in June 2012
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sUPPleMeNT 
The oligarchs’ fortunes in numbers
The	lists	of	Ukraine’s	richest	businessmen,	which	are	published	cyclically	both	
in	Ukraine	and	abroad,	illustrate	how	difficult	it	is	to	assess	their	assets.	The	
percentage	differences	in	the	estimated	assets	of	the	richest	businessmen	can	
be	well	into	double	figures,	depending	on	the	ranking.	For	example,	the	fortune	
of	Ukraine’s	richest	man,	Rinat	Akhmetov,	was	US$15.5	billion	in	2011	accord-
ing	to	calculations	made	by	Focus	weekly.	According	to	the	weekly	Korrespond-
ent,	however,	it	was	worth	US$25.6	billion.	The	assessments	of	the	assets	of	in-
dividual	oligarchs	differ	even	more	over	a	timeframe	of	several	years.	In	2009,	
Forbes	 assessed	 that	 Akhmetov’s	 fortune	 was	 worth	 US$1.8	 billion,	 which	
placed	him	 in	 397th	position	among	 the	world’s	 richest,	while	 in	2011	his	 as-
sets	were	evaluated	to	be	worth	US$16	billion156,	which	put	him	in	39th	position.	
As	has	been	described	earlier	in	this	text,	Akhmetov	has	become	significantly	
richer	over	the	past	three	years,	but	the	value	of	his	assets	has	certainly	not	
increased	nine-fold.	
Such	vast	differences	result	 from	the	 fact	 that	 in	most	cases	 it	 is	difficult	 to	
assess	the	value	of	the	assets	owned	by	oligarchs	in	a	reliable	way.	It	 is	usu-
ally	impossible	to	base	the	calculations	on	stock	market	prices	since	very	few	
companies	controlled	by	Ukrainian	big	business	are	 listed	on	Western	stock	
exchanges,	and	most	of	them	belong	to	the	agricultural	sector157.	The	price	paid	
for	a	plant	during	privatisation	often	cannot	be	relied	upon,	either,	since	it	has	
been	intentionally	reduced	to	a	lower	level.	In	turn,	the	costs	of	takeovers	of	
individual	companies	are	frequently	confidential,	and	press	leaks	are	the	only	
source	of	data,	and	these	do	not	always	necessarily	reflect	the	true	situation.	
It	should	also	not	be	forgotten	that	in	many	cases	(this	especially	concerns	poli-
ticians	and	state	officials)	the	assets	are	not	revealed.	
156	 Rinat	Akhmetov,	Forbes,	accessed	on	19	March	2012,	http://www.forbes.com/profile/rinat-
akhmetov/
157	 One	exception	is	Kostyantin	Zhevago,	whose	company,	Ferrexpo,	has	been	listed	on	London	
Stock	Exchange	since	2007.	Furthermore,	a	few	companies	from	the	agricultural	sector	are	
listed	on	the	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange.	In	2011,	even	a	special	index,	WIG-Ukraine,	which	
covers	five	Ukrainian	companies,	was	created.
‘WIG-Ukraine	–	pierwszy	taki	indeks	giełdowy	w	Europie’,	wp.pl,	5	May	2011,	http://media.
wp.pl/kat,1022947,wid,13376465,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1e13c	
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Despite	 these	 limitations,	 the	 rankings	 of	 Ukraine’s	 richest	 people	 are	 use-
ful.	 It	can	clearly	be	seen	how	quickly	 the	oligarchs	recovered	 from	the	cri-
sis	of	2008–2009.	The	oligarchic	fortunes	flourished	after	Yanukovych’s	vic-
tory.	They	also	show	to	what	extent	assets	are	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	
group	of	the	richest	businessmen.	Korrespondent	weekly	assessed	in	2011	that	
the	fortunes	of	Ukraine’s	one	hundred	richest	businessmen	were	worth	US$83	
billion,	of	which	as	much	as	70%	(US$57.9	billion)	belonged	to	the	top	ten.	
A	comparison	of	the	rankings	for	preceding	years	also	reveals	that	the	top	posi-
tions	remain	unchanged.	According	to	Korrespondent,	since	2006	–	when	the	lists	
of	Ukraine’s	richest	people	first	started	to	be	published	–	the	top	five	has	been	
constantly	formed	by	the	same	people:	Akhmetov,	the	leaders	of	Privat	Group,	
Pinchuk	and	Zhevago158.	More	reshuffles	have	been	seen	lower	down	the	rank-
ing,	but	these	positions	have	also	been	occupied	for	years	by	the	same	business-
men,	the	rise	of	whose	fortunes	dates	back	to	Kuchma’s	rule.	Cases	such	as	that	
of	Oleh	Bakhmatyuk,	who	created	his	empire	in	the	agricultural	sector	after	the	
Orange	Revolution,	are	rather	the	exceptions	which	prove	the	rule.	
List of Ukraine’s richest people in 2011 (US$ millions)
Korrespondent Focus 
1 Rinat	Akhmetov 25,600 1 Rinat	Akhmetov 15,590
2 Henadiy	Boholyubov 6,600 2 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi 5,323
3 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi 6,200 3 Henadiy	Boholyubov 4,975
4 Viktor	Pinchuk 5,900 4 Viktor	Pinchuk 2,970
5 Kostyantin	Zhevago 3,200 5 Vadym	Novinsky 2,683
6 Viktor	Nusenkis 2,900 6 Kostyantin	Zhevago 2,675
7 Dmytro	Firtash 2,250 7 Andriy	Verevsky 2,200
8 Oleh	Bakhmatyuk 2,200 8
Kostyantin	
Hryhoryshyn
2,169
158	 ‘Рейтинг самых богатых украинцев’,	 Корреспондент.net,	 accessed	 on	 19	 March	 2012,	
http://files.korrespondent.net/projects/top50/2011#
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Korrespondent Focus 
9 Oleksiy	Martynov 1,520 9 Serhiy	Taruta 2,126
10 Oleksiy	Vadatursky 1,500 10 Vitaliy	Hayduk 2,073
11 Yuriy	Kosyuk 1,300 11 Yuriy	Kosyuk 2,070
12 Oleksandr	Yaroslavsky 1,200 12 Oleh	Mkrtczyan 1,877
13 Petro	Poroshenko 980 13 Dmytro	Firtash 1,489
14 Ivan	Huta 918 14 Oleksandr	Shnaider 1,407
15 Serhiy	Taruta 730 15 Eduard	Shyfryn 1,407
16 Oleh	Mkrtchyan 730 16 Oleksandr	Yaroslavsky 1,403
17 Andriy	Verevsky 716 17 Petro	Poroshenko 1,193
18 Vyacheslav	Bohuslayev 704 18 Vasyl	Khmelnytsky 1,173
19 Valeriy	Khoroshkovskyi 599 19 Oleh	Bakhmatyuk 1,093
20 Leonid	Chernovetskyi 556 20 Leonid	Baisarov 1,060
21 Anatoliy	Yurevich 548 21 Andriy	Ivanov 1,015
22 Serhiy	Tihipko 535 22 Leonid	Yurushev 979
23 Mykola	Yankovsky 522 23 Ivan	Huta 939
24 Yukhym	Zvyahilsky 504 24 Oleksiy	Martynov 930
25 Vitaliy	Hayduk 481 25
Andriy	and	Serhiy	
Klyuyev 
901
26 Olha	Nechytailo 476 26 Mykola	Tolmachov 892
27 Ihor	Dvoretsky 458 27
Oleksandr	and	Halina	
Gerega
891
28 Borys	Kolesnikov 448 28 Oleksandr	Savchuk 868
29 Yevhen	Chernyak 447 29 Vyacheslav	Bohuslayev 845
30 Georgiy	Skudar 438 30 Serhiy	Tihipko 796
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list of Ukraine’s billionaires in 2012 according to Forbes159
Global rank Name Assets (Us$ billions)
39 Rinat	Akhmetov 16.0
255 Viktor	Pinchuk 4.2
377 Ihor	Kolomoyskyi 3.0
418 Henadiy	Boholyubov 2.8
719 Kostyantin	Zhevago 1.8
960 Yuriy	Kosyuk 1.3
1153 Petro	Poroshenko 1.0
1153 Andriy	Verevsky 1.0
DZIKIE	PRZYPISY	159
159	 The	World’s	 Billionaires,	Forbes,	 accessed	 on	 19	March	 2012,	 http://www.forbes.com/bil-
lionaires/list/#p_1_s_a0_All%20industries_Ukraine_All%20states_
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APPeNDIx
1. yanukovych’s ‘family’
The	interests	and	the	connections	of	the	people	who	form	the	president’s	in-
ner	circle	have	been	described	in	chapter	III,	section	2	of	this	text.	The	assets	
owned	by	 ‘the	family’	are	still	relatively	modest	as	compared	to	those	of	the	
oligarchs	outlined	below.	Furthermore,	 in	most	 cases,	media	 reports	 on	 the	
takeover	of	a	given	company	by	‘the	family’	are	difficult	to	verify.	
2. Akhmetov’s group
This	is	definitely	the	strongest	in	financial	terms	and	one	of	the	most	influential	
oligarch	groups	in	Ukraine.	The	pivotal	figure	in	this	group	is	Rinat	Akhmetov,	
Ukraine’s	richest	businessman.	Vadym	Novinsky	is	his	business	partner	in	the	
steel	industry.	Another	of	his	business	partners,	Borys	Kolesnikov,	the	depu-
ty	prime	minister	in	charge	of	Euro	2012,	is	reportedly	also	a	member	of	this	
group.	A	number	of	Ukrainian	politicians,	including	Raisa	Bogatyreva	(deputy	
prime	minister	and	healthcare	minister),	Iryna	Akimova	(first	deputy	head	of	
the	Presidential	Administration)	and	Rinat	Kuzmin	(deputy	attorney	general),	
are	believed	 to	have	 links	with	Akhmetov.	This	 annexe	provides	an	outline	
of	only	those	members	of	this	group	who	have	a	high	position	in	business,	i.e.	
Akhmetov,	Novinsky	and	Kolesnikov.	
2.1. Rinat Akhmetov
He	was	born	in	1966	in	Donetsk.	His	father	was	a	miner	who	had	immigrated	
from	Tatarstan.	No	proven	information	is	available	on	the	beginnings	of	his	ac-
tivity.	In	the	first	half	of	the	1990s,	he	was	probably	linked	to	Akhat	Bragin	(nick-
name	Alik	Grek),	a	leader	of	the	criminal	underworld	in	the	Donetsk	Oblast,	who	
was	the	president	of	Shakhtar	Donetsk	Football	Club160.	The	mid	1990s	saw	a	vio-
lent	struggle	for	influence	in	which	a	number	of	representatives	of	both	the	ma-
fia	and	the	political	and	business	elite	were	killed161.	Akhmetov’s	significance	in	
the	region	started	to	grow	after	1995,	when	Bragin	was	assassinated.	
160	 Links	between	Akhmetov	and	Bragin	were	documented	in	the	operational	evidence	of	the	
Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs,	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dA29BDRfCEA
161	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 ‘Ukraińska	 metalurgia:	 gospodarcze	 ogniwo	 oligarchicznego	 systemu	
władzy’,	Analizy	OSW,	1	May	2002.
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In	1995,	Akhmetov	became	a	shareholder	of	the	Donetsk-based	Dongorbank	to	
quickly	become	the	business	leader	of	Donbass	by	taking	over	more	and	more	
companies	and	plants,	also	in	the	metallurgical	industry.	Viktor	Yanukovych	
became	the	governor	of	the	Donetsk	Oblast	in	1997,	and	then	close	co-operation	
between	 the	 oligarch	 and	 the	 future	 president	 began.	 Yanukovych	was	 the	
political	representative	of	the	Donetsk	clan,	first	as	the	governor	(1997–2002)	
and	later	as	the	prime	minister	(2002	–	 January	2005),	while	Akhmetov	was	
the	most	 important	businessman	 in	 the	 clan.	This	was	 the	 time	of	 the	 sud-
den	expansion	of	Akhmetov’s	business,	first	 of	 all	 in	metallurgy	but	 also	 in	
coal	mining	and	electricity	production.	Akhmetov	backed	Viktor	Yanukovych	
financially	during	the	presidential	election	campaign	in	2004.	Following	the	
Orange	Revolution,	despite	the	loss	of	Kryvorizhstal,	Akhmetov	reinforced	his	
position	as	Ukraine’s	richest	businessman.	
Despite	his	enormous	influence	on	politics	at	the	district	and	then	national	level,	
the	only	position	Akhmetov	held	between	1996	and	2006	was	that	of	the	president	
of	Shakhtar	Donetsk	Football	Club.	He	won	a	seat	in	the	Verkhovna	Rada	as	a	rep-
resentative	of	the	Party	of	Regions	(no.	7	on	the	list)	in	the	parliamentary	elections	
in	2006	and	2007,	but	he	did	not	take	an	active	part	in	parliamentary	work.	At	that	
time,	the	paths	of	Akhmetov	and	Yanukovych	began	to	gradually	split,	but	this	
could	not	be	called	a	conflict.	Yanukovych,	in	his	attempts	to	become	independ-
ent	from	Akhmetov,	started	to	rely	to	a	greater	extent	on	the	RUE	Group.	His	at-
tempts	to	distance	himself	from	Akhmetov	became	even	more	evident	when	he	
was	elected	president	and	started	 to	build	his	own	business	base	 (‘the	 family’).	
Despite	repeated	media	reports	on	the	escalating	conflict	between	the	president	
and	Akhmetov162,	it	is	difficult	to	point	to	any	precise	examples	which	could	prove	
this.	On	the	contrary,	Akhmetov	can	recognise	the	two	years	of	Yanukovych’s	rule	
as	the	best	time	in	his	business	career,	one	sign	of	which	is	the	entrenchment	of	his	
dominant	position	in	the	steel	industry	and	power	engineering.	
Assets
Akhmetov	 owns	 companies	 which	 operate	 in	 very	 different	 sectors	 of	 the	
economy.	However,	his	power	is	based	on	three	pillars:	the	metallurgical	in-
dustry,	power	engineering	and	the	media.	The	greater	part	of	Akhmetov’s	as-
sets	are	concentrated	in	System	Capital	Management	(SCM),	Ukraine’s	largest	
162	 ‘Во власти зреет конфликт между „семьей” и группой Ахметова’,	Послезавтра,	 17	No-
vember	2011,	http://poslezavtra.com.ua/vo-vlasti-zreet-konflikt-mezhdu-semej-i-gruppoj-
axmetova/
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corporation,	which	was	founded	in	2000.	It	is	estimated	that	SCM’s	assets	are	
worth	US$22.8	billion163.	Most	of	the	firms	which	form	the	SCM	structure	are	
owned	by	SCM	Ltd	 and	SCM	Holdings	Ltd,	which	 are	 registered	 in	Cyprus;	
their	sole	shareholder	being	Akhmetov.	
Metallurgy
The	plants	operating	in	the	metallurgical	industry	are	part	of	MetInvest	Hold-
ing,	where	SCM	has	a	71.25%	stake,	while	23.75%	belong	to	Vadym	Novinsky’s	
Smart	Holding.	MetInvest	has	an	integrated	production	chain,	which	includes	
iron	ore	and	coal	mines,	ore	enrichment	works,	metallurgical	plants	and	com-
panies	which	 specialise	 in	 production	 sales.	 The	 fact	 that	MetInvest	 has	 its	
own	ore	mines	ensures	it	access	to	cheap	raw	materials164.	
MetInvest	 is	 Ukraine’s	 largest	 iron	 ore	 manufacturer.	 The	 Ingulets	 works,	
Northern	works	and	Central	works	all	extract	and	enrich	ore.	The	Komsomol-
skoye	 ore	mine	produces	 limestone,	 and	Krasnodonugol	 is	Ukraine’s	 second	
largest	 coking	 coal	mine.	MetInvest	 also	 controls	 the	United	Coal	Company,	
which	has	coal	mines	in	the	USA.	
MetInvest	owns	factories	which	manufacture	40%	of	Ukraine’s	steel	produc-
tion:	Azovstal,	the	Ilyich	Steel	and	Iron	Works	in	Mariupol,	the	Yenakieve	Met-
allurgical	Works	and	the	Khartsyzsk	Pipe	Plant,	which	manufactures	pipes	for	
oil	and	gas	pipelines.	MetInvest	also	has	metallurgical	plants	 in	other	coun-
tries:	Promet	Steel	(Bulgaria),	Ferreira	Valsider	and	MetInvest	Trametal	(Ita-
ly)	and	Spartan	UK	(United	Kingdom).	Furthermore,	the	holding	owns	plants	
which	support	steel	production:	the	Avdiivka	Coke	and	Chemical	Plant,	Inkor	
Chemicals	and	the	Kondratievsky	Refractory	Plant.	
Skif-Shipping	and	 the	Danube	Shipping	Stevedoring	Company	are	 in	charge	
of	 transporting	 the	 holding’s	 products	 both	 inside	 Ukraine	 and	 for	 export.	
MetInvest-Ukraine,	MetInvest-SMC,	MetInvest-International	and	MetInvest-	
-Eurasia	sell	the	holding’s	production	in	Ukraine	and	abroad.	
163	 Value	 at	 end	 of	 2010	 according	 to	 data	 from	 SCM	 http://www.scm.com.ua/ru/business/
overview/
164	 Akhmetov	 also	 used	 this	 against	 his	 competitors	 from	 ISD,	 who	 –	 given	 the	 high	 ore	
prices	 offered	 by	MetInvest	 –	were	 forced	 to	 buy	 raw	materials	 from	Russia	 and	Brazil:	
‘Тарута и Ахметов не поделили сырье’,	Trust.UA,	23	February	2010,	http://www.trust.ua/
news/22783.html
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The power engineering sector
DTEK	(Donbass	Fuel-Energy	Company)	owns	assets	in	the	power	engineering	
sector.	These	include	three	groups	of	plants	dealing	with	coal	mining	and	en-
richment,	and	electricity	production	and	distribution.	The	integrated	produc-
tion	chain	makes	DTEK	 independent	 from	external	 suppliers.	The	company	
employs	over	100,000	people,	and	its	income	in	2011	reached	almost	US$5	bil-
lion165.	For	comparison,	the	Ukrainian	state	budget	revenues	in	the	same	year	
were	at	US$43	billion.	
Coal	 is	 mined	 by:	 Pavlogradugol,	 Dobropolyeugol,	 Sverdlovantratsyt	 and	
Rovenkyantratsyt	(each	of	them	owns	several	coal	mines)	and	the	Komsomo-
lets	Donbassa	coal	mine.	In	mid	2012,	DTEK	bought	three	coal	mines	in	Ros-
tov	Oblast	 (Russian	Federation):	Donskoy	Anthracite,	 Sulinantratsit	 and	 the	
Obukhovskaya	Mine,	which	are	located	close	to	the	Ukrainian	border,	so	as	to	
ensure	cheap	raw	material	supplies.	
DTEK	also	owns	DTEK	Naftogaz166,	 an	oil	 and	gas	producer,	 and	has	 a	 25%	
stake	in	Vanco	Prikerchenska.	Coal	is	enriched	by	the	Pavlogradskaya,	Kura-
khovskaya,	Dobropolskaya,	Oktyabrskaya,	Mospinskoye	and	Obukhovskaya	
(this	one	is	in	Russia)	coal	enrichment	plants.	DTEK	Trading	is	also	in	charge	
of	coal	trade,	which	is	sold	to	both	DTEK	power	plants	and	the	other	plants	
owned	by	SCM.	
Electricity	 is	 produced	 by	 businesses	 consisting	 of	 several	 thermal	 power	
plants:	Skhidenerho,	Kyivenergo,	Dnieproenergo	and	Zakhidenerho.	The	 lat-
ter	includes	‘Burshtyn	Island’	consisting	of	power	plants	which	are	integrated	
with	 the	EU’s	ENTSO-E,	which	makes	 it	possible	 to	 export	 electricity	 to	EU	
member	states.	The	plants	controlled	by	DTEK	produce	over	30%	of	Ukraine’s	
electricity	consumption.	DTEK	also	intends	to	develop	electricity	production	
using	 renewable	 energy	 sources.	 The	Wind	 Power	 company	 is	 planning	 to	
build	wind	power	plants	in	the	Donetsk	and	Zaporizhia	Oblasts.	
Electricity	sales	 to	 individual	and	 industrial	 recipients	 in	Ukraine	and	elec-
tricity	 exports	 are	 handled	 by	 Servis-Invest,	 PES-Energougol,	 DTEK	 Power	
Trade,	Kyivenergo,	Donetskoblenerho	and	Dnieprooblenerho.	
165	 О нас, ДТЭК, http://www.dtek.com/ru/about-us
166	 Not	to	be	confused	with	the	state-owned	NAK	Naftohaz.	
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The media
The	electronic	media	assets	are	concentrated	in	Media	Group	Ukraine,	which	
owns	 a	 television	 channel	 with	 nationwide	 coverage	 ‘Ukraina’,	 a	 regional	
channel	‘Donbass’	and	two	sports	channels	Football	and	Football+.	It	also	in-
cludes	the	Internet	portal	tochka.net.	
Akhmetov	 also	 holds	 a	 strong	 position	 on	 the	 press	 market.	 His	 holding,	
Segodnya-multimedia,	controls	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	dailies,	Segodnya	(with	
a	circulation	of	150,000)	and	the	Internet	portal	segodnya.ua,	as	well	as	several	
local	press	titles	in	the	Donetsk	Oblast.	
Other assets of System Capital Management
SCM	also	has	a	strong	position	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy:	
•	 In	 the	 financial	 sector,	 it	 controls	 the	 banks	 FUIB	 (Ukraine’s	 9th	 largest	
bank)	and	Renaissance	Credit	(114th	position)	and	the	insurance	companies	
ASKA	and	ASKA-Life.	
•	 In	 telecommunications,	 SCM	 controls	 the	 Astelit	 company,	 which	 owns	
a	45%	stake	in	Life,	the	mobile	network	operator,	and	Vega	Group,	one	of	
the	major	fixed-line	telephone	network	operators.	
•	 ESTA	 Group	 controls	 the	 real	 estate	 owned	 by	 SCM,	 including	 CUM	 in	
Kyiv	and	 the	Donbass	Palace	Hotel	 in	Donetsk.	 It	has	also	been	reported	
that	Akhmetov	owns	a	large	amount	of	real	estate	in	Ukraine	and	abroad.	
In	2011,	he	reportedly	bought	a	luxury	flat	in	London	for	£136	million167.
•	 The	Gornye	Mashiny	Holding	deals	with	the	production	of	mining	equip-
ment.	The	holding	controls	six	plants	in	Ukraine	and	one	in	Russia.	United	
Minerals	Group	Limited	has	three	businesses	which	specialise	in	clay	ex-
traction.	
•	 HarvEast	Holding,	which	is	controlled	by	SCM	and	Novinsky’s	Smart	Hold-
ing	(50%	of	shares	each)	 is	 focused	on	the	agricultural	market.	HarvEast	
owns	 over	 200,000	 hectares	 of	 arable	 land	 and	 100,000	 livestock.	 This	
167	 Alex	Hawkes,	‘Rinat	Akhmetov	pays	record	£136.4m	for	apartment	at	One	Hyde	Park’,	The Guard-
ian,	19.04.2011,	http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/apr/19/rinat-akhmetov-one-hyde-park
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holding	was	established	in	June	2011.	At	present,	its	development	strategy	
is	being	devised	and	 is	 to	be	presented	 in	mid	2012.	This	holding	 stands	
a	great	chance	of	becoming	one	of	the	key	players	on	the	Ukrainian	agri-
cultural	market.	
•	 Furthermore,	 SCM	 owns	 the	 Parallel	 filling	 station	 chain	 and	 a	 chain	
of	 nearly	 100	 supermarkets	 called	 ‘Brusnychka’,	 located	 across	 eastern	
Ukraine,	a	chain	of	over	200	chemist’s	shops	and	several	harbours	at	Sev-
astopol	port.	
2.2. Borys Kolesnikov
He	 was	 born	 in	 1962	 in	 Mariupol,	 Donetsk	 Oblast.	 He	 was	 believed	 to	 be	
Akhmetov’s	 right	 hand	 for	many	 years.	 Now	 he	 has	 his	 own	 independent	
business	interests,	although	most	likely	they	still	co-operate	closely.	He	has	
been	the	deputy	president	of	Shakhtar	Donetsk	Football	Club	since	1998.	In	
1999–2001,	he	was	the	deputy	head	of	the	council	of	the	Donetsk	Oblast,	and	
the	head	of	the	council	between	2001	and	2006.	He	was	elected	to	the	Verk-
hovna	Rada	in	2006	and	2007	as	a	Party	of	Regions	candidate	(no.	10	on	the	
list).	Since	March	2010,	he	has	been	the	deputy	prime	minister	responsible	
for	Euro	2012.	In	December	2010,	as	a	consequence	of	the	administrative	re-
form,	he	was	also	put	in	charge	of	the	Ministry	for	Infrastructure.	Owing	to	
Kolesnikov’s	actions,	Ukraine	managed	to	make	up	for	its	delays	in	the	prepa-
rations	for	the	European	Football	Championships.	This	was	possible	mainly	
due	 to	 skipping	public	procurement	procedures	 for	most	of	 the	work.	This	
provided	ammunition	for	his	critics	to	accuse	him	of	abusing	his	powers	on	
numerous	 occasions,	 including	discrimination	 in	 favour	 of	Altkom,	 a	firm	
which	is	believed	to	be	linked	to	him168.
Assets
•	 Konti	Group	(co-owned	by	his	wife),	which	controls	four	confectionery	fac-
tories:	 in	Donetsk,	Kostiantynivka,	Horlivka	 (Donetsk	Oblast)	 and	Kursk	
(Russia),	which	manufacture	around	15%	of	the	sweets	produced	in	Ukraine.	
168	 Тетяна Ніколаєнко, Сергій Лещенко, ‘Хто заробляє на Євро-2012? Друга частина 
розслідування’,	 Украинская Правда,	 19	 January	 2011,	 http://www.pravda.com.ua/arti-
cles/2011/01/19/5805829/
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•	 Ukrinvest,	a	company	operating	in	the	food	industry.	It	owns	20,000	hec-
tares	of	land,	grain	silos	and	pig	farms	–	with	a	capacity	to	breed	150,000	
pigs	–	and	abattoirs.	The	company’s	products	are	sold	in	a	chain	of	70	stores	
named	‘Myasna	Vesna’	(‘Meat	Spring’).	In	2011,	this	company	accounted	for	
11%	of	industrial	pork	production	in	Ukraine169.
•	 Altkom,	a	group	of	companies	which	is	probably	linked	to	Kolesnikov	(he	
himself	 denies	 this).	 In	 connection	with	 the	 preparations	 for	 Euro	 2012,	
Altkom	was	granted	a	number	of	lucrative	contracts,	for	example,	the	con-
struction	of	a	runway	in	Donetsk	(the	contract	was	worth	UAH1.8	billion)	
and	the	construction	of	Lviv	stadium	(UAH1.4	billion).	
•	 Kolesnikov	has	admitted	that	he	holds	stakes	in	some	of	Akhmetov’s	firms,	
adding	the	reservation,	however,	that	these	stakes	are	low.	No	details	are	
available,	though.	
2.3. Vadym Novinsky 
He	was	born	in	1963	in	Staraya	Russa	(Russia).	In	1985,	he	graduated	from	the	
Leningrad	Academy	of	Civil	Aviation	as	an	engineer.	He	worked	in	aviation	be-
tween	1985	and	1991.	His	employers	in	the	1990’s	included	a	company	controlled	
by	LUKoil.	He	has	been	active	in	Ukraine	since	1999,	when	he	established	Smart	
Group.	Between	2004	and	2007,	he	was	the	chairman	of	the	supervisory	board	
of	Ingulets	Ore	Enrichment	Works.	Since	2006,	he	has	been	the	president	and	
the	 chairman	of	 the	 supervisory	board	of	Smart	Holding.	Due	 to	him	being	
a	Russian	citizen,	he	has	not	held	any	public	functions	in	Ukraine	and	has	not	
actively	participated	in	Ukrainian	political	life.	
Assets
Most	 of	 Novinsky’s	 assets	 are	 located	 in	 Ukraine.	 He	 owns	 Smart	 Holding,	
which	includes	plants	operating	in	the	metallurgical,	shipbuilding,	construc-
tion	and	agricultural	sectors.	
•	 Smart	Holding	 is	SCM’s	business	partner	 in	metallurgy	and	agriculture.	
Novinsky	holds	a	25%	stake	in	MetInvest	and	half	of	the	shares	in	HarvEast.	
169	 Цифры и факты, Компания АПК-Инвест,	 http://www.apk-invest.com.ua/ru/about/num-
ber-facts
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•	 Smart	holds	a	 54%	stake	 in	 the	British	company	Royal	Petroleum,	which	
owns	oil	and	gas	fields	in	the	Poltava	Oblast.	This	holding	is	also	planning	
to	build	ten	plants	for	fuel	production	using	biomass	(one	factory	 is	cur-
rently	under	construction).	
•	 In	 the	 shipbuilding	 industry,	 the	holding	owns	 the	 shipyard	 in	Kherson	
and	the	Black	Sea	Shipyard	in	Mykolaiv	(the	largest	one	in	Ukraine).	
•	 Kryvorizhaglostroy,	a	company	which	builds	and	repairs	industrial	prem-
ises.	The	plants	controlled	by	MetInvest	are	its	key	clients.	
•	 The	 holding	 also	 includes	 Smart-Nerudprom,	 which	 controls	 the	 plants	
which	manufacture	construction	materials	in	Crimea	and	Zaporizhia.	
•	 Balaklava	 Green	 is	 a	 holiday	 resort	 located	 around	 Balaklava,	 Crimea.	
Smart	 is	 also	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 preparations	 for	 the	Ochakiv	 port	 con-
struction	project.	
•	 It	owns	twenty	Amstore	hypermarkets.	
•	 In	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 in	 addition	 to	 HarvEast,	 Novinsky	 owns	 the	
Veres	group	of	companies	(which	deal	with	fruit	production	and	process-
ing)	and	the	arboriculture	firm	Vesna.
3. The RUe Group
This	 name	 originates	 from	 the	 name	 of	 the	 company	 RosUkrEnergo	 (RUE),	
which	was	acting	as	an	agent	 in	Russian	gas	 imports	 in	2004–2009.	At	pre-
sent,	 along	with	 Akhmetov,	 this	 is	 the	most	 influential	 oligarchic	 group	 in	
Ukraine.	 It	 is	 commonly	 recognised	 that	 its	members	 are:	 the	 businessman	
Dmytro	Firtash,	energy	minister	Yuriy	Boyko,	deputy	prime	minister	Valeriy	
Khoroshkovskyi	and	the	head	of	the	Presidential	Administration,	Serhiy	Lyo-
vochkin.	Although	the	media	often	use	the	term	the	‘Firtash	group’,	it	is	dif-
ficult	to	determine	the	real	hierarchy	which	exists	among	its	members.	Some	
believe	that	Firtash	is	the	main	player	in	this	group,	while	others	claim	that	he	
is	merely	a	puppet	in	the	hands	of	senior	state	officials.	All	the	members	of	the	
RUE	Group	have	earned	the	reputation	of	being	pro-Russian	politicians.	This	
is	not	about	ideology	but	rather	about	some	unclear	deals	with	representatives	
of	Russian	capital	or	open	lobbying	for	Russian	interests.	It	seems	that	since	
2011,	Khoroshkovskyi	and	Lyovochkin	have	become	oriented	directly	towards	
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President	Yanukovych	and	have	been	distancing	themselves	somewhat	from	
Firtash.	
The	 assets	 owned	 by	 Firtash	 and	 Khoroshkovskyi	 are	 outlined	 below.	 Lyo-
vochkin	and	Boyko	officially	do	not	own	any	major	fortunes.	However,	they	are	
believed	to	have	business	connections	primarily	with	Firtash	and	his	partner	
in	RosUkrEnergo,	Ivan	Fursin.	According	to	media	reports,	Lyovochkin’s	sister	
is	taking	care	of	interests	in	Fursin’s	businesses170.	
3.1. Dmytro Firtash
He	was	born	 in	 1965	 in	w	Bogdanovka	 (Ternopil	Oblast).	He	graduated	 from	
the	railway	technical	secondary	school	in	Donetsk	in	1984.	In	the	early	1990s,	
he	left	for	Moscow,	where	he	started	his	business	activity	(food	industry).	Lit-
tle	is	known	about	his	activity	at	that	time.	Later	on	he	was	engaged	in	barter	
transactions	with	Turkmenistan:	 he	 exchanged	 food	 for	 natural	 gas,	which	
he	then	sold	to	Ukraine171.	In	the	early	2000s,	he	was	Eural	Trans	Gas’s	repre-
sentative	for	Central	Asia.	This	firm	was	the	key	agent	in	the	sale	of	gas	from	
Turkmenistan	and	Russia	to	Ukraine172.	In	2004,	this	company	was	replaced	by	
RosUkrEnergo.	Firtash	was	little	known	in	Ukraine	before	2006.	His	name	was	
publicly	mentioned	for	the	first	time	when	the	media	revealed	the	sharehold-
ers	of	RosUkrEnergo,	which	he	has	a	45%	stake	in	(50%	of	the	shares	belong	to	
Gazprom,	and	the	other	5%	to	another	Ukrainian	businessman,	Ivan	Fursin).	
Firtash	has	been	distancing	himself	from	direct	participation	in	political	life.	
He	made	an	attempt	to	become	an	MP	in	2002,	but	he	was	seeking	election	as	
a	candidate	of	a	party	of	marginal	significance	(Women	for	the	Future),	which	
did	not	pass	the	election	threshold.	After	2006,	Firtash	provided	financial	sup-
port	to	President	Yushchenko	and	was	among	the	key	sponsors	of	 the	Party	
of	Regions.	This	was	one	of	 the	 reasons	 for	his	bitter	 conflict	with	 the	 then	
prime	 minister,	 Yulia	 Tymoshenko,	 who	 in	 2009	 brought	 RosUkr	Energo’s	
status	 as	 an	 agent	 in	 Russian	 gas	 trade	 to	 an	 end.	When	 Yanukovych	won	
the	election	 in	2010,	Firtash	managed	to	carry	out	a	number	of	 takeovers	 in	
170	 Наталья Приходько, ‘Лица новой власти. Консильери’, LB.ua,	5	March	2010,	http://lb.ua/
news/2010/03/05/30151_litsa_novoy_vlasti_konsileri.html
171	 Фирташ, Дмитрий Васильевич, Генштабъ,	 25	May	 2012,	 http://genshtab.censor.net.ua/
wiki/Фирташ,_Дмитрий_Васильевич
172	 Владимир Бережной, ‘Кто владеет украинским газом’,	Известия,	26	April	2006,	http://
izvestia.ru/news/313258
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the	chemical	industry	and	thus	gained	the	dominant	position	in	this	sector.	He	
was	able	to	purchase	these	plants	mainly	due	to	Russian	loans173.	Although	he	
has	not	regained	his	role	as	a	gas	trade	agent,	his	company,	Ostchem,	has	im-
ported	gas	directly	from	Russia	and	Central	Asia	for	the	needs	of	his	chemical	
plants	(4.8	billion	m3	in	2011)174.	
Although	Firtash	is	currently	one	of	the	best-known	oligarchs	in	Ukraine,	he	
is	also	among	the	most	mysterious	figures	in	Ukrainian	business.	In	addition	
to	strong	connections	with	Russia,	Firtash	has	hazy	links	with	the	organised	
criminal	underworld.	He	admitted	in	a	conversation	he	had	with	the	US	am-
bassador	in	2008	that	he	had	been	given	consent	to	start	business	activity	(this	
probably	concerned	Eural	Trans	Gas)	by	Semion	Mogilevich,	a	mafia	boss,	who	
is	on	the	FBI’s	list	of	top	ten	most	wanted	fugitives175.
Assets
Firtash’s	assets	have	been	concentrated	in	Group	DF	since	2007.	He	has	assets	
in	the	chemical	and	titanium	industries,	and	in	the	gas	and	financial	sectors.	
•	 The	chemical	plants	belong	to	Ostchem	Holding,	a	company	registered	in	
Austria	(90%	of	its	shares	are	held	by	Group	DF	and	10%	by	Ivan	Fursin).	
Ostchem	controls	plants	which	manufacture	artificial	 fertilisers,	 includ-
ing:	the	Sievierodonetsk	Azot	Association,	the	Nitrogen	Fertiliser	Factory	
in	Cherkasy,	 the	Nitrogen	 Fertiliser	 Factory	 in	Rivne,	 Stirol	 corporation	
and	the	Crimean	Soda	Plant,	and	also	the	nitrogen	fertiliser	company	Ni-
trofert	in	Estonia	and	JV	Tajik	Azot	in	Tajikistan.	The	plants	controlled	by	
Ostchem	manufacture	100%	of	Ukraine’s	production	of	ammonium	nitrate	
and	over	50%	of	ammonia	and	carbamide.	
•	 Ostchem	Holding	has	shares	in	the	Crimea	Titan	plant	(50%	minus	1	share)	
and	the	right	to	a	five-year	lease	of	the	Volnogorsky	and	Irshansky	mining	
and	metallurgical	works.	
173	 Олег Гавриш, Александр Черновалов; Наталья Гриб, ‘Всеобщее удобрение’, Коммерсант,	
7	February	2011,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1580931?isSearch=True
174	 ‘Ostchem	импортировала из Средней Азии 4,8 млрд. кубометров газа’, УкрРудПром,	21	Feb-
ruary	 2012,	 http://ukrrudprom.ua/news/Ostchem_importirovala_48_mlrd_kubometrov_
gaza_iz_Sredney_Azii.html
175	 Roman	 Olearchyk,	 Neil	 Buckley,	 ‘Ukraine’s	 Firtash	 questioned	 over	 mafia	 ties’,	 Finan-
cial Times,	 2	 December	 2010,	 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f75446de-fe40-11df-abac-
00144feab49a.html
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•	 In	2003,	Firtash	established	Emfesz,	a	company	which	used	to	be	involved	
in	gas	distribution	in	Hungary	(over	20%	of	the	market	share)	and	Poland.	
However,	as	a	consequence	of	a	series	of	lawsuits	and	an	attempted	hostile	
takeover,	this	company	has	lost	its	position	and	is	now	nearly	bankrupt176.
•	 Firtash	has	admitted	that	he	holds	shares	in	oblast	and	municipal	gas	dis-
tribution	 firms	 (oblhazes	 and	mistohazes),	which	 control	 the	 networks	 of	
gas	pipelines	distributing	gas	to	end	users.	This	concerns	majority	stakes	
in	at	least	several	of	the	52	oblhazes operating	in	Ukraine	(including	in	the	
Zakarpattia,	 Volhynia	 and	 Zhytomyr	 Oblasts)177.	 Furthermore,	 he	 holds	
options	which	authorise	the	purchase	of	shares	in	some	of	the	remaining	
oblhazes. He	is	also	among	the	leading	candidates	for	the	takeover	of	state-
owned	shares	 in	the	48	oblhazes and	mistohazes which	are	earmarked	for	
privatisation	in	2012.	
•	 In	 2011,	 Centragas,	 a	 company	 registered	 in	Austria	 (90%	Group	DF,	 10%	
Fursin)	bought	Nadra	Bank	(Ukraine’s	 11th	 largest	bank),	which	had	been	
nationalised	during	the	economic	crisis	in	2009.
•	 In	 2011,	 Firtash	 bought	 the	Nika-Tera	 port	 terminal	 in	Mykolaiv	Oblast.	
Now	that	he	has	a	port	of	his	own,	it	will	be	easier	for	him	to	export	his	
chemical	production	to	foreign	markets.	
3.2. Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi
He	was	born	in	1969	in	Kyiv.	He	was	educated	as	a	lawyer.	He	graduated	from	
the	Taras	Shevchenko	National	University	of	Kyiv.	His	employers	in	the	1980’s	
included	the	Arsenal	 factory	and	the	zoo	 in	Kyiv.	Between	1994	and	1997,	he	
managed	two	small	companies,	Veneda	Ltd	and	Merks	International.
He	embarked	on	political	activity	 in	 1996	by	 joining	the	People’s	Democratic	
Party	 of	 Ukraine	 led	 by	 Valeriy	 Pustovoitenko,	 who	 was	 later	 nominated	
prime	minister.	Khoroshkovskyi	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	1998.	
He	 sought	election	 for	 the	next	 tenure	 in	2002	as	 a	 candidate	of	 a	new	par-
ty,	 Team	 of	Winter	 Generation,	which	 however	 did	 not	manage	 to	 pass	 the	
176	 Алексей Топалов, Ольга Алексеева, ‘Фирташ вернул одно название’,	Газетa.Ru.	9	Novem-
ber	2011,	http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2011/11/09/3827794.shtml
177	 Игорь Маскалевич, ‘Газопеределки’, Зеркало недели,	4	November	2011,	http://zn.ua/ECO-
NOMICS/gazoperedelki-90970.html
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election	 threshold.	 In	 the	same	year,	he	was	nominated	first	deputy	head	of	
the	Presidential	Administration.	In	late	2002,	he	was	nominated	minister	for	
the	economy	 in	Yanukovych’s	government	but	he	 resigned	at	 the	beginning	
of	2004	after	a	conflict	with	the	then	deputy	prime	minister,	Azarov.	Follow-
ing	the	Orange	Revolution,	Khoroshkovskyi	managed	to	find	common	ground	
with	 the	 new	 government.	 In	 2006,	 President	 Yushchenko	 nominated	 him	
first	deputy	secretary	of	the	NSDC,	but	Khoroshkovskyi	resigned	after	a	few	
months.	He	became	the	head	of	the	State	Customs	Service	in	2007.	While	hold-
ing	this	position,	he	came	into	conflict	with	Prime	Minister	Tymoshenko	over	
the	11	billion	m3	of	gas	which	had	been	confiscated	from	RosUkrEnergo.	In	Janu-
ary	2009,	Yushchenko	nominated	Khoroshkovskyi	first	deputy	head	of	the	Se-
curity	Service	of	Ukraine	(SBU).	After	Yanukovych	won	the	presidential	elec-
tion,	Khoroshkovskyi	became	the	head	of	the	SBU.	In	February	2012,	he	was	
appointed	as	first	deputy	prime	minister	in	the	cabinet	led	by	Azarov.
Although	Khoroshkovskyi	is	seen	as	a	member	of	the	RUE	Group,	he	still	ap-
pears	 to	be	a	 relatively	 independent	player,	 and	his	 links	with	Firtash	have	
weakened	recently.	His	connections	with	Russian	capital	are	unclear.	Between	
2005	 and	 2006,	 Khoroshkovskyi	was	 the	 president	 of	 Russia’s	 Evraz	Group,	
one	of	the	world’s	largest	steel	manufacturers178.	Furthermore,	Russia’s	Kanal	
1	holds	a	29%	stake	in	Inter,	the	pivotal	TV	channel	in	Khoroshkovskyi’s	media	
corporation.	Khoroshkovskyi	does	not	 conceal	his	political	 ambitions	and	 is	
mentioned	as	one	of	the	key	candidates	for	the	next	prime	minister.	
Assets
•	 His	key	asset	is	the	U.A.	Inter	Media	Group,	Ukraine’s	 largest	media	cor-
poration.	Khoroshkovskyi	 is	the	predominant	shareholder	and	CEO	of	 it.	
He	bought	 it	 in	 2005.	U.A.	 Inter	Media	Group	 includes	 the	TV	channels:	
Inter,	 K1,	 K2,	 NTN,	Megasport	 and	MTV	Ukraine,	 and	 the	 news	 agency	
Ukrainian	News.	Some	media	outlets	have	reported	that	Firtash	is	the	real	
owner	of	Inter,	but	no	hard	evidence	has	been	put	forward	to	prove	this179.
•	 Between	 2004	 and	 2006	 Khoroshkovskyi,	 disposed	 of	most	 of	 his	 inter-
ests	in	other	economic	sectors.	He	sold	his	majority	stake	in	Ukrsocbank	
178	 Татьяна Ивженко, ‘Evraz Group возглавил украинец’, Независимая газета,	29	November	
2005,	http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-11-29/5_evraz.html
179	 Мустафа Найєм, Сергій Лещенко, Олігархічні війни. Хорошковський як маска Фірташа?	
Украинскaя Правда,	30.07.2008,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2008/07/30/3505053/
100
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
12
to	Viktor	Pinchuk.	He	also	sold	his	0.93%	stake	in	Evraz	for	US$80	million	
in	2006180.	
4. The other oligarchs from the Party of Regions
4.1. The Klyuyev brothers: Andriy and serhiy 
Andriy	Klyuyev	was	born	in	1964	in	Donetsk.	He	graduated	from	the	Donetsk	
Polytechnic	Institute	in	1986,	with	a	Master’s	degree	in	Engineering	in	Mining.	
He	was	awarded	a	PhD	in	1989.	He	was	working	at	a	mine	between	1983	and	
1986.	Then,	between	1986	and	1991,	he	was	an	academic	worker	at	the	Donetsk	
Polytechnic	Institute.	Between	1991	and	1994,	he	was	director	general	of	Ukr-
podshipnik,	a	company	in	Donetsk.	
In	1994,	he	began	to	work	for	the	local	administration,	first	as	deputy	head	of	the	
Donetsk	Oblast	council,	and	then	as	deputy	mayor	of	Donetsk	and	deputy	gov-
ernor	of	Donetsk	Oblast,	when	Viktor	Yanukovych	was	the	governor.	He	was	
elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	2002	as	a	representative	of	the	Party	of	Re-
gions.	Between	2003	and	2004,	he	was	a	deputy	prime	minister	in	Yanukovy-
ch’s	cabinet.	He	won	a	seat	in	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	the	parliamentary	elec-
tions	in	2002,	2006	and	2007	as	a	representative	of	the	Party	of	Regions.	He	held	
the	function	of	deputy	prime	minister	for	energy	between	2006	and	2007,	when	
Yanukovych	was	prime	minister	for	the	second	time.	He	was	appointed	deputy	
prime	minister	and	minister	for	the	economy	in	Azarov’s	cabinet.	Following	his	
dismissal	 from	 this	 function	 in	February	2012,	 the	president	nominated	him	
secretary	of	the	National	Security	and	Defence	Council.	Klyuyev	is	among	the	
most	influential	politicians	in	the	Party	of	Regions	and	a	trusted	man	of	Presi-
dent	 Yanukovych.	 In	 2011,	 the	 media	 published	 materials	 suggesting	 that	
Klyuyev	had	been	helping	the	president	to	hide	his	assets	abroad181.
Serhiy	Klyuyev	was	born	in	1969	in	Donetsk.	He	was	educated	as	mining	en-
gineer.	In	1992,	he	graduated	from	the	Donetsk	National	Technical	University.	
Between	1992	and	2002,	he	was	working	at	different	positions	for	Ukrpodship-
nik,	including	as	deputy	president	and	the	chairman	of	the	board	of	directors.	
Between	2002	and	2005,	he	was	deputy	head	of	 the	Donetsk	Oblast	 council.	
180	 Променял “Евраз” на политику,	Ведомости,	12.12.2006,	http://www.vedomosti.ru/news-
paper/article/2006/12/12/117490
181	 Сергій Лещенко, ‘Офшорний дах для Януковича та Клюєва’,	Украинскaя Правда,	21	Octo-
ber	2011,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/10/21/6693989/
101
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
12
He	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	2006	and	2007	as	a	representative	of	
the	Party	of	Regions.	At	present,	he	is	the	deputy	head	of	the	party’s	parliamen-
tary	faction.	
Assets
The	two	brothers	jointly	control	Ukrpodshipnik	Group,	which	consists	of	tens	
of	companies	and	firms,	the	most	important	of	which	operate	in	the	machine-
building	 industry	 and	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sector.	Ukrpodshipnik	has	 the	
reputation	of	being	one	of	the	most	powerful	financial	and	industrial	groups	
in	Ukraine.	The	structure	of	this	group	is	not	transparent.	The	estimated	value	
of	its	assets	ranges	from	US$140	million182	to	US$1.21	billion183.
•	 Holding	Activ	Solar	builds	solar	power	plants	and	is	the	leading	solar	en-
ergy	producer	in	Ukraine.	Although	the	Ukrainian	media	regularly	claim	
that	Activ	Solar	is	owned	by	Klyuyev,	the	director	of	this	holding	has	de-
nied	 that	 its	 shareholders	 include	 investors	 from	 Ukraine184.	 Formally,	
Activ	Solar	belongs	to	a	company	registered	in	Liechtenstein.	The	power	
sector	based	on	renewable	energy	is	profitable	because	of	the	‘green	tariff’	
setting	special	rates	(five	times	higher	than	market	prices)	at	which	elec-
tricity	produced	by	such	power	plants	is	bought.	
•	 The	Semiconductor	Plant	in	Zaporizhia	manufactures	components	for	so-
lar	power	plants.	It	is	75%	controlled	by	Activ	Solar.
•	 Ukrpodshipnik	 also	 has	 assets	 in	 the	machine-building	 and	metallurgi-
cal	 industries,	which	include:	the	Artyomovsk	machine	Building	Factory	
‘VISTEC’	 (non-ferrous	metallurgy),	 the	Artyomovsk	Non-Ferrous	Metals	
Processing	Works	and	the	Konstantinovka	Metallurgical	Works.
•	 The	Klyuyev	brothers	also	probably	hold	a	minority	stake	in	Prominvest-
bank	 (the	 6th	 largest	 in	Ukraine),	which	 is	 93.84%	 controlled	 by	 Russia’s	
Vnesheconombank.
182	 ‘Сергей Клюев, Андрей Клюев’,	Корреспондент,	 http://files.korrespondent.net/projects/
top50/2011/1229140
183	 ‘Андрей и Сергей Клюевы’,	Комментарии,	17	February	2011,	http://gazeta.comments.ua/?s
pec=1297976487&sart=1297977858
184	 Игорь Гошовский, Йоган Хартер: ‘Солнце - тоже бизнес’,	Инвестгазета,	 18	 April	 2011,	
http://www.investgazeta.net/kompanii-i-rynki/jogan-harter-solnce---tozhe-161133	
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4.2. serhiy Tihipko
He	was	 born	 in	 1960	 in	 Draganesti	 (Moldova).	 He	 graduated	 from	 the	Met-
allurgical	 Institute	 in	Dnipropetrovsk	in	1982.	 In	the	1980s,	he	was	the	head	
of	the	Komsomol’s	agitation	and	propaganda	department	in	Dnipropetrovsk.	
Between	1989	and	1991,	he	was	the	first	secretary	of	the	Komsomol	oblast	com-
mittee.	He	became	engaged	in	business	in	1991.	He	was	appointed	CEO	of	Pri-
vatbank	in	1992,	but	he	left	Privat	Group	a	few	years	later	to	focus	on	his	own	
business,	predominantly	in	the	financial	sector.	
Between	1994	and	1997,	he	was	a	monetary	policy	advisor	to	President	Kuchma.	
In	1997,	Tihipko	was	nominated	deputy	prime	minister	in	the	cabinet	led	by	
Pavlo	Lazarenko	 and	 then	by	Valeriy	Pustovoitenko	 (until	 1999).	 Some	 time	
later,	he	was	 the	minister	 for	 the	economy	 in	 the	government	 led	by	Viktor	
Yushchenko.	He	was	the	head	of	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	between	2002	
and	2004.	Tihipko	won	a	seat	in	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	2000	as	a	consequence	
of	a	supplementary	election.	He	was	elected	again	in	2002	and	joined	the	pro-
presidential	faction	For	United	Ukraine.	Between	2000	and	2005,	he	was	the	
president	of	the	Labour	Party,	whose	main	sponsor	was	Viktor	Pinchuk.	Tihip-
ko	was	the	head	of	the	Viktor	Yanukovych	campaign	team	in	the	presidential	
election	of	2004,	but	he	resigned	when	the	Orange	Revolution	broke	out	and	
withdrew	from	politics	until	2009.	Tihipko	ran	for	president	in	the	2010	elec-
tion.	He	came	third	and	established	the	Strong	Ukraine	party.	In	March	2010,	
he	became	 the	deputy	prime	minister	 in	 charge	of	 the	economy	 in	Azarov’s	
cabinet,	and	later	in	2010,	as	a	consequence	of	the	administrative	reform,	he	
was	nominated	deputy	prime	minister	and	minister	for	social	policy.	He	dis-
solved	his	party	in	March	2012	to	join	the	Party	of	Regions,	where	he	holds	the	
post	of	deputy	president.
Assets
Tihipko	is	the	founder	and	the	predominant	shareholder	of	the	financial	and	
industrial	group	TAS,	whose	main	areas	of	operation	are	the	financial	sector	
(banking	and	insurance)	and	the	machine-building	industry.	
•	 TAS	Insurance	Group	and	the	Insurance	Company	TAS	(life	insurance)	op-
erate	in	the	insurance	sector	and	are	leaders	on	Ukrainian	market	(5th	and	
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2nd	position	in	terms	of	assets,	respectively)185.	Tihipko	has	been	making	ef-
forts	to	find	a	buyer	for	these	two	companies	for	several	years	now186.
•	 Currently,	TAS	Group	controls	only	a	small	bank,	TASKombank	(67th	posi-
tion	in	Ukraine),	while	in	the	past	Tihipko’s	assets	had	a	much	stronger	po-
sition	in	the	banking	sector.	However,	in	2007,	he	sold	his	TAS-Investbank	
and	 TAS-Commerzbank	 to	 the	 Swedish	 group	 Swedbank	 for	more	 than	
US$700	million.	
•	 In	 the	 machine-building	 sector,	 TAS	 jointly	 with	 Privat	 Group	 controls	
Dniprovagonmash	 and	 Kryukiv	 Rail	 Car,	 which	manufacture	 passenger	
and	freight	rail	cars,	and	the	steel	casting	works	in	Kremenchuk.	
•	 TAS	is	also	involved	in	property	development	projects	–	the	construction	of	
residential	and	office	buildings.	Furthermore,	this	group	controls	a	chain	
of	chemist’s	 shops	and	 the	 ‘Stolichny’	 reinforced	concrete	 factory.	 It	also	
manages	 an	 agricultural	 company,	which	 leases	 30,000	hectares	 of	 land	
with	the	Swedish	investment	company	Kinnevik.	
4.3. Oleksandr yaroslavsky
He	 was	 born	 in	 1959	 in	Mariupol	 (Donetsk	 Oblast).	 He	 graduated	 from	 the	
Kharkiv	police	academy	and	 from	the	Kharkiv	 Institute	of	Food	Science.	He	
was	working	for	Kharkiv’s	police	 in	 1986–1987.	Yaroslavsky	started	his	busi-
ness	activity	in	the	early	1990s.	His	career	gained	momentum	after	he	married	
a	daughter	of	Oleksandr	Maselsky,	a	former	governor	of	Kharkiv	and	deputy	
prime	minister	of	Ukraine	in	1992.	In	2002,	he	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	
Rada	as	a	representative	of	the	Green	Party.	Although	he	is	not	currently	active	
in	politics,	he	has	close	contacts	with	President	Yanukovych,	although	his	rela-
tions	with	local	representatives	of	the	Party	of	Regions	are	strained187.	At	pre-
sent,	he	is	the	most	influential	businessman	in	Kharkiv,	Ukraine’s	second	larg-
est	city.	He	is	the	president	and	the	owner	of	Metalist	Kharkiv	Football	Club.	
185	 ‘Рейтинг страховых компаний Украины за 3 месяца 2012 г.’,	ForInsurer,	http://forinsurer.
com/ratings/nonlife/12/3/3/
186	 Николай Максимчук, ‘Павел Царук рискнул по-крупному’,	 Коммерсант,	 22	 February	
2012,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1878478
187	 ‘Кернес vs Ярославский: кто же действительно „Король Харькова”?’,	ATH,	24	Februrary	
2012,	http://atn.ua/newsread.php?id=74379
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The assets
Although	Yaroslavsky	is	still	mentioned	in	each	ranking	of	Ukraine’s	top	ten	
or	twenty	richest	people,	where	his	fortune	is	usually	assessed	as	being	worth	
over	one	billion	dollars,	he	sold	his	key	assets	a	few	years	ago.	Yaroslavsky’s	
stake	in	UkrSibBank	(17.6%)	was	sold	in	2006	to	the	French	group	BNP	Pari-
bas.	In	2011,	he	sold	the	nitrogen	fertiliser	factory	in	Cherkasy	to	Firtash,	re-
portedly	for	US$800	million188.	His	present	business	activity	is	focused	on	the	
property	development	 sector,	 in	which	he	has	 two	companies:	Development	
Construction	Holding	and	XXI	Vek.	He	also	owns	the	Ukrainian	Mining	Com-
pany,	which	produces	gravel.	Yaroslavsky’s	firms	were	entrusted	with	the	im-
plementation	of	projects	as	part	of	preparations	for	Euro	2012	(including	the	
construction	of	the	airport	terminal	in	Kharkiv)	and	also	the	construction	of	
other	properties	in	Kharkiv,	Kyiv,	Odessa	and	other	cities.	
5. Privat Group – Ihor Kolomoyskyi and henadiy Boholyubov
Privat	is	Ukraine’s	second	largest	financial	and	industrial	group,	after	Akhme-
tov’s	 SCM.	This	 group	 is	 controlled	 by	Kolomoyskyi	 and	Boholyubov.	 In	 ad-
dition	to	these	two	oligarchs,	who	play	the	key	role	in	this	group,	Privat	also	
has	a	few	minority	shareholders,	such	as	Aleksei	Martynov.	According	to	data	
published	by	the	State	Tax	Service,	Privat	Group	controls	over	one	thousand	
firms189,	but	its	structure	is	highly	non-transparent.	It	is	impossible	to	prove	
in	many	cases	 that	 the	plants	 specified	below	are	actually	owned	by	Privat.	
The	group’s	key	assets	are	concentrated	in	the	financial,	fuel	and	metallurgical	
sectors,	and	also	in	the	media	and	in	air	transport.	The	areas	of	responsibility	
are	divided	within	the	group	in	an	informal	manner.	Kolomoyskyi	is	in	charge	
of	the	energy	sector,	and	Boholyubov	is	in	charge	of	banking	and	metallurgy.	
Given	the	lack	of	transparency	in	the	ownership	structure	inside	the	group,	
the	assets	have	been	described	as	assets	of	Privat	Group.	
Ihor Kolomoyskyi	was	born	in	1963	in	Dnipropetrovsk.	He	started	his	busi-
ness	activity	in	1990,	trading	in	computer	software	(although	according	to	some	
188	 Андрей Самофалов, ‘Дмитрий Фирташ высаживается в Черкассах’,	Укррудпром,	4	March	
2011,	http://www.ukrrudprom.ua/digest/Dmitriy_Firtash_visagivaetsya_v_Cherkassah.html
189	 Андрій Вишинський, ‘Податкова офіційно визначила ФПГ’,	Украинскaя Правда,	30	March	
2012,	http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2012/03/30/320310/
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data,	he	was	engaged	 in	business	activity	already	 in	 1985)190.	 In	 1992,	he	and	
Henadiy	Boholyubov	established	Privat	Bank,	which	 soon	became	Ukraine’s	
largest	bank.	Kolomoyskyi	has	not	participated	in	current	politics,	but	–	de-
pending	on	his	own	needs	–	he	has	backed	various	political	forces,	mainly	those	
from	the	‘Orange’	camp.	The	oligarch	has	been	accused	on	many	occasions	of	
aggressive	behaviour	in	business	and	of	using	raider	practices191.	Criminal	pro-
ceedings	on	charges	of	ordering	contract	killings	have	been	launched	against	
him	twice.	Kolomoyskyi	has	been	the	president	of	the	United	Jewish	Commu-
nity	of	Ukraine	since	2008	and	the	president	of	the	European	Council	of	Jewish	
Communities	since	2010.	
henadiy Boholyubov	was	born	in	1962	in	Dniprodzerzhynsk.	He	graduated	
from	 the	Dnipropetrovsk	 Institute	 of	 Civil	 Engineering.	 In	 1990,	 he	 became	
engaged	in	business	activity	with	Kolomoyskyi.	Unlike	his	business	partner,	
Boholyubov	shuns	publicity	and	has	consistently	avoided	any	involvement	in	
politics.	Boholyubov,	like	Kolomoyskyi,	is	of	Jewish	background.	He	has	been	
the	 leader	of	 the	 Jewish	community	 in	Dnipropetrovsk	since	 1998.	Owing	 to	
support	from	these	two	businessmen,	Dnipropetrovsk	will	be	home	to	Menora,	
the	largest	Jewish	centre	in	Eastern	Europe192.	
Assets 
•	 Privatbank	is	the	largest	financial	institution	in	Ukraine.	Unlike	many	oth-
er	banks,	it	survived	the	economic	crisis	of	2009	without	problems	and	has	
generated	profits	every	year	since.	In	2011,	its	profit	exceeded	UAH1.4	billion,	
while	the	entire	Ukrainian	banking	sector	generated	a	total	loss	of	UAH7.7	
billion193.	This	group	also	controls	banks	operating	outside	Ukraine:	TaoPri-
vatBank	(Georgia),	Moscomprivatbank	(Russia)	and	PrivatBank	in	Latvia.
•	 As	 regards	 the	 oil	 production	 sector,	 Privat	 holds	 42%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	
Ukrnafta,	Ukraine’s	 largest	producer	of	 oil	 (2.5	million	 tonnes)	 and	gas	
190	 ‘Коломойский Игорь Валерьевич’,	Ліга.Досье,	20	April	2007,	http://file.liga.net/person/589-
igor-kolomoiskii.html
191	 ‘Коломойский пользовался услугами рейдеров’, Минпром,	27	February	2009,	http://min-
prom.ua/news/10541.html
192	 ‘Коломойский строит самый большой еврейский центр в СНГ’, Корреспондент,	5	August	
2008,	 http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/events/544658-kolomojskij-stroit-samyj-bolshoj-
evrejskij-centr-v-sng
193	 Доходи та витрати банків України за 2011 рік, Національний банк України, http://www.
bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=84911&cat_id=87530
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(2.5	billion	m3)194.	Although	 the	state-owned	company	Naftogaz	holds	 the	
majority	stake,	it	is	Kolomoyskyi	who	really	controls	Ukrnafta.	Privat	also	
has	25%	of	the	shares	in	the	British	company	JKX	Oil	and	Gas,	which	has	
fields	in	the	Poltava	Oblast.	Privat	also	controls	Ukrtransnafta,	the	formal-
ly	state-owned	Ukrainian	oil	pipeline	operator.	
•	 Privat	controls	Ukraine’s	largest	refinery	in	Kremenchuk	and	two	smaller	
and	 outdated	 refineries	 in	 western	 Ukraine:	 Naftokhimik	 Prykarpattia	
and	the	Halychyna	refinery.	Privat	owns	1,500	filling	stations	in	Ukraine,	
whose	market	share	is	approximately	25%195.	
•	 Metallurgy	is	among	the	key	areas	of	Privat’s	business	activity.	In	contrast	
to	the	other	Ukrainian	oligarchs,	the	key	assets	of	this	group	are	located	
abroad.	Boholyubov’s	Palmary	Enterprise	controls	Consolidated	Minerals	
(Australia),	which	accounts	 for	 10%	of	global	manganese	ore	production,	
and	also	Ghana	Manganese	and	Nsuta	Gold	Mining	 (Ghana)	and	Felman	
Production	ferroalloy	works	(USA).	It	also	controls	the	Nikopol,	Zaporizhia	
and	Stakhanov	Ferroalloy	Plants.	Furthermore,	Privat	holds	stakes	in	the	
following	 ferroalloy	 plants:	 Feral	 (Romania),	 Stalmag	 (Poland),	 Zestafon	
(Georgia)	and	Alapayevsk	Metallurgy	Plant	(Russia)196.
•	 Privat	owns	the	airlines:	Aerosvit,	Dnieproavia,	Donbassaero	and	probably	
Windrose,	which	handle	around	60%	of	the	passenger	flights	in	Ukraine.
•	 Privat	 has	 stakes	 in	 local	 electricity	 production	 and	 distribution	 plants	
(oblenergo)	in	Poltava,	Sumy,	Chernihiv	and	Ternopil,	and	also	16%	of	the	
shares	in	Akhmetov’s	Dniproblenergo.
•	 Privat	has	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	media	empires,	which	includes	the	TV	
channels	1+1,	2+2	and	TET	and	a	number	of	press	titles	and	Internet	portals,	
such	as	Glavred,	UNIAN	news	agency,	Izvestia in Ukraine,	Telekritika,	Profil	
and	Gazeta po-kievski.
194	 Виробництво, Укрнафта, http://www.ukrnafta.com/ua/business/production
195	 Сергей Куюн, ‘Кого накормит «Нафтогаз»?’,	 Зеркало недели,	 22	 July	 2011,	 http://zn.ua/
ECONOMICS/kogo_nakormit_naftogaz-84943.html
196	 ‘Геннадий Боголюбов’,	Комментарии,	17	February	2011,	http://gazeta.comments.ua/?spec
=1297976487&sart=1297978459
107
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
12
•	 As	regards	the	chemical	industry,	the	group	owns	the	DniproAZOT	chemi-
cal	 works.	 In	 2009,	 Kolomoyskyi	 won	 the	 tender	 for	 the	 privatisation	
of	Odessa	Port	Plant,	one	of	Ukraine’s	 largest	chemical	plants,	which	has	
an	ammonia	transhipment	terminal.	However,	this	transaction	was	not	fi-
nalised	because	Tymoshenko	invalidated	the	sale.
•	 Privat-AgroHolding,	 established	 in	 2005,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 companies	
operating	 on	 the	 Ukrainian	 agricultural	 market.	 The	 holding	 includes	
24	firms	which	lease	in	total	150,000	hectares	of	land.	
6. Other oligarchs
6.1. Viktor Pinchuk
He	was	born	in	1960	in	Kyiv.	In	1983,	he	graduated	from	the	Dnipropetrovsk	In-
stitute	of	Metallurgy,	where	he	was	employed	as	a	lab	assistant.	Later,	he	also	
worked	as	an	engineer	and	academic	worker	for	the	State	Research	and	Develop-
ment	Institute	of	the	Pipe	Industry	in	Dnipropetrovsk.	He	became	engaged	in	
business	 in	1990,	when	he	established	Interpipe	Group.	In	the	early	1990s,	 In-
terpipe	participated	in	imports	of	natural	gas	from	Russia	and	Turkmenistan,	
which	were	conducted	by	Itera.	Pinchuk	owed	the	rapid	development	of	his	busi-
ness	to	a	great	extent	to	his	relationship	(which	became	a	marriage	in	2002)	with	
Olena	Franchuk,	the	daughter	of	the	former	president,	Leonid	Kuchma.	
He	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	1998	and	2002,	and	was	a	member	and	
the	key	sponsor	of	the	Labour	Party.	Since	he	had	actively	supported	Kuchma’s	
rule,	he	had	some	transitional	problems	after	the	Orange	Revolution	(for	ex-
ample,	the	invalidation	of	the	privatisation	of	Kryvorizhstal).	He	was	not	elect-
ed	MP	in	2007,	and	has	been	absent	from	politics	since	then.	Pinchuk	is	 the	
greatest	patron	of	modern	art	in	Ukraine.	He	actively	supports	Ukraine’s	Eu-
ropean	integration	by	holding	the	annual	summit	in	Yalta	and	the	‘Ukrainian	
lunch’	during	the	Davos	forum.	His	wife	manages	the	ANITAIDS	Foundation.	
Pinchuk	is	of	Jewish	background.	He	is	an	honourable	member	of	the	Jewish	
community	in	Dnipropetrovsk.	
Assets
Pinchuk’s	 business	 extends	 primarily	 to	 two	 areas:	 metallurgy	 (mainly	
pipe	production)	 and	 the	media,	 both	 electronic	 and	printed.	His	 assets	 are	
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concentrated	in	EastOne	Group.	Along	with	Akhmetov’s	SCM,	this	is	one	of	the	
most	transparent	groups	in	Ukraine.	
•	 Interpipe	Group	is	the	world’s	fourth	largest	pipe	manufacturer	for	pipes	
which	are	used	mainly	for	oil	and	gas	pipelines,	the	world’s	third	largest	
manufacturer	of	railway	wheels	and	a	major	manufacturer	of	ferroalloys197.	
It	also	owns	the	Nizhnedneprovsky	Tube	Rolling	Plant,	the	Novomoskovs-
ky	Pipe	Plant	(Russian	Federation)	and	the	Nico	Tube	factory.	Furthermore,	
the	Dniprostal	works	are	now	under	construction.	It	controls	the	Nikipol	
Ferroalloy	Plant	–	the	 largest	plant	of	this	kind	in	Ukraine	–	 jointly	with	
Privat	Group.	
•	 Starlight	Media	Groups	owns	TV	channels	with	national	coverage,	such	as	
Novyi,	ISTV,	STB	and	QTV,	and	the	music	channels	M1	and	M2.	Pinchuk	
also	owns	the	newspaper	Fakty i Kommentarii,	the	business	weeklies	Delo	
and	Invest Gazeta	and	the	quarterly	TOP 100.	
•	 In	the	financial	sector,	Pinchuk	owns	Credit-Dnepr	Bank	(26th	position	in	
Ukraine),	Rossia	insurance	company,	and	has	shares	in	Oranta,	one	of	the	
largest	insurance	companies	on	the	Ukrainian	market.	In	2007,	his	shares	
in	Ukrsocbank	were	bought	for	US$2	billion	by	Italy’s	UniCredit	Group.
•	 Furthermore,	Pinchuk	owns	Geo	Alliance,	one	of	the	largest	private	pro-
ducers	of	oil	and	gas	in	Ukraine.	
6.2. Petro Poroshenko
He	was	born	in	1965	in	Bolhrad	(Odessa	Oblast).	In	1989,	he	graduated	from	the	
law	and	international	relations	departments	of	the	Taras	Shevchenko	Univer-
sity	of	Kyiv.	He	received	a	PhD	in	management	in	2002.	
He	embarked	on	his	political	career	in	1998,	when	he	was	elected	to	the	Verk-
hovna	 Rada.	 Although	 he	 sought	 election	 as	 an	 independent	 candidate,	 he	
joined	the	Social	Democratic	Party	of	Ukraine	(united),	which	represented	the	
interests	of	the	Kyiv	clan.	He	became	the	 leader	of	Solidarity	party	in	2000,	
and	he	joined	Our	Ukraine	in	2002.	After	the	Orange	Revolution,	he	held	the	
197	 ‘Пинчук сокращает своих сотрудников из-за НЗФ?’,	 Украинскaя Правда,	 6	 September	
2005,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/09/6/4391607/
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function	of	secretary	of	the	National	Security	and	Defence	Council,	but	he	was	
dismissed	as	early	as	September	2005	on	charges	of	corruption.	
Between	2007	and	2012,	he	has	been	the	president	of	the	board	of	the	Nation-
al	Bank	of	Ukraine.	He	served	as	the	minister	of	foreign	affairs	from	October	
2009	to	March	2010.	He	was	minister	for	the	economy	in	the	government	led	by	
Mykola	Azarov	until	March	2012.	
Poroshenko	was	among	the	closest	aides	of	Viktor	Yushchenko,	with	whom	he	
also	has	private	bonds;	Yushchenko	is	godfather	to	Poroshenko’s	two	daugh-
ters.	 Nevertheless,	 Poroshenko	 is	 able	 to	 find	 common	 ground	with	 all	 the	
major	players	on	the	Ukrainian	political	scene.	Although	he	found	himself	in	
a	bitter	conflict	with	Yulia	Tymoshenko	in	2005,	he	managed	to	gain	her	sup-
port	in	2009,	which	was	necessary	for	his	nomination	as	minister	of	foreign	af-
fairs.	Poroshenko’s	relations	with	the	Party	of	Regions	have	also	been	amicable	
since	2010.	Although	Poroshenko	was	dismissed	as	minister	of	foreign	affairs,	
Yanukovych	offered	him	the	position	of	minister	 for	 the	economy	 in	March	
2012.	Poroshenko	accepted	this	proposal,	without	however	stating	his	 inten-
tion	to	join	the	Party	of	Regions.	
Assets
Poroshenko	owns	Ukrprominvest,	which	controls	a	number	of	firms	predomi-
nantly	in	the	automobile	and	food	industries.	
•	 Bohdan	Corporation	 is	among	 the	key	manufacturers	of	 cars	and	 trucks	
and	 the	 largest	manufacturer	 of	 buses	 in	Ukraine.	 It	 includes	 Cherkasy	
Autobus,	assembly	plant	no.	1	(buses	and	trolleybuses),	no.	2	(motor	cars),	
no.	3	(trucks)	and	Bohdan	Motors198.	Furthermore,	the	corporation	controls	
dealer	networks,	 repair	works	and	Bohdan	 transport	 company,	which	 is	
engaged	in	forwarding.	
•	 Ukravtozapchastina	includes	a	plant	for	the	production	of	tractors	and	oth-
er	agricultural	vehicles	and	also	other	car	parts.	The	company	also	controls	
a	chain	of	forty	wholesale	and	retail	sales	points199.	
198	 ‘Богдан Корпорация’,	 Ліга.Досье,	 4	 August	 2010	 http://file.liga.net/company/2060-bog-
dan_korporaciya.html
199	 Про компанію, Укравтозапчастина, http://uaz-upi.com/company
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•	 ISTA	 is	 the	 largest	battery	manufacturer	 in	 the	Commonwealth	of	 Inde-
pendent	States200.	The	company	has	four	factories	in	Dnipropetrovsk.
•	 Roshen	 Corporation	 is	 Ukraine’s	 number	 one	 confectionery	 producer.	
The	corporation	has	plants	in	Kyiv,	Vinnytsia,	Mariupol	and	Kremenchuk,	
and	sweets	factories	in	the	Lipetsk	Oblast	(Russia)	and	Klaipeda	(Lithuania).	
•	 Leninska	Kuznya	builds	 ships	of	various	kinds,	with	displacement	of	up	
to	 5,000	 tonnes,	 and	manufactures	metal	 and	machine	goods201.	 In	 2010,	
Poroshenko	 bought	 the	 Sevastopol	 shipyard,	 one	 of	 Ukraine’s	 largest.	
One	of	this	shipyard’s	customers	is	the	Russian	Black	Sea	Fleet.	
•	 The	food	company	Ridna	Marka,	whose	assets	include	the	Radomyshl	Beer	
and	Beverage	Plant,	and	the	fruit	and	vegetable	processing	plant	Kherson.	
•	 Poroshenko	also	has	assets	in	the	media:	5	Kanal,	which	is	the	largest	tel-
evision	news	channel,	and	Korrespondent	weekly.	
6.3. Kostyantin Zhevago
He	was	 born	 in	 1974	 in	w	 Iultin,	Magadan	 Oblast	 (Russian	 Federation)	 and	
moved	to	Ukraine	as	a	child.	In	1996,	he	graduated	from	the	Kyiv	National	Eco-
nomic	University.	The	same	year	he	became	the	CEO	of	the	company,	‘Finance	
and	Credit’,	which	within	a	few	years	developed	into	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	
financial	and	industrial	groups.	He	was	elected	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	1998	
as	a	candidate	 from	a	single-member	constituency.	Zhevago	has	belonged	to	
various	political	groupings,	including	the	Regions	of	Ukraine,	the	predecessor	
of	the	Party	of	Regions.	He	won	the	parliamentary	seat	in	the	elections	of	2006	
and	2007	as	a	candidate	of	the	Yulia	Tymoshenko	Bloc.	Zhevago	is	currently	
the	only	representative	of	big	business	to	have	remained	in	opposition	to	the	
government.	Although	part	of	his	business	has	encountered	problems	due	to	
this	(for	example,	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	has	audited	his	bank	several	
times)202,	his	position	is	strong,	because	his	main	asset,	the	Ferrexpo	corpora-
tion,	is	listed	on	the	London	Stock	Exchange.	
200	 ‘Петр Порошенко’,	Комментарии,	17	February	2011,	http://gazeta.comments.ua/?spec=1297
976487&sart=1297977646
201	 Ленинская Кузница, ПАО Завод,	http://1201.ua.all.biz/
202	 ‘СБУ «накрыла» еще и банк Жеваго’,	Зеркало недели,	11	July	2011,	http://news.zn.ua/ECO-
NOMICS/sbu_nakryla_esche_i_bank_zhevago-84220.html
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Assets
The	 Finance	 and	 Credit	 Group	 is	 formed	 by	 around	 sixty	 corporations	 and	
companies	operating	predominantly	in	metallurgy	and	the	machine-building	
industry,	and	also	in	the	financial	and	other	sectors.	
•	 Zhevago	controls	51%	of	Ferrexpo,	one	of	Ukraine’s	largest	iron	ore	and	steel	
manufacturers.	Ferrexpo	is	one	of	the	few	Ukrainian	companies	which	are	
traded	on	a	Western	stock	market.	In	2007,	this	company	made	its	debut	
on	the	London	Stock	Exchange,	where	 it	 is	 listed	on	the	FTSE	250	 index.	
Ferrexpo	has	the	plants	Vorskla	Steel	AG	(Switzerland),	Vorskla	Steel	(Den-
mark)	and	Skopski	Legury	(Macedonia),	the	Vorskla	Steel	factory,	and	the	
Poltava	and	Vostok-Ruda	ore	production	and	enrichment	plants.	Ferrexpo	
intends	to	continue	its	expansion	outside	Ukraine	in	the	coming	years203.
•	 The	Finance	and	Credit	Bank	is	one	of	the	largest	banks	in	Ukraine;	in	early	
2012	it	was	ranked	14th	in	terms	of	assets204.
•	 The	AvtoKrAZ	Holding	includes	firms	which	manufacture	means	of	trans-
port,	predominantly	heary	goods	vehicles	and	railway	cars,	and	also	sea	
and	 river	 ships.	 The	 Kremenchuk	 Automobile	 Plant	 and	 the	 Stakhanov	
Railway	 Car	 Building	Works,	which	manufactures	 railway	 cars,	 are	 the	
largest	plants	controlled	by	AvtoKrAZ.	
•	 Zhevago	also	has	some	assets	in	the	power	engineering	sector,	for	example,	
Luhanskoblenerho	and	a	combined	heat	and	power	plant	in	Bila	Tserkva.	
6.4. Oleh Bakhmatyuk
He	was	born	in	1974	in	Ivano-Frankivsk.	In	1996,	he	graduated	from	the	Insti-
tute	of	Economics	and	Law	in	Chernivtsi.	Little	is	known	about	the	early	days	
of	his	business	career.	After	the	Orange	Revolution,	he	was	among	the	spon-
sors	of	the	Yulia	Tymoshenko	Bloc,	but	he	did	not	take	an	active	part	in	politics.	
In	2005–2006,	he	was	deputy	head	of	Naftogaz.	He	bought	controlling	stakes	
203	 ‘Ferrexpo	considers	expanding	out	of	Ukraine’,	Financial Times,	4	August	2011.	http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4305e7a2-bde2-11e0-ab9f-00144feabdc0.html
204	 ‘Дані фінансової звітності банків України, Національний банк України’, http://www.
bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=102699
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in	several	oblhazes between	2006	and	2007,	but	later	resold	them	to	Firtash205.	
Bakhmatyuk	 is	one	of	 the	very	 few	Ukrainian	oligarchs	who	have	made	big	
fortunes	over	the	past	few	years.	
Assets
Bakhmatyuk’s	assets	are	mainly	concentrated	in	the	agricultural	and	food	and	
the	financial	sectors.	In	2011,	he	merged	his	two	companies,	Avangard	and	Ukr-
land	farming,	to	build	Ukraine’s	largest	corporation	operating	in	the	food	and	
agriculture	sector.	
•	 Avangard	Holding	specialises	in	eggs	and	egg	products.	Its	assets	include	
nineteen	hen	farms,	which	in	2011	produced	a	total	of	25	million	hens,	and	
six	hen	feed	production	plants.	Furthermore,	Avangard	controls	Ukraine’s	
largest	egg	processing	plant,	Imperovo	Foods	in	Ivano-Frankivsk.	
•	 Ukraland	farming	 leases	 the	 largest	area	of	arable	 land	 in	Ukraine	(over	
530,000	hectares).	It	breeds	pigs	and	cattle,	and	produces	sugar.	
•	 Bakhmatyuk	owns	two	banks:	Finansova	Initsiatyva	and	VAB	(23rd	and	24th	
positions	in	Ukraine).	VAB	was	taken	over	in	2011,	which	gave	rise	to	a	con-
flict	with	the	bank’s	previous	owner206.
SŁAWOMIR	MATUSZAK
205	 Игорь Маскалевич, ‘Газопеределки’,	Зеркало недели,	4	November	2011,	http://zn.ua/ECO-
NOMICS/gazoperedelki-90970.html
206	 Руслан Черный, ‘Конфликт вышел на свободу’,	Коммерсант,	 14	 June	2012,	http://www.
kommersant.ua/doc/1958043
